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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Banking and Finance Law
A Framework For A Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: The Kiss Principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) And Other Guiding Principles, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
A Framework For A Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: The Kiss Principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) And Other Guiding Principles, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
Given the ongoing work on a multilateral restructuring process for sovereign debt in the UN, consideration of the content and implementation of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is timely. The framework and content of the SDRM proposed here differs from earlier proposals in several important respects. For the classification and supermajority voting of claims in the approval a restructuring plan, it would mimic the structure and operation of the model collective action clauses (Model CACs) proposed by the International Capital Markets Association. Restructuring under a qualified sovereign debt restructuring law (QSDRL) would be guided by four principles: (i) observe …
The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr.
The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, U.S. bank regulation and bankruptcy have become far more closely intertwined. In this Article, I ask whether the new synthesis of bank regulation and bankruptcy is coherent, and whether it is likely to prove effective.
I begin by exploring some of the basic differences between bank resolution, which is a highly administrative process in the U.S., and bankruptcy, which relies more on courts and the parties themselves. I then focus on a series of remarkable new innovations designed to facilitate the rapid recapitalization of systemically important financial institutions: convertible contingent capital …
A Model-Law Approach To Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz
A Model-Law Approach To Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting debtor nations, their citizens and their creditors, and also can pose serious systemic threats to the international financial system. The existing contractual restructuring approach is insufficient to make sovereign debt sustainable. Although a more systematic legal resolution framework is needed, a formal multilateral approach, such as a treaty, is not currently politically viable. An informal model-law approach should be legally, politically and economically feasible. This informal approach would not require multilateral acceptance. Because most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either New York or English law, it would be sufficient if one or both …
Derivatives And Collateral: Balancing Remedies And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Derivatives And Collateral: Balancing Remedies And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
U.S. bankruptcy law grants special rights and immunities to creditors in derivatives transactions, including virtually unlimited enforcement rights. This Article examines whether exempting those transactions from bankruptcy’s automatic stay, including the stay of foreclosure actions against collateral, is necessary or appropriate in order to minimize systemic risk.
The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown On Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, Sara Sternberg Greene
The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown On Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, Sara Sternberg Greene
Faculty Scholarship
After decades of lobbying to “get tough” on bankruptcy repeat filers, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). The Bankruptcy Code now requires that the automatic stay, which prevents creditors from pursuing the property of bankruptcy debtors, expires after thirty days for petitioners who file for bankruptcy within one year of a previously failed petition. Debtors can file a motion to extend the stay, but there is a presumption of a bad faith filing, only overcome if a debtor can show there has been a “substantial change in his or her financial or personal …
The Logic And Limits Of Liens, Edward Janger
The Logic And Limits Of Liens, Edward Janger
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Implementing Symmetric Treatment Of Financial Contracts In Bankruptcy And Bank Resolution, E. J. Janger, John A.E. Pottow
Implementing Symmetric Treatment Of Financial Contracts In Bankruptcy And Bank Resolution, E. J. Janger, John A.E. Pottow
Articles
Financial contracts come in many forms and serve many functions in both the financial system and the broader economy. Repos secured by U.S. Treasury securities act as money substitutes and can play an important role as part of the money supply, while similarly structured repos, secured by more volatile collateral, may be used as speculative devices or hedges. Swaps can be used to insure against various types of market risk, from interest rates to oil prices, or they can operate as vehicles for highly leveraged investments. The parties to these instruments are sometimes major financial institutions and, other times, ordinary …
Rules Of Thumb For Intercreditor Agreements, Edward R. Morrison
Rules Of Thumb For Intercreditor Agreements, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
Intercreditor agreements frequently restrict the extent to which subordinated creditors can participate in the bankruptcy process by, for example, contesting liens of senior lenders, objecting to a cash collateral motion, or even exercising the right to vote on a plan of reorganization. Because intercreditor agreements can reorder the bargaining environment in bankruptcy, some judges have been unsure about their enforceability. Other judges have not hesitated to enforce the agreements, at least when they do not restrict the voting rights of subordinated creditors. This essay argues that intercreditor agreements are controversial because they pose a trade-off: they reduce bargaining costs (by …