Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Federalism, Free Competition, And Sherman Act Preemption Of State Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Sherman Act establishes free competition as the rule governing interstate trade. Banning private restraints cannot ensure that competitive markets allocate the nation's resources. State laws can pose identical threats to free markets, posing an obstacle to achieving Congress's goal to protect free competition.

The Sherman Act would thus override anticompetitive state laws under ordinary preemption standards. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected such preemption in Parker v. Brown, creating the "state action doctrine." Parker and its progeny hold that state-imposed restraints are immune from Sherman Act preemption, even if they impose significant harm on out-of-state consumers. Parker's progeny …

Will The Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair The Damage Resulting From Ncaa's Sports League Exemption, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Horizontal restraints are unlawful per se unless a court can identify some redeeming virtue that such restraints may create. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (“NCAA”), the Supreme Court rejected this standard, refusing to condemn horizontal restraints on price and output imposed by the NCAA without specifying any possible redeeming virtues. The Court emphasized that other restraints not before the Court were necessary to create and maintain athletic competition like that supervised by the NCAA. This exemption for sports leagues ensures that all restraints imposed by such entities merit Rule …

Requiem For A Lightweight: How Ncaa Continues To Distort Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court speaks rarely about the meaning of the Sherman Act. When the Court does speak, its pronouncements have particular resonance and staying power among jurists, scholars, and enforcers. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma was such a case. There the Court assessed agreements reducing the output and increasing the prices of televised college football games. After announcing that restraints imposed by sports leagues are exempt from per se condemnation, the Court went on to invalidate the challenged agreements under the rule of reason because they produced significant economic harm without offsetting benefits. In so …

Antitrust Regulation And The Federal-State Balance: Restoring The Original Design, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The U.S. Constitution divides authority over commerce between states and the national government. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act (“the Act”) reflects this allocation of power, reaching only those harmful agreements that are “in restraint of... commerce among the several States.” This Article contends that the Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state and national power over trade restraints in 1948, abruptly abandoning decades of precedent recognizing exclusive state authority over most intrastate restraints. This revised construction of the Act contravened the statute’s apparent meaning, unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and undermined the …

In Praise Of All Or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject The Quick Look, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Antitrust, Regulatory Harm, And Economic Liberty, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Robert Bork's Forgotten Role In The Transaction Cost Revolution, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The last few decades have witnessed a scientific revolution in the field of industrial organization in the form of transaction cost economics (TCE). This revolution has radically altered economists’ understanding and interpretation of both partial and complete economic integration. Not surprisingly, this sea change has substantially influenced antitrust law and policy, impelling the Supreme Court to reverse or greatly modify various precedents.

This essay supplements the received historiography of the TCE revolution. It contends that Robert Bork played a hitherto underappreciated role in that revolution. In particular, the essay contends that in 1966, before the official onset of the transaction …

Reframing The (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare And Total Welfare, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

This Article critiques the role that the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare” that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine. The Article contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the debate between those who would equate “consumer welfare” with “total welfare” and those who equate consumer welfare with “purchaser welfare.” In particular, the model excludes, by fiat, the fact that new efficiencies free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output and thus the welfare of purchasers in those markets. Moreover, the model also assumes that both …

Competition Policy And The Great Depression: Lessons Learned And A New Way Forward, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The recent Great Recession has shaken the nation’s faith in free markets and inspired various forms of actual or proposed regulatory intervention displacing free competition. Proponents of such intervention often claim that such interference with free-market outcomes will help foster economic recovery and thus macroeconomic stability by, for instance, enhancing the “purchasing power” of workers or reducing consumer prices. Such arguments for increased economic centralization echo those made during the Great Depression, when proponents of regulatory intervention claimed that such interference with economic liberty and free competition, including suspension of the antitrust laws, was necessary to foster economic recovery. Indeed, …

Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Federal Pleading And State Presuit Discovery, Scott Dodson

Faculty Publications

This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could play in rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal - when a plaintiff in federal court requires information in the hands (or minds) of defendants or third parties in order to properly plead her claim, but such information is not discoverable unless the claim can survive a motion to dismiss. First, this Article provides an account of the development of federal pleading standards from before Twombly through their current post-Iqbal state. Second, this Article describes the effects of the post-Iqbal federal pleading standards and highlights the harsh results …

Competition And Market Failure In The Antitrust Jurisprudence Of Justice Stevens, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Intrabrand Restraints And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure optimal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some scholars reject both approaches, …

Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Challenging traditional antitrust jurisprudence, Professor Alan J. Meese argues that the present structure of Rule of Reason analysis, applied pursuant to Standard Oil v. United States, has become outdated. The Rule of Reason as currently applied by the courts rests upon neoclassical price theory, an economic paradigm that assumes that legitimate competition consists of unbridled technological rivalry, unconstrained by nonstandard contracts. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to apply a competing paradigm- Transaction Cost Economics-when determining whether a contract is unreasonable "per se" or instead deserving of Rule of Reason scrutiny. Professor Meese argues that Transaction Cost Economics more …

Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Antitrust And The Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses In The New Economy, A. Benjamin Spencer

Faculty Publications

On April 3, 2000, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson declared that the Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") had maintained monopoly power in the personal computer operating system market by anticompetitive means, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A case of enormous significance, Microsoft raises difficult questions regarding how antitrust laws should be applied to information technology ("IT') companies. Specifically, many characteristics of what has come to be called the "New Economy" - and of the IT companies within it - suggest that traditional monopolization analysis may need modification. As the U.S. has moved toward an information- based …

Farewell To The Quick Look: Redefining The Scope And Content Of The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Most scholars would agree that a merger between General Motors and Ford should not be judged solely by Delaware corporate law, even if both firms are incorporated in Delaware. Leaving the standards governing such mergers to state law would assuredly produce a race to the bottom that would result in unduly permissive treatment of such transactions. Similarly, if the two firms agreed to divide markets, most would agree that some regulatory authority other than Michigan or Delaware should have the final word on the agreement. Thus, in order to forestall monopoly or its equivalent, the national government must itself exercise …

Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Economic Theory, Trader Freedom And Consumer Welfare: State Oil Co. V. Khan And The Continuing Incoherence Of Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics: Farewell To The Chimera Of Forcing, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

When First Amendment Values And Competition Policy Collide: Resolving The Dilemma Of Mixed-Motive Boycotts, Kay P. Kindred

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Labor Unions In The Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, Davison M. Douglas

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.