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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Updating The Merger Guidelines: Comments, Steven C. Salop, Serge Moresi
Updating The Merger Guidelines: Comments, Steven C. Salop, Serge Moresi
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
These comments (originally submitted to the DOJ and FTC in November 2009) make a number of comments relevant to revising the Merger Guidelines. The comments focus on the use of the GUPPI (gross upward pricing pressure index) in unilateral effects analysis. They also comment on the deterrence and incipiency standard, exclusionary effects of horizontal mergers and market definition when there are multi-product firms or pre-merger coordination, among other issues.
Of Myths And Evidence: An Analysis Of 40 U.S. Cases For Countries Considering A Private Right Of Action For Competition Law Violations, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
Of Myths And Evidence: An Analysis Of 40 U.S. Cases For Countries Considering A Private Right Of Action For Competition Law Violations, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
All Faculty Scholarship
This article assesses some of the benefits of private enforcement of the United States antitrust laws by analyzing forty large recent, successful private cases. It should help in assessing the desirability and efficacy of private enforcement - information that may prove useful to jurisdictions contemplating a private right of action for competition cases.
Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This essay offers a brief, non-technical exposition of the antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers in product differentiated markets where the resulting price increase is thought to be unilateral - that is, only the post-merger firm increases its prices while other firms in the market do not. More realistically, non-merging firms who are reasonably close in product space to the merging firm will also be able to increase their prices when the post-merger firm's prices rise. The unilateral effects theory is robust and has become quite conventional in merger analysis. There is certainly no reason for thinking that it involves any …
Mergers And Market Dominance, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Mergers And Market Dominance, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Mergers involving dominant firms legitimately receive close scrutiny under the antitrust laws, even if they involve tiny firms. Further, they should be examined closely even in markets that generally exhibit low entry barriers. Many of the so-called "unilateral effects" cases in current merger law are in fact mergers that create dominant firms. The rhetoric of unilateral effects often serves to disguise this fact by presenting the situation as if it involves the ability of a small number of firms (typically two or three) in a much larger market to increase their price to unacceptable levels. In fact, if such a …
The Evolution Of Chinese Merger Notification Guidelines: A Work In Progress Integrating Global Consensus And Domestic Imperatives, Susan Beth Farmer
The Evolution Of Chinese Merger Notification Guidelines: A Work In Progress Integrating Global Consensus And Domestic Imperatives, Susan Beth Farmer
Journal Articles
China is among the most recent entrants into global competition enforcement, having adopted the first competition law of general application, the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) after more than a decade of drafting. The AML and Merger Notification Thresholds, rules issued by decree of the State Council, became effective on August 3, 2008. Both the law and the guidelines were subject to public review and comment, and went through a number of drafts before final adoption.
This article is a comprehensive comparison of merger standards across jurisdictions, with particular focus on the evolution of merger regulation in China. It comprises six parts; …
Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol
Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate governance-the governance of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). There are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance across legal origins. In …
Regulatory Competition, Choice Of Forum And Delaware’S Stake In Corporate Law, Faith Stevelman
Regulatory Competition, Choice Of Forum And Delaware’S Stake In Corporate Law, Faith Stevelman
Articles & Chapters
As Delaware corporate law confronts the twenty-first-century global economy, the state's legislators and jurists are becoming sensitive to increased threats to the law's sustained preeminence. The increased presence of federal laws and regulations in areas of corporate governance traditionally allocated to the states has been widely noted. The growth of federal corporate law standards may be undermining Delaware's confidence in the sustained prosperity of its chartering business - which has been a vital source of revenues and prestige for Delaware, its equity courts, and especially its corporate bar. The Delaware Court of Chancery appears to be concerned about the emigration …
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Articles
Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of …
Substance, Procedure, And Institutions In The International Harmonization Of Competition Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Substance, Procedure, And Institutions In The International Harmonization Of Competition Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Many people who pay attention to the rapid development of antitrust regimes across the globe hold two tenets in common. First, most of the relevant stakeholders would benefit if competition policy could be harmonized interjurisdictionally.' Second, and alas, this beneficial harmonization is unlikely to happen on a significant scale in the foreseeable future.2 To many, antitrust harmonization is thus a noble but utopian aspiration. I generally share both the former sentiment and the latter lament but both are far too general to be of much use without further specification. Uniformity of competition policy is valuable to be sure, but not …