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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Afterword: Could A Merger Lead To Both A Monopoly And A Lower Price?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Walter Vandaele Dec 1983

Afterword: Could A Merger Lead To Both A Monopoly And A Lower Price?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Walter Vandaele

All Faculty Scholarship

This article demonstrates that significant net efficiencies from a merger could cause prices to decrease, even if the merger results in a monopoly. The article also shows that a price focus would require substantially more efficiencies to justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger than would an efficiency focus (in other words, it re-does the Williamsonian merger tradeoff, using price to consumers instead of net efficiencies as its focus). We demonstrate this by calculating how large the necessary efficiency gains would have to be to prevent price increases under different market conditions.


Efficiency Considerations In Merger Enforcement, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande Dec 1983

Efficiency Considerations In Merger Enforcement, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This is one of the first articles to demonstrate that the primary goal of antitrust is neither exclusively to enhance economic efficiency, nor to address any social or political factor. Rather, the overriding intent behind the merger laws was to prevent prices to purchasers from rising due to mergers (a wealth transfer concern). This is the first article to show how to analyze mergers with this goal in mind. Doing so challenges the fundamental underpinnings of Williamsonian merger analysis (which assumes mergers should be evaluated only in terms of net efficiency effects).

In this and three related articles we re-do …


Employee Standing Under Section 4 Of The Clayton Act, Michigan Law Review Aug 1983

Employee Standing Under Section 4 Of The Clayton Act, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note will focus on the confusion that plagues one category of antitrust standing cases, those in which an employee alleges wrongful discharge for his refusal to participate in a scheme that violates the antitrust laws. Conflicts among the circuits in their analysis and resolution of these employee standing cases have not been definitively settled by the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the right to seek recovery under section 4. This Note argues that these recent Supreme Court decisions, as well as the policies behind the antitrust laws, weigh in favor of permitting an employee to maintain a section 4 …


The Federal Trade Commission, Injunctive Relief, And Allegedly Anticompetitive Mergers: Preliminary Relief Under The Federal Trade Commission Act, David M. Stryker Jan 1983

The Federal Trade Commission, Injunctive Relief, And Allegedly Anticompetitive Mergers: Preliminary Relief Under The Federal Trade Commission Act, David M. Stryker

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.