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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Los Enredos Por La Fibra Oscura, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor
Los Enredos Por La Fibra Oscura, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor
Víctor Pavón-Villamayor
No abstract provided.
Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han
Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han
Martijn A. Han
Compliance programs entail monitoring of employees' behavior with the claimed objective of fighting corporate crime. (Competition) Authorities promote such intra-firm monitoring. In a three-tier hierarchy model, authority-shareholder-manager, we study the impact of monitoring through a compliance program on contracting within the firm and the authority's optimal sanctions and leniency policy. We find that compliance programs are beneficial in the fight against corporate crime if and only if the managerial sanction is low. Moreover, when the shareholder blows the whistle, the authority optimally grants partial corporate leniency, while not granting individual leniency to the involved employees. Conversely, when the employee blows …