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Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2009

Economics

Selected Works

Articles 1 - 14 of 14

Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Sanciones Económicas Y Compensación De Daños En El Régimen De Competencia Mexicano, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor Dec 2009

Sanciones Económicas Y Compensación De Daños En El Régimen De Competencia Mexicano, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

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On Refusals To Deal In The European Competition Regime, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor Dec 2009

On Refusals To Deal In The European Competition Regime, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

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Crisis Económica Y Política De Competencia En México, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor Jul 2009

Crisis Económica Y Política De Competencia En México, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

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Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin Jun 2009

Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

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Crisis Económica Y Política Antimonopolios, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor May 2009

Crisis Económica Y Política Antimonopolios, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

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A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

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A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

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A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Jan 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …

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A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Jan 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …

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Collusion In Convergent Markets, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor Jan 2009

Collusion In Convergent Markets, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

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Opportunism, Uncertainty, And Relational Contracting - Antitrust Rules In The Film Industry, Ryan M. Riegg Dec 2008

Opportunism, Uncertainty, And Relational Contracting - Antitrust Rules In The Film Industry, Ryan M. Riegg

Ryan M. Riegg

For a long time, economists and investors have been baffled as to why Studios continue to produce movies with "blockbuster"-sized budgets (i.e. movies with budgets over $100 million) when producing those movies expose Studios to considerable economic risk.
By explaining the unique economics of the Film industry, and the effect of the Paramount (antitrust) rules on Film distribution contracts, this article provides an explanation to the puzzle of the blockbuster that is confirmed by recent trends in Film industry. Additionally, by using the Film industry as a model, this article also demonstrates how relational contracting can be understood as a …

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Strategic Considerations In The Emergence Of Private Action Rights, Reza Rajabiun Dec 2008

Strategic Considerations In The Emergence Of Private Action Rights, Reza Rajabiun

Reza Rajabiun

The design of mechanisms for the enforcement of rules regarding anticompetitive practices has been the subject of considerable controversy in both developed and developing countries. Public competition authorities have advantages in terms of scale economies and coordination of competing policy objectives. Private rights of action enhance the capacity of legal regimes to generate information and deter collusive agreements and exclusionary practices. Private enforcement also increases the transaction costs of regulatory capture. Given these differences, mixed regimes are likely to be superior to purely public or private arrangements. However, most national jurisdictions grant exclusive authority to public agencies and prosecutors. This …

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Competition Law And The Economy In The Russian Federation, 1990-2006, Reza Rajabiun Dec 2008

Competition Law And The Economy In The Russian Federation, 1990-2006, Reza Rajabiun

Reza Rajabiun

Most developing and transition countries adopted statutes prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and abusive practices during the 1980's and 1990's. The effectiveness of these laws is nevertheless widely debated. This paper contributes to the literature by conducting an event study of the adoption of Russian competition laws in the early years of transition, the subsequent economic developments and the legislative reform process of 2002-2006. An examination of the substantive prohibitions and enforcement data reveals that Russian competition laws relied on complex standards and imposed weak constraints on anticompetitive practices. The more recent shift to simpler and more predictable per se prohibitions against …

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Competition Law As Development Policy: Evidence From Poland, Reza Rajabiun Dec 2008

Competition Law As Development Policy: Evidence From Poland, Reza Rajabiun

Reza Rajabiun

The relationship between the design of competition laws and economic outcomes remains the subject of considerable controversy in both law and economics. Recent cross-national studies suggest that effective legal constraints against anticompetitive practices can enhance prospects for economic development by increasing the number of market participants and the quality of broader political and economic institutions. This paper explores the linkages between regulatory constraints against anticompetitive practices and the efficiency of market mechanisms by focusing on the experience in Poland between the collapse of central planning and regulatory harmonization pursuant to European Union accession. The analysis suggests that per se prohibitions …

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