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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

The Tethered Economy, Aaron K. Perzanowski, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari Jan 2019

The Tethered Economy, Aaron K. Perzanowski, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari

Faculty Publications

Imagine a future in which every purchase decision is as complex as choosing a mobile phone. What will ongoing service cost? Is it compatible with other devices you use? Can you move data and applications across de- vices? Can you switch providers? These are just some of the questions one must consider when a product is “tethered” or persistently linked to the seller. The Internet of Things, but more broadly, consumer products with embedded software, are already tethered. While tethered products bring the benefits of connection, they also carry its pathologies. As sellers blend hardware and software—as well as product …


A Solution In Search Of A Problem At The Biologics Frontier, Erika Lietzan Jan 2018

A Solution In Search Of A Problem At The Biologics Frontier, Erika Lietzan

Faculty Publications

This short paper comments on Professor Carrier's new article, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier. His article makes a profound initial contribution to a new area of scholarship, based on a large body of prior work considering antitrust issues relating to small molecule drugs. But Professor Carrier’s article, like my own forthcoming piece on innovation and competition in the biologics marketplace, is inherently speculative. We are making our best judgments about the nature of a still emerging marketplace and likely conduct in that marketplace, based on our understandings of a new regulatory framework that is itself still emerging, the broader legal …


Tweaking Antitrust's Business Model , Thom Lambert Jan 2006

Tweaking Antitrust's Business Model , Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

This essay evaluates Hovenkamp's suggestions, concluding that most are sound, that a few might be slightly revised to enhance their effectiveness or administrability, and that a couple are downright unwise. In particular, the essay criticizes Hovenkamp's call for abandonment of the indirect purchaser rule and his proposed test for identifying exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.


Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese Oct 2005

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese Jan 2005

Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese Jan 2005

Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese Jan 2004

Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure optimal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some scholars reject both approaches, …


Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese Jan 2003

Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.