Banking and Finance Law Commons^™

The Role Of U.S. Government Regulatioms, Bert Chapman

Libraries Faculty and Staff Presentations

Provides detailed coverage of information resources on U.S. Government information resources for federal regulations. Features historical background on these regulations, details on the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations, includes information on individuals can participate in the federal regulatory process by commenting on proposed agency regulations via https://regulations.gov/, describes the role of presidential executive orders, refers to recent and upcoming U.S. Supreme Court cases involving federal regulations, and describes current congressional legislation seeking to give Congress greater involvement in the federal regulatory process.

A Narrow View Of Transnational Fiduciary Law, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Fiduciaries frequently confront transnational situations. Yet, even as people, products, and capital have become more mobile, scholars have until recently given little attention to the transnational dimensions of fiduciary law.

This chapter conceptualizes transnational fiduciary law, a term that marries the fields of fiduciary and transnational law. It identifies two primary understandings of the concept and explores their scope and possible content.

Under the first interpretation of this composite concept, the term transnational qualifies what fiduciary scholars have conventionally understood as fiduciary law. Transnational fiduciary law, on this view, encompasses the application of fiduciary law to transnational problems and situations. …

Comments On Proposed Rules For Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, And Projections, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

In March 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission released proposed rules for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), shell companies, and projections. In this comment letter, filed with the SEC, I provide a critical assessment of this proposal.

The SEC proposed far-reaching changes intended to enhance investor protections and align disclosure and liability rules in de-SPACs more closely with those in traditional IPOs. An under-appreciated feature of the proposed reforms is that they would subject de-SPACs to provisions closely modeled on Rule 13e-3 of the Exchange Act, which applies to going-private transactions, including management buyouts. Intended to tackle potential conflicts of …

The Further Erosion Of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions, Spac Mergers, And Direct Listings, Andrew F. Tuch, Joel Seligman

Scholarship@WashULaw

This Article examines the decades-long decline of investor protections enshrined in the Securities Act of 1933, most notably Section 11, which imposes near strict liability on corporate insiders and certain secondary actors, primarily underwriters. The provision, the most potent in the federal securities regulatory arsenal, popularized the concept of outside gatekeepers and transformed practices in securities offerings, making due diligence a byword for careful investigation of facts whether required by legal process or otherwise. The measures required by Section 11 restored confidence in US capital markets in the wake of the Great Depression and have been instrumental in these markets’ …

Corporate Crime And Punishment: An Empirical Study, Dorothy S. Lund, Natasha Sarin

All Faculty Scholarship

For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whether corporate criminal enforcement overdeters beneficial corporate activity or in the alternative, lets corporate criminals off too easily. This debate has recently expanded in its polarization: On the one hand, academics, judges, and politicians have excoriated enforcement agencies for failing to send guilty bankers to jail in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis; on the other, the U.S. Department of Justice has since relaxed policies that encouraged individual prosecutions and reduced the size of fines and number of prosecutions. A crucial and yet understudied …

Fiduciary Principles In Banking Law, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

When are banks fiduciaries of their customers and clients? This question is of more than theoretical interest given the organizational structure of modern financial institutions and the broad-ranging functions they perform. In this chapter of the Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, I canvass fiduciary principles in banking law. I consider when fiduciary duties exist and what they require, the range of remedies available for breach, and the various techniques banks use to exclude or modify fiduciary duties. One puzzling feature of the legal landscape is that clients bring actions less often than banks’ size and conduct might suggest, which contributes …

The Weakening Of Fiduciary Law, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

In the 1970s and 80s, as major financial institutions grew and diversified their operations, courts and scholars recognized that fiduciary law posed profound challenges for the organizational practices of these firms. The challenges were considered existential by some: firms, ultimately, would need to slim down their operations, and perhaps even need to disaggregate some units, to avoid fiduciary liability. However, since these challenges were recognized, financial conglomerates have grown massively and focused more on taking direct stakes as principals, a practice that accentuates the risk of conflicts of interest.

How were financial conglomerates able to continue growing and diversifying despite …

The Remaking Of Wall Street, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This Article critically examines the transformation of the financial services industry during and since the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. This transformation has been marked by the demise of the major investment banks and the related rise of a set of powerful players known as private equity firms or alternative asset managers – pools of assets structured as private funds. First, this Article argues that private equity firms now mirror investment banks in their mix of activities; ethos of entrepreneurialism, innovation, and risk-taking; role as “shadow banks”; and overall power and influence.

These similarities might suggest that private equity firms pose …

The Limits Of Gatekeeper Liability, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Gatekeeper liability – the framework under which actors such as law firms, investment banks and accountants face liability for the wrongs committed by their corporate clients – is one of the most widely used strategies for controlling corporate wrongdoing. It nevertheless faces well-recognized flaws: gatekeepers often depend financially on the clients whose conduct they monitor; to carry out their gatekeeping function, gatekeepers rely on individuals – often their employees – whose interests diverge from their own; and major transactions typically involve multiple gatekeepers, each with specific areas of expertise and information, which produces both gaps and overlaps in the gatekeeping …

Banker Loyalty In Mergers And Acquisitions, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

When investment banks advise on merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, are they fiduciaries of their clients, gatekeepers for investors, or simply arm’s-length counterparties with no other-regarding duties? Scholars have generally treated M&A advisors as arm’s-length counterparties, putting faith in the power of contract law and market constraints to discipline errant bank behavior. This Article counters that view, arguing that investment banks are rightly characterized as fiduciaries of their M&A clients and thus required to loyally serve client interests.

This Article also develops an analytical framework for assessing the liability rules that will most effectively deter disloyalty on the part of …

Conduct Of Business Regulation, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This chapter provides a survey and comparative analysis of conduct of business (COB) regulation. COB regulation governs financial intermediaries’ conduct toward their clients, that is, toward the actors – whether individuals or institutions – with whom financial intermediaries transact in providing financial products and services. Modal regulatory strategies include anti-fraud rules, and duties of care, loyalty, fair-dealing and best-execution – and variants of these duties.

The chapter describes the justifications for COB regulation, the modal regulatory strategies used and the complex frameworks within which COB regulation operates. It then generally assesses US COB regulation, focusing on the regulation of broker-dealers …

Disclaiming Loyalty: M&A Advisors And Their Engagement Letters, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Are investment banks fiduciaries of their merger and acquisition clients? If not, what rules, if any, constrain the conflicts of interest M&A advisors may face when advising their clients? These questions are rarely asked but central to the regulation of investment banking activities. In their article Bankers and Chancellors, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2014), Professors William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter contend that M&A advisors effectively contract out of fiduciary duties in their client engagement letters, “emerging] in practice as arm’s-length counterparties constrained less by rules of law than by a market for reputation.” They also regard recent …

The Self-Regulation Of Investment Bankers, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

As broker-dealers, investment bankers must register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and comply with its rules, including the requirement to “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.” As the self-regulatory body for broker-dealers, FINRA functions as the equivalent of the self-regulatory bodies governing other professionals, such as lawyers and accountants. Unlike the self-regulation of these professionals, however, the self-regulation of investment bankers has thus far attracted scant scholarly attention.

This Article evaluates the effectiveness of this self-regulatory system in deterring investment bankers’ misconduct. Based on a hand-collected data set of every disciplinary …

Financial Conglomerates And Information Barriers, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

The organizational structure of financial conglomerates gives rise to fundamental regulatory challenges. Legally, the structure subjects firms to multiple, incompatible client duties. Practically, the structure provides firms with a huge reservoir of non-public information that they may use to further their self-interests, potentially harming clients and third parties. The primary regulatory response to these challenges and a core feature of the financial regulatory architecture is the information barrier or Chinese wall. Rather than examine measures to strengthen information barriers, to date legal scholars have focused on the circumstances in which to deny them legal effect, while economists have focused on …

Banks And Governments: An Arial View, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Financial systems and public treasuries are communicating vessels: strength or weakness in one flows to the other, and back. This chapter considers the implications of this insight using case studies from Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The connection is not unique to Europe, although it does not always result in feedback effects, or the ‘doom loop’ that has made headlines since 2010. Events now known as banking or government debt crises often have had elements of both, and could have gone either way. Policy and political choices determined their path. In all cases, governments were as indispensable for resolving banking …

The Wonder-Clause, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Greek debt crisis prompted EU officials to embark on a radical reconstruction of the European sovereign debt markets. Prominently featured in this reconstruction was a set of contract provisions called Collective Action Clauses, or CACs. CACs are supposed to help governments and private creditors to renegotiate unsustainable debt contracts, and obviate the need for EU bailouts. But European sovereign debt contacts were already amenable to restructuring; adding CACs could make it harder. Why, then, promote CACs at all, and cast them in such a central role in the market reform initiative? Using interviews with participants in the initiative and …

Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule And Goldman Sachs, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

In many areas of regulation, rules require one person to act with loyalty to another person, or at least constrain one person’s pursuit of self-interest by restricting the extent to which that person may act in conflict with the interests of another person. These rules are typically justified on the basis of reducing (economic) agency costs. However, recently-adopted provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which include the so-called Volcker Rule, impose such conflict of interest rules on underwriters selling securities to investors, including sophisticated investors - a context in which agency costs do not arise. …

Multiple Gatekeepers, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

In the context of business transactions, gatekeepers are lawyers, investment bankers, accountants and other actors with the capacity to monitor and control the disclosure decisions of their clients – and thereby to deter corporate securities fraud. After each wave of corporate upheaval, including the recent financial crisis, the spotlight of responsibility invariably falls on gatekeepers for failing to avert the wrongs of their clients. A rich vein of literature has considered what liability regime would lead gatekeepers to deter securities fraud optimally, but has overlooked the phenomenon that multiple interdependent gatekeepers act on business transactions and thus form an interlocking …

Evil Has A New Name (And A New Narrative): Bernard Madoff, A. Christine Hurt

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Paradox Of Financial Services Regulation: Preserving Client Expectations Of Loyalty In An Industry Rife With Conflicts Of Interest, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This paper considers the implications of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v. Citigroup [2007] FCA 963, a landmark decision of the Federal Court of Australia. The case highlights an apparent paradox in financial services regulation: at the same time as allowing, or even fostering, the development of financial services conglomerates, regulation in multiple jurisdictions preserves potentially incompatible general law obligations that arise from client expectations of loyalty. The paradox is most evident in the context of the modern investment bank.

The paper discusses the dynamic nature of investment banks, their organizational structure, the types of conflicts they typically face and …

Securities Underwriters In Public Capital Markets: The Existence, Parameters And Consequences Of The Fiduciary Obligation To Avoid Conflicts, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This article considers whether an investment bank, when acting as underwriter of a public securities offering, owes the issuing company the fiduciary obligation to avoid conflicts of interest. The question has not arisen for final judicial determination and has been overlooked by scholars and regulators. The highly lucrative and visible nature of underwriting work creates powerful incentives for investment banks to accept instructions in the face of this duty. At the same time, the web of loyalties that these institutions owe, by virtue of their broad and diverse range of products and services, creates intractable practical difficulties for compliance with …

Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

Regulators responded to the analyst scandals of the late 1990s by imposing extensive new rules on the research industry. These rules include a requirement forcing financial firms to separate investment banking operations from research. Regulators argued, with questionable empirical support, that the reforms were necessary to eliminate analyst conflicts of interest and ensure the integrity of sell-side research.

By eliminating investment banking revenues as a source for funding research, the reforms have had substantial effects. Research coverage of small issuers has been dramatically reduced—the vast majority of small capitalization firms now have no coverage at all. The market for research …

Obligations Of Financial Advisers In Change-Of-Control Transactions: Fiduciary And Other Questions, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Outside the United States, financial regulators have recently focused their attention on whether a financial adviser to a party in a change-of-control transaction (such as a takeover) is obliged to avoid being in positions of conflict with the interests of that party. Because financial advisers in these transactions are typically investment banks, the integrated structure of which may make conflicts of interest inevitable, such an obligation is likely to pose difficult challenges for the investment banking industry. The question is complicated by two apparently inconsistent standards being applied: the fiduciary obligation to avoid conflicts and the statutory obligation in many …

Contemporary Challenges In Takeovers: Avoiding Conflicts, Preserving Confidences And Taming The Commercial Imperative, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This article discusses contemporary legal, commercial, ethical and other issues that arise in the context of corporate takeover transactions. Due to their complexity and the numerous parties - including deal advisers - they involve, the loyalties of company directors and advisers are frequently tangled, creating legion opportunities for conflicted interests and breached confidences. At the same time, the high status of advising on takeovers and the financial lure they provide produce powerful incentives that inevitably inform the application of legal principles to these issues. The article adopts a hypothetical case study approach to focus on the challenges confronting these parties …

Investment Banking: Immediate Challenges And Future Directions, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This article discusses the organizational nature of the integrated (or full-service) investment bank, the incidence of conflicts of interest in the financial services industry and the role and effectiveness of information barriers such as Chinese walls as an arrangement for managing conflicts. The paper also describes the growing importance to investment banks of proprietary trading and principal investing, the conflicts of interest that they can produce, and the recent responses of financial regulators to these developments.

The paper was presented at a discussion forum involving senior investment bankers, lawyers and scholars in August 2006, organized against the backdrop of litigation …

Enforcing The Fair Housing Act: Can Agency Interpretations Override Congressional Intent In Anti-Discrimination Legislation?, Francesca Laguardia

Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works

On October 12, 2005, the Southern District of New York ruled that the New York State Attorney General was enjoined from enforcing state laws prohibiting discriminatory lending against national banks.1 The court found in favor of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal regulator of national banks. The OCC claimed that while state fair lending laws had not been preempted, the New York State Attorney General’s (OAG) authority to enforce those laws had been preempted by a series of federal statutes and OCC-written regulations that give the OCC exclusive authority to bring any enforcement action against …

Investment Banks As Fiduciaries: Implications For Conflicts Of Interest, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Investment banks play an intermediary role in the financial system that is integral to its efficient operation. A core, and highly visible, part of their work involves providing financial advisory services to institutional clients on transactions that have strategic importance, such as mergers and acquisitions. As these services are but one aspect of the broad and diverse range of financial services that investment banks typically provide, challenges such as conflicts of interest inevitably arise. Somewhat anomalously, the question of whether these firms owe fiduciary duties to their clients when providing financial advisory services has received little regulatory, judicial or scholarly …

Pari Passu And A Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Vultures Or Vanguards?: The Role Of Litigation In Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile

All Faculty Scholarship

The market for sovereign debt differs from the market for corporate debt in several important ways including the risk of opportunistic default by sovereign debtors, the importance of political pressures, and the presence of international development organizations. Moreover, countries are subject to neither liquidation nor standardized processes of debt reorganization. Instead, negotiations between a sovereign debtor and its creditors lead to a voluntary restructuring of the sovereign's debt. One of the greatest difficulties in restructuring claims against sovereign debtors is balancing the interests of the majority of the creditors with those of minority creditors. Holdout creditors serve as a check …

Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities Exchange Commission move too quickly ·when they prod the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the standard setter for US GAAP, to move immediately to a principles-based system. Priorities respecting reform of corporate reporting in the US need to be ordered more carefully. Incentive problems impairing audit performance should be solved first through institutional reform insulating the audit from the negative impact of rent-seeking and solving adverse selection problems otherwise affecting audit practice. So long as auditor independence and management incentives respecting accounting treatments remain suspect. the US reporting system holds out no actor plausibly positioned …