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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Unilateral Refusals To License In The Us, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley
Unilateral Refusals To License In The Us, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley
All Faculty Scholarship
Most antitrust claims relating to intellectual property involve challenges to agreements, licensing practices or affirmative conduct involving the use or disposition of the intellectual property rights or the products they cover. But sometimes an antitrust claim centers on an intellectual property owner's refusal to use or license an intellectual property right, perhaps coupled with efforts to enforce the intellectual property right against infringers. The allegation may be that the intellectual property right is so essential to competition that it must be licensed across the board, or that a refusal to license it to one particular party was discriminatory, or that …
What Do Exit Polls And Flu Vaccine Shortages Have In Common?, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande, F.M. Scherer
What Do Exit Polls And Flu Vaccine Shortages Have In Common?, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande, F.M. Scherer
All Faculty Scholarship
What do exit polls and flu vaccine shortages have in common? Both involve situations where society has come to rely excessively on too few entities. When even one company makes a mistake society can suffer significantly. This short piece advocates that we abandon our almost laissez faire tolerence towards high concentration, and rely upon competition, rather than on monopoly or a small number of producers.
Player Restraints And Competition Law Throughout The World, Stephen F. Ross
Player Restraints And Competition Law Throughout The World, Stephen F. Ross
Journal Articles
This article reviews agreements among clubs participating in league sports in many countries throughout the world that limit competition for the services of players. Under the English common law (which governs in most of the British commonwealth), the competition law provisions of the European Union's governing treaty, the American Sherman Act, and the Canadian Competition Act, the governing standard is quite similar. Player restraints cab only be justified if they are related to a legitimate purpose, which is usually defined as one that demonstrably improves the consumer appeal for the sporting competition. Moreover, and significantly, player restraints must be reasonably …
Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese
Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Anticompetitive Overbuying By Power Buyers, Steven C. Salop
Anticompetitive Overbuying By Power Buyers, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Two types of single-firm overbuying are analyzed in this article. Predatory overbuying consists of overbuying inputs as a predatory strategy to cause buyer-side competitors in the input market to exit from the market or permanently shrink their capacity in order to gain monopsony power in the input market. Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC) overbuying consists of overbuying inputs as an exclusionary strategy to raise rivals' input costs and thereby gain market power in the output market. In most cases, the additional input purchases are used to produce output. However, in unusual cases a firm may engage in naked overbuying, that is, …
The Problem Of New Uses, Rebecca S. Eisenberg
The Problem Of New Uses, Rebecca S. Eisenberg
Articles
Discovering new uses for drugs that are already on the market seems like it ought to be the low-lying fruit of biopharmaceutical research and development (R&D). Firms have already made significant investments in developing these drugs and bringing them to market, including testing them in clinical trials, shepherding them through the FDA regulatory approval process, building production facilities, and training sales staff to market them to physicians. By this point, the drugs have begun to enjoy goodwill among patients and physicians and casual observations in the course of clinical experience may point to potential new uses. One might expect that …