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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

American Needle And The Boundaries Of The Firm In Antitrust Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Aug 2010

American Needle And The Boundaries Of The Firm In Antitrust Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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In American Needle the Supreme Court unanimously held that for the practice at issue the NFL should be treated as a “combination” of its teams rather than a single entity. However, the arrangement must be assessed under the rule of reason. The opinion, written by Justice Stevens, was almost certainly his last opinion for the Court in an antitrust case; Justice Stevens had been a dissenter in the Supreme Court’s Copperweld decision 25 years earlier, which held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary constituted a single “firm” for antitrust purposes. The Sherman Act speaks to this issue …


All Of The Economic Aid The U.S., Eu, And Japan Give To The Developing World Is Stolen Back By Our Illegal Price-Fixing Cartels, Robert H. Lande Aug 2010

All Of The Economic Aid The U.S., Eu, And Japan Give To The Developing World Is Stolen Back By Our Illegal Price-Fixing Cartels, Robert H. Lande

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This compares the magnitudes of two forms of economic interaction between the developed and developing world. The first is the amount of economic foreign aid provided by the developed world to the developing world during a single year. The second is an estimate of the yearly amount that illegal price fixing cartels, comprised of companies from the U.S., the EU, and Japan, overcharge – steal! – from purchasers in these same countries. This comparison shows these amounts are roughly equivalent. If anything, cartels probably steal more from the developing world than the developed world gives them in economic assistance.

This …


The Insurance Industry's Antitrust Immunity, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2010

The Insurance Industry's Antitrust Immunity, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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The 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that federal legislation generally, including the antitrust laws, is “applicable to the business of insurance [only] to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.” The statute was enacted after United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Assn. (1944), held that insurance transactions were “interstate commerce” and thus subject to the antitrust laws. That case had in turn undermined the traditional view expressed in Paul v. Virginia (1868), that insurance was not interstate commerce, but strictly local transactions. The South Eastern case followed in turn upon the Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. …


Aproximación A La Implementación De Los Programas De Clemencia Como Instrumentos Del Derecho De La Competencia (Approach To The Implementation Of Leniency Programs As Competition Law Instruments), Jesús A. Soto Jan 2010

Aproximación A La Implementación De Los Programas De Clemencia Como Instrumentos Del Derecho De La Competencia (Approach To The Implementation Of Leniency Programs As Competition Law Instruments), Jesús A. Soto

Jesús Alfonso Soto Pineda

En el presente escrito se expone como una realidad del mercado, la presencia de acuerdos restrictivos de la libre competencia. Se presentan las políticas de clemencia como instrumento efectivo del Derecho en el combate contra el Cartel y las prácticas colusorias. Se realiza un análisis comparativo de una elección de territorios que han implementado los programas de clemencia y se estructuran los inconvenientes que comúnmente afectan dicho sistema, así como los paliativos escogidos que han generado un mayor nivel de eficacia en el mismo. Los aprendizajes logrados en torno a la implementación de programas de clemencia en pasos ya recorridos …