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Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, Stephen Yelderman Oct 2016

Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, Stephen Yelderman

Journal Articles

This Article is the first to seriously scrutinize the claim that patent challenges lead to increased competition. It identifies a number of conditions that must hold for a patent challenge to provide this particular benefit, and evaluates the reasonableness of assuming that the pro-competitive benefits of patent challenges are generally available. As it turns out, there are a number of ways these conditions can and regularly do fail. This Article synthesizes legal doctrine, recent empirical scholarship, and several novel case studies to identify categories of challenges in which the potential benefits for competition are smaller than previously thought or, in …


Modifying Merger Consent Decrees To Improve Merger Enforcement Policy, Steven C. Salop Oct 2016

Modifying Merger Consent Decrees To Improve Merger Enforcement Policy, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article analyzes my short proposal for reviewing and modifying merger consent decrees to permit additional relief if the provisions of the initial consent merger are found to fail to preserve or restore competition in a reasonable period of time after the merger was consummated. My proposal also would involve more frequent reviews of consummated mergers that have been cleared without challenge, particularly those that were close calls. While “Don't Look Back” might be the best anthem for artists, economic decision theory would not support that approach to merger policy.

Predicting the impact of proposed mergers and remedies on consumers …


Antitrust And Wealth Inequality, Daniel Crane Apr 2016

Antitrust And Wealth Inequality, Daniel Crane

Articles

In recent years, progressive public intellectuals and prominent scholars have asserted that monopoly power lies at the root of wealth inequality and that increases in antitrust enforcement are necessary to stem its rising tide. This claim is misguided. Exercises of market power have complex, crosscutting effects that undermine the generality of the monopoly regressivity claim. Contrary to what the regressivity critics assume, wealthy shareholders and senior corporate executives do not capture the preponderance of monopoly rents. Such profits are broadly shared within and dissipated outside the firm. Further, many of the subjects of antitrust law are middle-class professionals, sole proprietors, …


Assembled Products: The Key To More Effective Competition And Antitrust Oversight In Health Care, William M. Sage Apr 2016

Assembled Products: The Key To More Effective Competition And Antitrust Oversight In Health Care, William M. Sage

Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that recent calls for antitrust enforcement to protect health insurers from hospital and physician consolidation are incomplete. The principal obstacle to effective competition in health care is not that one or the other party has too much bargaining power, but that they have been buying and selling the wrong things. Vigorous antitrust enforcement will benefit health care consumers only if it accounts for the competitive distortions caused by the sector’s long history of government regulation. Because of regulation, what pass for products in health care are typically small process steps and isolated components that can be assigned …


Evaluating Joint Ventures: Economic Analysis Checklist, Steven C. Salop Mar 2016

Evaluating Joint Ventures: Economic Analysis Checklist, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This short article (for a symposium on joint ventures) provides practitioners and law professor with a 20 question checklist to guide the competitive effects analysis of the formation of a joint venture and the specific restraints and conduct of the venture. The questions mainly focus on ventures among actual or potential competitors, though some of the questions also are relevant for ventures involving complementary product firms. The questions concern potential competitive harms, potential competitive benefits, and the determination of net competitive effects. While this sequencing follows the standard burden-shifting formulation of the rule of reason decision process, the article notes …


Hospital Mergers And Economic Efficiency, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance, D. Daniel Sokol Mar 2016

Hospital Mergers And Economic Efficiency, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

Consolidation via merger both from hospital-to-hospital mergers and from hospital acquisitions of physician groups is changing the competitive landscape of the provision of health care delivery in the United States. This Article undertakes a legal and economic examination of a recent Ninth Circuit case examining the hospital acquisition of a physician group. This Article explores the Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd. (St. Luke’s) decision—proposing a type of analysis that the district court and Ninth Circuit should have undertaken and that we hope future courts undertake when analyzing mergers in the …


Formalism And Functionalism In Antitrust Treatment Of Loyalty Rebates: A Comparative Perspective, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2016

Formalism And Functionalism In Antitrust Treatment Of Loyalty Rebates: A Comparative Perspective, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

It is a widely held belief that U.S. antitrust law has long been characterized by economic functionalism and that European antitrust law has long been characterized by legal formalism.' The received wisdom began to change in Europe a decade ago when the Directorate General Competition of the European Commission (DG Comp) began to advocate a more "effects-based" analysis of abuse of dominance. Two factors arguably contributed to this change. First, the DG Comp became increasingly influenced by economists who had little use for the old formalism. Second, as Europe trie to spread antitrust to developing antitrust regimes across the world-and, …