Banking and Finance Law Commons^™

Wanted: A Prudential Framework For Crypto Assets, Lee Reiners, Sangita Gazi

Arkansas Law Review

This Article summarizes the limited publicly available data on banks’ exposure to crypto assets and offers several specific examples of how U.S. banks engage in crypto-related businesses. It then examines past guidance issued by U.S. bank regulators and explains why this guidance lacks sufficient detail to clarify the prudential requirements associated with the various crypto-related activities in which banks are engaged. The Article then assesses the adequacy of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s final prudential standard for crypto-asset exposures, issued in December 2022, and finds that the measure fails to adequately address the unique risks various crypto-asset activities pose …

Why Do Banks Fail Together? Evidence From Executive Compensation, Deniz Anginer, Jinjing Liu, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Recent bank failures have elicited extensive interest about the causes, focusing on incompetence of bank executives, policymakers, bank regulators and supervisors and even uninsured depositors. Yet, before we can prescribe solutions to bank failures, we need to identify the correct causes of the underlying problems. We argue that the problem is not so much with incompetence of executives, depositors, or regulators per se, but rather with managerial incentives.

We provide both a conceptual basis as well as empirical evidence to show that bank executives have incentives to increase systemic risks in order to maximize the benefits of bank bailouts. Consequently, …

Predatory Fintech And The Politics Of Banking, Christopher K. Odinet

Faculty Scholarship

With American families living on the financial edge and seeking out high-cost loans even before COVID-19, the term financial technology or “fintech” has been used like an incantation aimed at remedying everything that’s wrong with America’s financial system. Scholars and supporters from both the public and private sector proclaim that innovations in financial technology will “bank the unbanked” and open new channels to affordable credit. This exuberance for all things tech in finance has led to a quiet yet aggressive deregulatory agenda, including, as of late, a federal assault via rulemaking on the ability of states to police the cost …

Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

During 2008-09, the federal government extended multiple guarantee programs in an effort to restore the financial market and contain the panic and crisis in the market. For example, the Treasury provided a temporary guarantee program for the money market funds, the FDIC decided to stand behind certain debts and non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, and the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve agreed to share losses in certain assets belonging to Citigroup. This case reviews these guarantee programs implemented during the global financial crisis by the government and explores the different rationale that shaped certain design features of each program.

Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises A: Haircuts And Resolutions, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

After the mortgage market meltdown in mid-2007 and during the financial crisis in 2008, major financial institutions around the world were on the verge of collapsing one after another. Faced with these troubles, the government had to respond quickly to contain the crisis as efficiently as possible. It was, however, limited in resources, time, and experience. To make matters worse, the complexity and opaqueness of the financial market and these institutions greatly affected the government’s ability to design an efficient and consistent method to contain the crisis. Shortly after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, American International …

The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk Exception, Lee Davison

Journal of Financial Crises

In the fall of 2008, short-term credit markets were all but frozen, creating liquidity issues for banks and bank holding companies that could not rollover their debt at reasonable rates. Fearing that the situation would worsen if something was not done, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board invoked, and the Secretary of the Treasury approved, the use of the “systemic risk exception” (SRE) under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, to provide unprecedented broad-based relief to struggling banks. The SRE permitted the FDIC to depart from its “least-cost” requirement when addressing failing …

When All Else Fails: The Evolution Of Customer Asset Protections After Brokerage Bankruptcy, Ronald H. Filler

Articles & Chapters

No abstract provided.

Summary Of Munoz V. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 23 (Apr. 30, 2015), Michael S. Valiente

Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

NRS 40.459(1)(c)’s limitation on the amount of deficiency judgment that a successor can recover conflicts with the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act’s (“FIRREA”) purpose of facilitating the transfer of assets of failed banks to other institutions. Because NRS 40.459(1)(c) limits the value a successor can recover on a deficiency judgment, its application to assets transferred by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) frustrates FIRREA’s purpose. Therefore, NRS 40.459(1)(c) is preempted by FIRREA to the extent that NRS 40.459(1)(c) limits deficiency judgment that may be obtained from loans transferred by the FDIC.

Dismantling Large Bank Holding Companies For Their Own Good And For The Good Of The Country, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

This paper suggests that bank holding companies are in fact “financial malls.” I demonstrates the problems that they pose for the financial system, not only by size but by inefficient and inappropriate concentration. The article suggests restructuring of bank holding companies by introducing more market discipline to the various “shops” in the mall as well as concentrating services for the purpose of efficiency. The Article concludes with suggestion that rather than imposing a restructure by law it may perhaps be possible to entice managements that look to the long-term future to follow a restructure voluntarily.

Shockwave: Lender Liability Under Cercla After United States V. Fleet Factors Corporation, Nicholas M. Kublicki

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Bridge Banks: Detox Tools For A Melted Economy, Gabriela Steier

Gabriela Steier

This paper compares the fragmented three-pillar banking system in Germany to the banking system in the U.S. and suggests an amendment to 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(n), the bridge bank statute, to make some fragmentation of the financial sector in the U.S. possible. This paper is the first of its kind and explains why the German bad bank prototype works within the fragmented three-pillars of banking. The three pillars of banking in Germany are (1) Savings Banks (Sparkassen), (2) Private Commercial Banks (Kreditbanken, Genossenschaftsbanken), and (3) Public and Cooperative Credit Institutions (Volks- and Raiffeisenbanken). The resulting fragmented banking system is more …

Recoupment Under Dodd-Frank: Punishing Financial Executives And Perpetuating "Too Big To Fail", Joshua Mitts

Faculty Scholarship

In July 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) promulgated new rules implementing Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. These rules define a cause of action to recoup compensation paid to senior executives and directors of failed nonbank financial institutions placed into the FDIC's "orderly liquidation authority" receivership. An action for recoupment is based on a negligence theory of liability, but it does not require establishing that an executive's conduct caused the financial institution any harm. The rules presume liability merely for having held executive responsibility prior to the firm entering receivership. The executive …

Panel 3: Bankruptcy & Restructuring Of Financial Institutions, Barry E. Adler, William A. Ackman, Marcia L. Goldstein, Arthur J. Gonzalez, Michael J. Krimminger, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

Barry Adler: Thank you all for being here. It is an honor for me to be on this panel and an honor to moderate it. Let me introduce our panel before we get started. William A. Ackman, the founder and CEO of Pershing Square Capital Management; Marsha Goldstein, a partner and chair of the business finance and restructuring department at Weil, Gotshal; the Honorable Arthur Gonzalez, a judge in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York; and Ed Morrison, the Harvey Miller Professor of Law and Economics at Columbia Law School. Also on this panel is …

Covered Bonds: Shelter From Financial Turmoil, Exposure To The 1940 Act, Steve Flantsbaum

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

An Analysis Of The Implementation And Impact Of The 2004–2005 Amendments To The Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: Th E Continuing Importance Of The Cra Examination Process, Josh Silver, Richard Marsico

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Federal Regulation And Legislation In The Wake Of The Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: A Legal Philosophical Analysis Of Federal Government Responses To Market Bubbles, Joshua Wirth

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Waging War With Wal-Mart: A Cry For Change Threatens The Future Of Industrial Loan Corporations, Zachariah J. Lloyd

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

25th Annual Conference On Legal Issues For Financial Institutions, Office Of Continuing Legal Education At The University Of Kentucky College Of Law

Continuing Legal Education Materials

Materials from the 25th Annual Conference on Legal Issues for Financial Institutions held by UK/CLE in April of 2005.

In Search Of A Higher Standard: Rethinking Fiduciary Duties Of Directors Of Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, Stefan J. Padfield

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

23rd Annual Conference On Legal Issues For Financial Institutions, Office Of Continuing Legal Education At The University Of Kentucky College Of Law

Continuing Legal Education Materials

Materials from the 23rd Annual Conference on Legal Issues for Financial Institutions held by UK/CLE in April of 2003.

Credit Derivatives: An Overview Of Regulatory Initiatives In The United States And Europe, Andre Scheerer

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article considers the federal banking regulation regime implemented in response to the widespread bank failures of the 1980s and early 1990s. The first section of the Article examines the moral hazard problem created by the presence of the deposit insurance scheme and the market discipline debate that has attempted to correct the moral hazard problem. The Author argues that the law has evolved to make bank holding companies the primary enforcers of market discipline. The Article’s second section examines the specific regulatory changes that have been designed to create an incentive for bank holding companies to impose discipline on …

Federal Reserve: History, Purposes And Functions - An Analysis, Mukunda Lakshamanarao

LLM Theses and Essays

On December 23, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson signed into law the Federal Reserve Act. With this law, Congress established a central banking system which would enable the world’s most powerful industrial nation to manage its money and credit more effectively than ever before. The political and legislative struggle to create the Federal Reserve System was long and often bitter, and this final product in 1913 was the result of a carefully crafted and somewhat tenuous political compromise between national and regional powers. Since its founding, the Federal Reserve System has evolved to meet the needs of a changing financial system …

Back To The Parent: Holding Company Liability For Subsidiary Banks — A Discussion Of The Net Worth Maintenance Agreement, The Source Of Strength Doctrine, And The Prompt Corrective Action Provision, Cassandra Jones Havard

All Faculty Scholarship

Given the statutory goal of parental accountability, this Article focuses on a narrow issue: Whether parental guarantees are the most effective regulatory tool for shielding the federal deposit insurance fund from losses when insured banking subsidiaries that are members of a multibank holding company system are insolvent. This Article posits that a needed complement to parental guarantees is temporary substantive consolidation of a holding company's affiliated banks. This would require the parent company to combine the assets of its banking siblings to facilitate the reorganization of a financially troubled subsidiary. Temporary enterprise consolidation is a necessary regulatory tool because it …

Banking And Deposit Insurance: An Unfinished Agenda For The 1990s, Sarah Jane Hughes

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Rtc: A Practical Guide To The Receivership/Conservatorship Process And The Resolution Of Failed Thrifts, Vicki O. Tucker, Patti G. Meire, Phyllis M. Rubinstein

University of Richmond Law Review

In response to a growing crisis in the thrift industry, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA" or "Act"). The crisis was evidenced by the failure of over 500 thrifts between 1980 and 1988-more than three and one-half times as many in the previous forty-five years combined. In 1988 alone, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC," which prior to FIRREA insured most of the thrift industry's deposits) merged or liquidated over 200 insolvent thrifts, and the U.S. Government's General Accounting Office ("GAO") estimated in 1989 that at least 338 additional thrifts were …