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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Updating The Merger Guidelines: Comments, Steven C. Salop, Serge Moresi Nov 2009

Updating The Merger Guidelines: Comments, Steven C. Salop, Serge Moresi

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

These comments (originally submitted to the DOJ and FTC in November 2009) make a number of comments relevant to revising the Merger Guidelines. The comments focus on the use of the GUPPI (gross upward pricing pressure index) in unilateral effects analysis. They also comment on the deterrence and incipiency standard, exclusionary effects of horizontal mergers and market definition when there are multi-product firms or pre-merger coordination, among other issues.


Revisiting Allied Tube And Noerr: The Antitrust Implications Of Green Building Legislation & Case Law Considerations For Policymakers, Stephen Del Percio Oct 2009

Revisiting Allied Tube And Noerr: The Antitrust Implications Of Green Building Legislation & Case Law Considerations For Policymakers, Stephen Del Percio

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

No abstract provided.


Teoria Unificada Da Colusão: Uma Sugestão De Regulação Dos, Ivo T. Gico Sep 2009

Teoria Unificada Da Colusão: Uma Sugestão De Regulação Dos, Ivo T. Gico

Ivo Teixeira Gico Jr.

A legislação concorrencial brasileira caracteriza toda e qualquer forma de abuso do poder econômico como uma infração à ordem econômica. A principal conduta delitiva é a formação de cartel. A maior dificuldade na implementação de uma política pública contrária à cartelização dos mercados é a caracterização jurídica de um acordo entre concorrentes, principalmente, no contexto oligopolístico. Nossa hipótese é a seguinte: se a lei brasileira não exige a presença de um acordo para a caracterização do delito administrativo, deveria ser juridicamente possível condenar a coordenação indevida de ações entre concorrentes mesmo na ausência de acordo. Não obstante, como a colusão …


The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller May 2009

The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller

William & Mary Law Review

In any large corporate acquisition, there is an interim period between the time that the parties enter into a merger agreement and the time the transaction is effected and the purchase price paid. During this period, the business of the acquired company may deteriorate, thus raising the question of whether the counterparty must perform on the agreement and pay the purchase price. Merger agreements typically address this problem through "material adverse change" (MAC) clauses, which provide that a party may walk away from the transaction without penalty if the counterparty has suffered a MAC. Although the definition of MAC is …