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A Careful Examination Of The Live Nation-Ticketmaster Merger, Barak D. Richman, Alan J. Meese
A Careful Examination Of The Live Nation-Ticketmaster Merger, Barak D. Richman, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Scholarship
As great admirers of The Boss and as fans of live entertainment, we share in the popular dismay over rising ticket prices for live performances. But we have been asked as antitrust scholars to examine the proposed merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster, and we do so with the objectivity and honesty called for by The Boss’s quotes above. The proposed merger has been the target of aggressive attacks from several industry commentators and popular figures, but the legal and policy question is whether the transaction is at odds with the nation’s antitrust laws.
One primary source of concern to …
The Antitrust Of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics And Concerted Refusals To Deal, Barak D. Richman
The Antitrust Of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics And Concerted Refusals To Deal, Barak D. Richman
Faculty Scholarship
An agreement among competitors to refuse to deal with another party is traditionally per se illegal under the antitrust laws. But coordinated refusals to deal are often necessary to punish wrongdoers, and thus to deter undesirable behavior that state-sponsored courts cannot reach. When viewed as a mechanism to govern transactions and induce socially desirable cooperative behavior, coordinated refusals to deal can sustain valuable reputation mechanisms. This paper employs institutional economics to understand the role of coordinated refusals to deal in merchant circles and to evaluate the economic desirability of permitting such coordinated actions among competitors. It concludes that if the …