Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

In this paper, we will analyse the issue of concurrence between competition and sector rules and the relation between parallel concepts within the two different legal frameworks. We will firstly examine Third Party Access in relation to essential facilities doctrine and refusal of access and we will identify the common points and objectives of these concepts and the extent to which they provide a context to each other’s implementation. Second, we will focus on how Commission uses sector regulation and objectives as a context within the process of implementation of competition law in the energy sector and third, we will …

Vertical Restraints, Dealers With Power, And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s Leegin decision has now brought the rule of reason to all purely vertical intrabrand distribution restraints. But the rule of reason does not mean per se legality and occasions for anticompetitive vertically imposed restraints may still arise. Of all those that have been suggested the most plausible are vertical restraints imposed at the behest of a powerful dealer or group (cartel) of dealers.

Although a vertical distribution restraint resembles a dealer cartel in that both limit intraband competition, a manufacturer restraining the distribution of its product shuns the excess dealer profits a dealer cartel would seek. Accordingly, …

La Reforma De Poder Sustancial De Mercado Conjunto En México, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

American Needle And The Boundaries Of The Firm In Antitrust Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In American Needle the Supreme Court unanimously held that for the practice at issue the NFL should be treated as a “combination” of its teams rather than a single entity. However, the arrangement must be assessed under the rule of reason. The opinion, written by Justice Stevens, was almost certainly his last opinion for the Court in an antitrust case; Justice Stevens had been a dissenter in the Supreme Court’s Copperweld decision 25 years earlier, which held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary constituted a single “firm” for antitrust purposes. The Sherman Act speaks to this issue …

Mexicana De Aviación ¿Rescate O Transferencia?, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

From Energy Sector Inquiry To Recent Antitrust Decisions In European Energy Markets: Competition Law As A Means To Implement Energy Sector Regulation In Eu, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

This paper presents the conceptual path followed by European Union, European Commission and European Competition Network, after the Energy Sector Inquiry (2007) towards the realisation of the objective of an Energy Internal Market, fully functional and open to competition. Firstly, we examine the findings of Sector Inquiry and then we describe how the Third Energy Package - that followed - tried to address the issues highlighted by the Inquiry and how Third Energy Package introduces a promising but complex system, in order to develop sector rules. Following the above, we proceed to a brief but close examination of 10 recent …

Competition Law Reform In Mexico: A Note On Joint Dominance, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

American Needle: The Sherman Act, Conspiracy, And Exclusion, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay, part of a colloquium in the CPI Antitrust Journal, explores the meaning and significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle v. NFL. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the dispute at hand the NFL should be treated as a collaboration of its member teams rather than a single entity. The factors that the Supreme Court considered most important were, first, that the NFL’s member teams are individually owned profit making entities who compete with each other in at least some economic markets, such as that for the sale of apparel bearing NFL symbols. …

Relational Contract Theory And Management Contracts: A Paradigm For The Application Of The Theory Of The Norms, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

This paper examines management contracts as a paradigm for the application of relational contracts theory and especially of the theory of contractual and relational norms. This theory, deriving from Macauley's implications, but structured and analysed by I.R. MacNeil gives us a framework for the explanation and understanding of contractual obligations and business relations' rules and practice. After presenting the key literature about the norms theory and especially defining the content of MacNeil's norms, we define management contracts as relations, characterised by a high relational element and we explain why, investigating all their features, which make them a suitable object for …

Los Enredos Por La Fibra Oscura, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Autonomía Del Ministerio Público Y La Procuración De Justicia En México, Max Garcia

Max Garcia Sanchez

No abstract provided.

Complicaciones De La Ley De Competencia, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

It Works For Mergers, Why Not Finance, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Los Temas Pendientes En Competencia, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

The Ftc's Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The FTC’s wide ranging complaint against Intel Corporation indicates that the FTC intends to rely on the “unfair methods of competition” language in §5 of the FTC Act to reach beyond the proscriptions on unilateral conduct contained in §2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has expressly authorized such expansion, and statutory text, legislative history and legal policy all support it. While §2 reaches only conduct that threatens to “monopolize” a market, the “unfair methods of competition” language can reach improper abuses of a dominant position that fall short of creating monopoly. Further, the FTC has expertise that courts …

Intra-Enterprise Activity, Joint Ventures And Sports Leagues: Identifying Unilateral Conduct Under The Antitrust Laws, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In the American Needle case the Supreme Court will consider whether the NFL’s decision to give an exclusive trademark license to one firm should be counted as “unilateral” on the NFL’s part, or rather as the concerted joint venture activity of the NFL’s individual member teams. The intellectual property in question is not trademarks in the NFL itself, but rather the trademarks and other intellectual property developed separately by each individual team, and which the teams in turn have licensed exclusively to the NFL.

In general, when a joint venture is engaged in its own business the unilateral characterization is …

The Insurance Industry's Antitrust Immunity, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that federal legislation generally, including the antitrust laws, is “applicable to the business of insurance [only] to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.” The statute was enacted after United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Assn. (1944), held that insurance transactions were “interstate commerce” and thus subject to the antitrust laws. That case had in turn undermined the traditional view expressed in Paul v. Virginia (1868), that insurance was not interstate commerce, but strictly local transactions. The South Eastern case followed in turn upon the Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. …

Propiedad Intelectual Y Prácticas Monopólicas, Carlos Mena-Labarthe, Alejandro Hernández Alva

Carlos Mena-Labarthe

El estudio hace un recuento de algunos de los principales problemas y cuestiones que se pueden presentar en la relación de la propiedad intelectual con el Derecho de competencia, en particular en la regulación de las prácticas monopólicas.

Acuerdos Entre Competidores Y Su Regulación En El Derecho De Competencia, Carlos Mena-Labarthe

Carlos Mena-Labarthe

No abstract provided.

Competencia Económica En El Sector Inmobiliario Y Sus Principales Transacciones, Carlos Mena-Labarthe

Carlos Mena-Labarthe

Estudio de la regulación de competencia y su impacto en las principales transacciones inmobiliarias. Se estudia la experiencia mexicana y se compara con otras experiencias.

Reforming At A Time Of Crisis: The Mexican Experience 1994-1995 & 2008-2009, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

An Economic Assessment Of Patent Settlements In The Pharmaceutical Industry, Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag, Laura Tyson

Bret Dickey

In recent years, patent settlements between branded and generic manufacturers involving “reverse payments” from branded manufacturers to generic manufacturers have received close antitrust scrutiny, driven by concerns that such settlements harm consumers by delaying the entry of lower-priced generic drugs. It appears that such settlements will be a focus of the Obama Administration’s antitrust enforcement policy. Yet there is a growing consensus among the courts that such settlements are anticompetitive only under narrow sets of circumstances. In this paper, we present an analytical framework for evaluating the competitive effects of patent settlements, including those involving reverse payments, and demonstrate that …

Intellectual Property And Antitrust Limits On Contract: Comment, Matthew J. Holian, Neil Nguyen

Matthew J. Holian

In their chapter in Dynamic Competition and Public Policy (2001, Cambridge University Press), Burtis and Kobayashi never defined their model's discount rate, making replicating their simulation results difficult. Through our own simulations, we were able to verify their results when using a discount rate of 0.10. We also identified two new types of equilibria that the authors overlooked, doubling the number of distinct equilibria in the model.

Intellectual Property And Antitrust Limits On Contract: Comment, Matthew J. Holian, Neil Nguyen

Faculty Publications

In their chapter in Dynamic Competition and Public Policy (2001, Cambridge University Press), Burtis and Kobayashi never defined their model's discount rate, making replicating their simulation results difficult. Through our own simulations, we were able to verify their results when using a discount rate of 0.10. We also identified two new types of equilibria that the authors overlooked, doubling the number of distinct equilibria in the model.

What Blogging Might Teach About Cybernorms, Jacqueline D. Lipton

Articles

Since the dawn of the information age, scholars have debated the viability of regulating cyberspace. Early on, Professor Lawrence Lessig suggested that “code is law” online. Lessig and others also examined the respective regulatory functions of laws, code, market forces, and social norms. In recent years, with the rise of Web 2.0 interactive technologies, norms have taken center-stage as a regulatory modality online. The advantages of norms are that they can develop quickly by the communities that seek to enforce them, and they are not bound by geography. However, to date there has been scant literature dealing in any detail …

Governing Gambling In The United States, Maria E. Garcia

CMC Senior Theses

The role risk taking has played in American history has helped shape current legislation concerning gambling. This thesis attempts to explain the discrepancies in legislation regarding distinct forms of gambling. While casinos are heavily regulated by state and federal laws, most statutes dealing with lotteries strive to regulate the activities of other parties instead of those of the lottery institutions. Incidentally, lotteries are the only form of gambling completely managed by the government. It can be inferred that the United States government is more concerned with people exploiting gambling than with the actual practice of wagering.

In an effort to …

The Law Of Vertical Integration And The Business Firm: 1880-1960, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Vertical integration occurs when a firm does something for itself that it could otherwise procure on the market. For example, a manufacturer that opens its own stores is said to be vertically integrated into distribution. One irony of history is that both classical political economy and neoclassicism saw vertical integration and vertical contractual arrangements as much less threatening to competition than cartels or other horizontal arrangements. Nevertheless, vertical integration has produced by far the greater amount of legislation at both federal and state levels and has motivated many more political action groups. Two things explain this phenomenon. First, while economists …

Tying Arrangements And Antitrust Harm, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A tying arrangement is a seller’s requirement that a customer may purchase its “tying” product only by taking its “tied” product. In a variable proportion tie the purchaser can vary the amount of the tied product. For example, a customer might purchase a single printer, but either a contract or technological design requires the purchase of varying numbers of printer cartridges from the same manufacturer.

Such arrangements are widely considered to be price discrimination devices, but their economic effects have been controversial. Tying has been attacked on the theory that price discrimination of this sort reduces consumer welfare. We show …

Harvard, Chicago And Transaction Cost Economics In Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Since Oliver Williamson published Markets and Hierarchies in 1975 transaction cost economics (TCE) has claimed an important place in antitrust, avoiding the extreme positions of the two once reigning schools of antitrust policy. At one extreme was the “structural” school, which saw market structure as the principal determinant of poor economic performance. At the other extreme was the Chicago School, which also saw the economic landscape in terms of competition and monopoly, but found monopoly only infrequently and denied that a monopolist could “leverage” its power into related markets. Since the 1970s both the structural and Chicago positions have moved …

The Obama Administration And Section Two Of The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

During the administration of President George W. Bush, the Antitrust Division was not enthusiastic about use of §2 of the Sherman Act to pursue anticompetitive single-firm conduct. Indeed, its most prominent contribution on the issue was the Antitrust Division’s §2 Report, which the Obama Antitrust Division withdrew only eight months after it was issued.This withdrawal was entirely in keeping with candidate Obama’s repeated promises to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement.

This essay analyzes the current state of antitrust and makes recommendations concerning structures and practices where increased §2 enforcement is warranted and those where it is not. Wise use of enforcement dollars …