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Full-Text Articles in Banking and Finance Law
Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory And Evidence From Financial Market Regulation, Chenggang Xu, Katharina Pistor
Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory And Evidence From Financial Market Regulation, Chenggang Xu, Katharina Pistor
Faculty Scholarship
This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the social-welfare loss that results from the regime's inability to deter harmful actions. As a potential remedy a regulatory regime is introduced. The major functional difference between courts and regulators is that courts enforce law reactively, that is only once others have initiated law enforcement procedures, while regulators enforce law proactively, i.e. on their own initiative. Proactive law enforcement may be superior in preventing harm. However, …
Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid", John C. Coffee Jr.
Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid", John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
What do we know after Enron's implosion that we did not know before it? The conventional wisdom is that the Enron debacle reveals basic weaknesses in our contemporary system of corporate governance. Perhaps, this is so, but where is the weakness located? Under what circumstances will critical systems fail? Major debacles of historical dimensions – and Enron is surely that – tend to produce an excess of explanations. In Enron's case, the firm's strange failure is becoming a virtual Rorschach test in which each commentator can see evidence confirming what he or she already believed.