Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Sanciones Económicas Y Compensación De Daños En El Régimen De Competencia Mexicano, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

On Refusals To Deal In The European Competition Regime, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Crisis Económica Y Política De Competencia En México, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

The Role Of Theory And Evidence In Media Regulation And Law: A Response To Baker And A Defense Of Empirical Legal Studies, Daniel E. Ho, Kevin M. Quinn

Federal Communications Law Journal

We thank Professor Baker for a stimulating response to an Article in which we offered empirical evidence of editorial viewpoint diversity in the face of media consolidation. We appreciate his praise of the Article as "apply[ing] innovative statistical techniques" and as "far superior methodologically to most empirical studies" he has seen. At the same time, Baker "denies the policy relevance" to our Article because empirical evidence is "entirely irrelevant" to the field of media regulation under his preferred normative theory. Baker argues sweepingly that the legal academy's increased willingness to consider the perspectives of quantitative empiricists and positive theorists is …

Crisis Económica Y Política Antimonopolios, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay offers a brief, non-technical exposition of the antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers in product differentiated markets where the resulting price increase is thought to be unilateral - that is, only the post-merger firm increases its prices while other firms in the market do not. More realistically, non-merging firms who are reasonably close in product space to the merging firm will also be able to increase their prices when the post-merger firm's prices rise. The unilateral effects theory is robust and has become quite conventional in merger analysis. There is certainly no reason for thinking that it involves any …

The Neal Report And The Crisis In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The Neal Report, which was commissioned by Lyndon Johnson and published in 1967, is rightfully criticized for representing the past rather than the future of antitrust. Its authors completely embraced a theory of competition and industrial organization that had dominated American economic thinking for forty years, but was just in the process of coming to an end. The structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm that the Neal Report embodied had in fact been one of the most elegant and most tested theories of industrial organization. The theory represented the high point of structuralism in industrial organization economics, resting on the proposition that certain …

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …

Collusion In Convergent Markets, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A price squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm "squeezes' a rival's margins between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the rival, and a low output price to consumers for whom the two firms compete. Price squeezes have been a recognized but controversial antitrust violation for two-thirds of a century. We examine the law and economics of the price squeeze, beginning with Judge Hand's famous discussion in the Alcoa case in 1945. While Alcoa has been widely portrayed as creating a "fairness" or "fair profit" test for unlawful price squeezes, Judge Hand actually adopted a cost-based …

United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The development of marginalist, or neoclassical, economics led to a fifty-year long crisis in competition theory. Given an industrial structure with sufficient fixed costs, competition always became "ruinous," forcing firms to cut prices to marginal cost without sufficient revenue remaining to pay off investment. Early neoclassicists such as Alfred Marshall were not able to solve this problem, and as a result many economists were hostile toward the antitrust laws in the early decades of the twentieth century. The ruinous competition debate came to an abrupt end in the early 1930's, when Joan Robinson and particularly Edward Chamberlin developed models that …

Federalism, Variation, And State Regulation Of Franchise Termination, Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi, Larry Ribstein

All Faculty Scholarship

This article discusses and expands on our recent work examining the effects of franchise-termination laws. In a prior article, we examined empirically the effect of franchise-termination laws on the level of franchise activity. Our analysis improved upon the prior literature in two major ways. First, our work exploited two new sources of panel data to provide new empirical evidence on the effect of franchise termination laws. Second, our analysis examined variation in states’ restrictions on the ability of franchisors and franchisees to contract around a particular state’s regulation. We found that the effects of termination laws on the overall level …

Opportunism, Uncertainty, And Relational Contracting - Antitrust Rules In The Film Industry, Ryan M. Riegg

Ryan M. Riegg

Strategic Considerations In The Emergence Of Private Action Rights, Reza Rajabiun

Reza Rajabiun

Competition Law And The Economy In The Russian Federation, 1990-2006, Reza Rajabiun

Reza Rajabiun

Competition Law As Development Policy: Evidence From Poland, Reza Rajabiun

Reza Rajabiun