Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Law and Economics (4)
- Business Organizations Law (3)
- Commercial Law (2)
- Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law (2)
- Intellectual Property Law (2)
-
- Law and Society (2)
- Banking and Finance Law (1)
- Civil Law (1)
- Computer Law (1)
- Constitutional Law (1)
- Consumer Protection Law (1)
- Contracts (1)
- Courts (1)
- Internet Law (1)
- Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (1)
- Legal Profession (1)
- Litigation (1)
- Marketing Law (1)
- Organizations Law (1)
- Other Law (1)
- Science and Technology Law (1)
- Securities Law (1)
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Defining Unreasonable Radius Clauses For American Music Festivals, Trevor Lane
Defining Unreasonable Radius Clauses For American Music Festivals, Trevor Lane
Seattle University Law Review
Since 1969, the music festival remains a staple of American musical culture, and in order to meet consumer demands, today’s music festival promoters rely on radius clauses ancillary to the performance agreements that they use with artists. These radius clauses limit artists’ ability to perform at other music festivals and concerts within a specified temporal and geographic radius of the contracted music festival. Beginning in 2010, legal challenges have alleged that broadly defined radius clauses used by music festival promoters violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. This Note contends that radius clauses which limit artists from performing beyond …
E-Books, Collusion, And Antitrust Policy: Protecting A Dominant Firm At The Cost Of Innovation, Nicholas Timchalk
E-Books, Collusion, And Antitrust Policy: Protecting A Dominant Firm At The Cost Of Innovation, Nicholas Timchalk
Seattle University Law Review
Amazon’s main rival, Apple, went to great lengths and took major risks to enter the e-book market. Why did Apple simply choose not to compete on the merits of its product and brand equity (the iPad and iBookstore) as it does with its other products? Why did Apple decide not to continue to rely on its earlier success of situating its products differently in the market than other electronics and working hard to be different and cutting-edge with its e-book delivery? This Note argues that the combination of Amazon’s 90% market share, network externalities, and an innovative technology market creates …
A Comprehensive Economic And Legal Analysis Of Tying Arrangements, Guy Sagi
A Comprehensive Economic And Legal Analysis Of Tying Arrangements, Guy Sagi
Seattle University Law Review
The law of tying arrangements as it stands does not correspond with modern economic analysis. Therefore, and because tying arrangements are so widely common, the law is expected to change and extensive academic writing is currently attempting to guide its way. In tying arrangements, monopolistic firms coerce consumers to buy additional products or services beyond what they intended to purchase. This pressure can be applied because a consumer in a monopolistic market does not have the alternative to buy the product or service from a competing firm. In the absence of such choice, the monopolistic firm can allegedly force the …
Banking And Competition In Exceptional Times, Brett Christophers
Banking And Competition In Exceptional Times, Brett Christophers
Seattle University Law Review
This Article has two main aims: to provide a critical consideration of this contemporary antitrust “revival” from an explicitly political–economic perspective and to point toward some theoretical resources that might facilitate such an assessment.Part II looks backward at the evolution and application of competition law in the banking sector over the relatively longue durée. In this Part, I invoke the concept of “exception” to understand how antitrust policy has developed, and my chief interlocutors are the perhaps unlikely figures of Giorgio Agamben and Karl Marx. Part III looks forward and considers the central question around which the recent resurgence of …
The Importance Of History To The Design Of Competition Policy Strategy: The Federal Trade Commission And Intellectual Property Law, William E. Kovacic
The Importance Of History To The Design Of Competition Policy Strategy: The Federal Trade Commission And Intellectual Property Law, William E. Kovacic
Seattle University Law Review
The Article's framework for considering the value of history in shaping strategy is the effort of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to apply its competition policy powers to issues involving intellectual property (IP). The Article chooses the example of intellectual property because of its importance to the modern work of the FTC and the increasingly significant place that intellectual property and, more generally, technology-driven innovation hold in the field of competition policy. To provide context for the discussion, Part II of the Article presents a profile of the FTC's modern competition policy initiatives concerning intellectual property. Part III then reviews …
Independent Ink At The Crossroads Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property Law: The Court's Holding Regarding Market Power In Cases Involving Patents And Implications In Cases Involving Copyrights, Leonard J. Feldman, Rima J. Alaily, Chad D. Farrell
Independent Ink At The Crossroads Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property Law: The Court's Holding Regarding Market Power In Cases Involving Patents And Implications In Cases Involving Copyrights, Leonard J. Feldman, Rima J. Alaily, Chad D. Farrell
Seattle University Law Review
By eliminating the market power presumption for patent holders, Independent Ink calls into question the presumption's continued validity for tying arrangements involving copyrights. While the Court's holding directly applies only to patents, we present three reasons why, after Independent Ink, the presumption can no longer be viable in antitrust lawsuits challenging a tying arrangement involving a copyrighted product. First, the Court's rationale for eliminating the presumption including citations to extensive academic writings, agency guidelines, and legislative amendments precludes the presumption's continued application in any other context. Second, copyrights are significantly less likely than patents to confer market power because …
Maximum Vertical Price Fixing From Albrecht Through Brunswick To Khan: An Antitrust Odyssey, James M. Fesmire
Maximum Vertical Price Fixing From Albrecht Through Brunswick To Khan: An Antitrust Odyssey, James M. Fesmire
Seattle University Law Review
The article attempts to sort out some of this confusion caused by the legal journey from Albrecht to Khan by portraying that long road as a successful example of the antitrust injury doctrine's ability to bring substantive antitrust law into compliance with the goals of antitrust. First, the article examines how the existence of successive monopoly provides an incentive for maximum vertical price fixing and how maximum vertical price fixing leads to an increase in consumer welfare. Second, it examines manufacturer alternatives to vertical price restraints, finding them less attractive in terms of social welfare. Third, the article analyzes other …