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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Regulating Interoperability: Lessons From At&T, Microsoft, And Beyond, Philip J. Weiser
Regulating Interoperability: Lessons From At&T, Microsoft, And Beyond, Philip J. Weiser
Publications
Antitrust law confronted the challenges of regulating interoperability between platforms and applications in both the AT&T and Microsoft cases, but it has yet to mine the series of lessons that can inform how to address this challenge going forward. With the Microsoft consent decree still in place, it may too soon to render a final judgment on the remedy adopted in that case as well as to evaluate more generally whether antitrust law is up to the task of developing the institutional strategies - be it the use of technical committees or reliance on standard setting bodies - for addressing …
Remedies, Antitrust Law, And Microsoft: Comment On Shapiro, Keith N. Hylton
Remedies, Antitrust Law, And Microsoft: Comment On Shapiro, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
The subject of remedies is a relatively under-theorized area of antitrust law, and Professor Shapiro has done the antitrust community a great favor by offering some innovative and useful theoretical insights on the design of antitrust remedies. He applies his theoretical insights to the Microsoft III case to reach the conclusion that the remedies adopted were inadequate to restore competition in the market for software platforms. In this review, I will offer additional theoretical insights on remedies and explain my reasons for rejecting his conclusions on Microsoft III.
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
UF Law Faculty Publications
Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with Microsoft's server operating systems. This provision has been by far the most difficult and costly to implement, primarily because of questions about the quality of Microsoft's documentation of the protocols. The plaintiffs' technical experts, in testing the documentation, have found numerous issues, which they have asked Microsoft to resolve. Because of accumulation of unresolved issues, the parties agreed in 2006 to extend Section III.E for up to five more …
Pangloss Responds, Daniel A. Crane
Pangloss Responds, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
I am afraid that William Shieber and I are speaking past each other. I agree wholeheartedly with his assertion that anyone who believes that political appointees do not exert a considerable influence over the antitrust agencies is naïve. However, Technocracy and Antitrust does not advance the Panglossian view that the antitrust agencies are apolitical, if by that we mean that robotic machines devoid of human perspective or ideological commitment churn out scientifically predetermined antitrust results.