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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

The Google Book Search Settlement: Ends, Means, And The Future Of Books, James Grimmelmann Apr 2009

The Google Book Search Settlement: Ends, Means, And The Future Of Books, James Grimmelmann

Faculty Scholarship

For the past four years, Google has been systematically making digital copies of books in the collections of many major university libraries. It made the digital copies searchable through its web site--you couldn't read the books, but you could at least find out where the phrase you're looking for appears within them. This outraged copyright owners, who filed a class action lawsuit to make Google stop. Then, last fall, the parties to this large class action announced an even larger settlement: one that would give Google a license not only to scan books, but also to sell them.

The settlement …


How To Fix The Google Book Search Settlement, James Grimmelmann Apr 2009

How To Fix The Google Book Search Settlement, James Grimmelmann

Faculty Scholarship

The proposed settlement in the Google Book Search case should be approved with strings attached. The project will be immensely good for society, and the proposed deal is a fair one for Google, for authors, and for publishers. The public interest demands, however, that the settlement be modified first. It creates two new entities—the Books Rights Registry Leviathan and the Google Book Search Behemoth—with dangerously concentrated power over the publishing industry. Left unchecked, they could trample on consumers in any number of ways. We the public have a right to demand that those entities be subject to healthy, pro-competitive oversight, …


Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh Feb 2009

Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …


Remedies, Antitrust Law, And Microsoft: Comment On Shapiro, Keith N. Hylton Jan 2009

Remedies, Antitrust Law, And Microsoft: Comment On Shapiro, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

The subject of remedies is a relatively under-theorized area of antitrust law, and Professor Shapiro has done the antitrust community a great favor by offering some innovative and useful theoretical insights on the design of antitrust remedies. He applies his theoretical insights to the Microsoft III case to reach the conclusion that the remedies adopted were inadequate to restore competition in the market for software platforms. In this review, I will offer additional theoretical insights on remedies and explain my reasons for rejecting his conclusions on Microsoft III.


A Careful Examination Of The Live Nation-Ticketmaster Merger, Barak D. Richman, Alan J. Meese Jan 2009

A Careful Examination Of The Live Nation-Ticketmaster Merger, Barak D. Richman, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Scholarship

As great admirers of The Boss and as fans of live entertainment, we share in the popular dismay over rising ticket prices for live performances. But we have been asked as antitrust scholars to examine the proposed merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster, and we do so with the objectivity and honesty called for by The Boss’s quotes above. The proposed merger has been the target of aggressive attacks from several industry commentators and popular figures, but the legal and policy question is whether the transaction is at odds with the nation’s antitrust laws.

One primary source of concern to …


The Antitrust Of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics And Concerted Refusals To Deal, Barak D. Richman Jan 2009

The Antitrust Of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics And Concerted Refusals To Deal, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

An agreement among competitors to refuse to deal with another party is traditionally per se illegal under the antitrust laws. But coordinated refusals to deal are often necessary to punish wrongdoers, and thus to deter undesirable behavior that state-sponsored courts cannot reach. When viewed as a mechanism to govern transactions and induce socially desirable cooperative behavior, coordinated refusals to deal can sustain valuable reputation mechanisms. This paper employs institutional economics to understand the role of coordinated refusals to deal in merchant circles and to evaluate the economic desirability of permitting such coordinated actions among competitors. It concludes that if the …


Contracting For Innovation: Vertical Disintegration And Interfirm Collaboration, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, Robert E. Scott Jan 2009

Contracting For Innovation: Vertical Disintegration And Interfirm Collaboration, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Rapidly innovating industries are not behaving the way theory expects. Conventional industrial organization theory predicts that, when parties in a supply chain have to make transaction-specific investments, the risk of opportunism will drive them away from contracts and toward vertical integration. Despite the conventional theory, however, contemporary practice is moving in the other direction. Instead of vertical integration, we observe vertical disintegration in a significant number of industries, as producers recognize that they cannot themselves maintain cutting-edge technology in every field required for the success of their products. In doing this, the parties are developing forms of contracting beyond the …


The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick And A Hard Place, Victor P. Goldberg Jan 2009

The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick And A Hard Place, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Before it was uncovered and prosecuted, the international vitamin cartel, known as "Vitamins, Inc." by its perpetrators, was extraordinarily successful. Estimates of cartel profits run as high as $18 billion (in 2003 dollars). In addition to substantial criminal sanctions, cartel members paid over $2 billion to American plaintiffs. When foreign plaintiffs tried to sue the foreign defendants in American courts, however, they encountered resistance. A trial court read the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA") to restrict the reach of the Sherman Act and preclude foreign purchasers from suing the foreign defendants. The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the facts …