Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Certificacion De Una Acción De Clase, Gabriel Martinez Medrano

Gabriel Martinez Medrano

Analisis del sistema de class actions en Argentina con posterioridad al leading case de la Corte Suprema "Halabi"

Sobre Homogeneidad Y Delimitación De La Clase En Las Acciones Colectivas De Consumidores. (Critica A Un Fallo)., Gabriel Martinez Medrano

Gabriel Martinez Medrano

La presente nota critica la solución adoptada por el Juez de Primera Instancia en la acción colectiva PADEC PREVENCION ASESORAMIENTO Y DEFENSA DEL CONSUM. C/ CITIBANK N.A. S/ SUMARISIMO, sentencia de fecha 8 de octubre de 2009, por la cual se rechazó una acción colectiva pretendida por una asociación de consumidores, utilizándose como argumento para el rechazo del caso la falta de delimitación de la clase representada y la consecuente falta de homogeneidad en el reclamo de los miembros de la clase.

Competencia Desleal En La Modalidad De Ambush Marketing: ¿Realmente Debe Preocuparnos?, Gustavo M. Rodríguez García

Gustavo M. Rodríguez García

Ambush marketing is calling for the attention of specialists around the world because of recent legal proposals in order to regulate this practice. In Peru, unfair competition law may be the way to respond to ambush marketing. However, is it really a problem that law should solve? or is it just the natural reaction of competitors in the market? is it unfair o simply agressive competition?

Cuarto Congreso Nacional De Organismos Públicos Autónomos, Bruno L. Costantini García

Bruno L. Costantini García

Memorias del Cuarto Congreso Nacional de Organismos Públicos Autónomos

"El papel de los Organismos Públicos Autónomos en la Consolidación de la Democracia"

The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The May 13, 2009 decision by the European Commission ('EC') holding that Intel violated Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome and should be fined a record amount and prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, set off a predictable four part chorus of denunciations:

1. Intel did nothing wrong and was just competing hard;
2. Intel's discounts were good for consumers;;
3. The entire matter is just another example of Europeans protecting their own against a more efficient U.S. company; and;
4. Even if Intel did engage in anticompetitive activity, the fine was much too large. These assertions will be addressed in turn.;

Who Needs Tickets? Examining Problems In The Growing Online Ticket Resale Industry, Clark P. Kirkman

Federal Communications Law Journal

The Internet has dramatically changed the methods by which people purchase tickets to events. In the past decade, the secondary ticket market has grown exponentially, and today the online ticket resale industry is valued at approximately $4 billion. Although there are consumer benefits to this industry growth, some of the industry practices have precipitated a consumer backlash. This was typified in 2007 when many parents, hoping to purchase tickets to the Hannah Montana "Best of Both Worlds Tour," watched as tickets sold out online in only a few minutes or less. Coupled with this episode was the Ticketmaster v. RMG …

Monopoly Pricing On Campus: New York's Textbook Access Act, Gary Minda

Pace Law Review

No abstract provided.

Impedimentos A La Declaración Como Denominaciones De Origen En El Decreto Legislativo 1075 Sobre Propiedad Industrial, Gustavo M. Rodríguez García

Gustavo M. Rodríguez García

No abstract provided.

Revitalizing Section 5 Of The Ftc Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper makes two points. First, Section 5 of the FTC Act, properly construed, is indeed significantly broader and more encompassing than the Sherman Act or Clayton Act. Section 5 violations include incipient violations of the other antitrust laws, and also violations of their policy or spirit.

Second, the best - and probably the only - way to interpret Section 5 in an expansive manner is to do so in a way that also is relatively definite, predictable, principled and clearly bounded. This best can be done if Section 5 is articulated using the consumer choice framework. Without the discipline …

Checks And Balances: European Competition Law And The Rule Of Law, Philip Marsden

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Intervención Obligada De Terceros En El Proceso Laboral, Gabriel Martinez Medrano

Gabriel Martinez Medrano

Versión abreviada de Tesina presentada para aprobar Curso Posgrado Derecho Laboral (Sociedad Argentina de Derecho Laboral SADL) 2007

A Roundtable Discussion

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Introduction

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Does The Rule Of Reason Violate The Rule Of Law?, Maurice E. Stucke

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Does The Rule Of Reason Violate The Rule Of Law?, Maurice E. Stucke

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Checks And Balances: European Competition Law And The Rule Of Law, Philip Marsden

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Eu Competition Law And The Rule Of Law Ii: Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied, Tim Cowen

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Ftc Takes Action On Stop-Foreclosure Scams, Kyle Gaffaney

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Does Antitrust Regulation Violate The Rule Of Law?, Elbert L. Robertson

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Does Antitrust Regulation Violate The Rule Of Law?, Elbert L. Robertson

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Federal Ban On Automated Prerecorded Messages, So-Called "Robocalls," Goes Into Effect, Kyle Gaffaney

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Editor's Note, Sarah Tennant

Loyola Consumer Law Review

No abstract provided.

Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright

Articles

Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of …

Sobre El Contrato De Licencia De Marcas, Gustavo M. Rodríguez García

Gustavo M. Rodríguez García

The author explains the basics of trademark licence agreements in light of peruvian legislation and shares some considerations about the explicit and implicit obligations of the parties