Banking and Finance Law Commons^™

The Role Of Rival Litigation In Wilmarth's New Glass-Steagall, Heidi Mandanis Schooner

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.

Who's Looking Out For The Banks?, Jeremy C. Kress

University of Colorado Law Review

When the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act authorized financial conglomeration in 1999, Professor Arthur Wilmarth, Jr. presciently predicted that diversified financial holding companies would try to exploit their bank subsidiaries by transferring government subsidies to their nonbank affiliates. To prevent financial conglomerates from taking advantage of their insured depository subsidiaries in this way, policymakers instructed a bank's board of directors to act in the best interests of the bank, rather than the bank's holding company. This symposium Article, written in honor of Professor Wilmarth's retirement, contends that this legal safeguard ignores a critical conflict of interest: the vast majority of large-bank directors also …

The Tailors Of Wall Street, Graham S. Steele

University of Colorado Law Review

The narrative that emerged in the aftermath of the COVID-19 financial crisis has focused on nonbank financial intermediation as the primary vulnerability that plagued financial markets starting in March of 2020 and the exogenous nature of a public health crisis as a unique precipitating event. As a result, the crisis has largely been viewed as vindication for financial regulation as it applies to banks, with the Federal Reserve playing the role of heroic rescuer of the financial system.

This Article offers an alternative-and critical-analysis of the performance of banks during the COVID-19 financial crisis and the Fed's role as a …

Afterword: Why "Taming The Megabanks" Should Remain A Top Priority For Financial Regulators And Policymakers, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.

Remutualization, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

Policymakers need to rediscover the organizational form of business entity as a tool of financial regulation. Recent and classic scholarship has produced evidence that financial institutions organized as alternative entity forms – including investment bank partnerships and banks and insurance companies organized as mutual or cooperatives – tend to take less risk, exploit customers/consumer less, or commit less misconduct compared to counterparts organized as investor-owned corporations. This article builds off the work of Hill and Painter on investment banks organized as partnerships, Hansmann on the history and economics of banks and insurance companies organized as mutuals and cooperatives, and other …

Financial Institution Interlocks After The Bankamerica Case, Arthur H. Travers Jr.

Publications

No abstract provided.