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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Extending Predation Analysis To Monopolist's Bundled Discounts Under Section 2: An Economic, Legal, And Comparative Perspective, Seth B. Chertok
Extending Predation Analysis To Monopolist's Bundled Discounts Under Section 2: An Economic, Legal, And Comparative Perspective, Seth B. Chertok
ExpressO
In LePage’s v. 3M, the Third Circuit decided the first case at the federal appellate court level that dealt with the subject of bundled discounts by a monopolist under Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the period following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation. Prior to the decision in Brooke Group, the Third Circuit had only once before addressed this topic in Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Company. Smithkline is only significant because it nearly suggested that any bundled discount, regardless of whether above or below cost, was anti-competitive. …
Transparency In Global Merger Review: A Limited Role For The Wto?, Keith R. Fisher
Transparency In Global Merger Review: A Limited Role For The Wto?, Keith R. Fisher
ExpressO
This article identifies certain problems faced by parties to transnational merger transactions in view of the global proliferation in recent years of competition (and, specifically, merger review) laws. After considering the pros and cons of merger remedies (both structural and behavioral) that may be offered to mitigate potentially anticompetitive effects and illustrating (through a case study of the GE/Honeywell transaction) the pitfalls of divergent market definition even as between two legal regimes employing substantially similar standards, the article reviews and critiques proposals for establishing a supranational competition authority under the aegis of the World Trade Organization. While rejecting the WTO …
The Comparative Analysis On The Presumption Of Cartel Agreements Which Is Unique In The Korean Cartel Regulation Provision, Woo-Jong Jon
The Comparative Analysis On The Presumption Of Cartel Agreements Which Is Unique In The Korean Cartel Regulation Provision, Woo-Jong Jon
ExpressO
In terms of cartel regulation, Korea has a “presumption of agreement” provision that does not exist in the United States or in the European Union (EU). This provision is Article 19(5) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA). This provision was created for the convenience of enforcement because firms made cartel agreements by more sophisticated methods as the cartel regulation became more intense. Accordingly, in the continental law of Korea the approach of the courts in relation to cartel regulation is somewhat different to the United States. However, in terms of a standard for deciding specifically what to …
Digital Wars -- Legal Battles And Economic Bottlenecks In The Digital Information Industries, Curt A. Hessler
Digital Wars -- Legal Battles And Economic Bottlenecks In The Digital Information Industries, Curt A. Hessler
ExpressO
The Digital Age has spawned major legal battles over the fundamental principles of intellectual property law and antitrust law. These diverse struggles can best be analyzed using the basic norm of "value added" from neo-classical normative economics. This analysis suggests that current intellectual property doctirnes provide excessive protection and current antitrust doctrines remain awkward in dealing with the cross-market leveraging of monopoly power in the presence of "natural monopolies" created by network effects.