Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Panel I: Professor Brodley’S General Contributions To Antitrust Scholarship : Introduction, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

When I began teaching Antitrust, I was the junior colleague of a more senior antitrust scholar, teaching the course on opposite semesters to the relatively few students who were forced by scheduling conflicts to take the course with me as their teacher. After my senior colleague departed for another school – and after the departure of some other senior Law and Economics colleagues – I was for a brief period the senior antitrust scholar at the institution, and this was in only my fifth year of teaching law. Boston University soon approached me and my wife with the offer of …

Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, And Changing Economic Conditions, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

The recent financial crisis and recession provide an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus static efficiency tradeoff in antitrust enforcement policy. We examine implications of the optimal antitrust enforcement model when dynamic efficiency is incorporated. The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, some suggestions for modifying enforcement in light of its dynamic costs, and implies antitrust enforcers should put a greater weight on dynamic efficiency during recessions.

The Law And Economics Of Monopolization Standards, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Monopolization, the restriction of competition by a dominant firm, is regulated in roughly half of the world’s nations. The two most famous laws regulating monopolization are Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in the United States, and Article 82 of the European Community Treaty. Both laws have been understood as prohibiting ‘abuses’ of monopoly power.

Intel And The Death Of U.S. Antitrust Law, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) new legal attack on Intel threatens to leave the company a shell of its former self. The Commission claims that Intel violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by giving discounts and rebates to customers in a manner that harmed its main rival AMD, by designing its products in a way that disadvantages rivals, and acting too aggressively in protecting its intellectual property. The remedies the FTC is seeking would impose broad restrictions on pricing, product design, and protection of intellectual property.

The FTC’s claims are not well founded in U.S. antitrust law, though they …