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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
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- Antitrust Law (2)
- Acquisitions and Mergers (1)
- Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head Inc. (1)
- Business Risk (1)
- Conspiracy (1)
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- Contracts (1)
- Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons (1)
- Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight (1)
- Green Buildings (1)
- Inc. (1)
- Inc. (551 U.S. 877 (2007)) (1)
- Inc. v. PSKS (1)
- Leegin Creative Leather Products (1)
- Price Maintenance (1)
- Restraint of Trade (1)
- Vertical Integration (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Revisiting Allied Tube And Noerr: The Antitrust Implications Of Green Building Legislation & Case Law Considerations For Policymakers, Stephen Del Percio
Revisiting Allied Tube And Noerr: The Antitrust Implications Of Green Building Legislation & Case Law Considerations For Policymakers, Stephen Del Percio
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
No abstract provided.
Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring A Rule Of Reason For Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Thomas A. Lambert
Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring A Rule Of Reason For Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Thomas A. Lambert
William & Mary Law Review
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court overruled its 1911 precedent declaring vertical minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to be per se illegal. The Leegin Court held that the practice should instead be examined on a case-by-case basis under antitrust's rule of reason. The Court further exhorted the lower courts to craft a "structured" rule of reason for evaluating RPM. This Article critiques six proposed approaches for evaluating minimum RPM and offers an alternative approach. The six approaches critiqued are: (1) the Brandeisian, unstructured rule of reason; (2) Judge Posner's rule of per se …
The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller
The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller
William & Mary Law Review
In any large corporate acquisition, there is an interim period between the time that the parties enter into a merger agreement and the time the transaction is effected and the purchase price paid. During this period, the business of the acquired company may deteriorate, thus raising the question of whether the counterparty must perform on the agreement and pay the purchase price. Merger agreements typically address this problem through "material adverse change" (MAC) clauses, which provide that a party may walk away from the transaction without penalty if the counterparty has suffered a MAC. Although the definition of MAC is …