Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Publication Year
Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Monopolizing Sports Data, Marc Edelman, John T. Holden
Monopolizing Sports Data, Marc Edelman, John T. Holden
William & Mary Law Review
With legal sports betting viewed as a panacea for state budget woes across the United States, the underlying data that fuels the sports betting industry has emerged as an especially valuable asset. In the hopes of capitalizing on state laws that have now legalized sports betting, United States professional sports leagues have attempted to gain exclusive ownership rights over valuable sports betting data by asking legislators to mandate that bookmakers exclusively use data sold through the league. In addition, some sports leagues have imposed policies mandating that teams bundle together their collected data for purposes of selling it exclusively through …
No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao
No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao
William & Mary Law Review
The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competition is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy. These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate …
Wickard Through An Antitrust Lens, Alan J. Meese
Wickard Through An Antitrust Lens, Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
More Than Just A Toothache? N.C. Dental Leaves Medical Boards Vulnerable: A Look At Telemedicine Companies And Antitrust Challenges To State Prescription Drug Rules, Alexander R. Kalyniuk
More Than Just A Toothache? N.C. Dental Leaves Medical Boards Vulnerable: A Look At Telemedicine Companies And Antitrust Challenges To State Prescription Drug Rules, Alexander R. Kalyniuk
William & Mary Business Law Review
Encouraged by technological advancements and favorable provisions within the Affordable Care Act, telemedicine companies that offer online doctor visits are thriving in the health care industry. Online doctor visits are a relatively new and cost-efficient method to provide medical care over long distances that do not require patients to step outside their homes. However, many state medical board scope-of-practice rules prohibit physicians from prescribing medications without an in-person physical examination of the patient, which impedes telemedicine companies from offering their online services in those states. To circumvent this barrier, telemedicine companies may have a prima facie case under § 1 …
Ncaa Scholarship Restrictions As Anticompetitive Measures: The One-Year Rule And Scholarship Caps As Avenues For Antitrust Society, Neil Gibson
William & Mary Business Law Review
By referencing the historical record to expose the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship limits as cost-cutting, anticompetitive measures imposing harmful effects upon scholarship-seeking student athletes, this Note argues that despite the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana’s unfavorable ruling in Agnew v. NCAA, a Sherman Act claim against the NCAA linking bachelor’s degrees and scholarships could be legally viable. In particular, just application of the quick look rule of reason, an abbreviated form of antitrust analysis, could lead a court to find the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship caps as violative of …
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
William & Mary Law Review
Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …
Tying Conspiracies, Christopher R. Leslie
Tying Conspiracies, Christopher R. Leslie
William & Mary Law Review
Antitrust law has long condemned tying arrangements when they are imposed by a single dominant firm. However, tying jurisprudence does not recognize that tie-ins can also occur as the result of a conspiracy among competitors. Consequently, antitrust doctrine fails to appreciate the unique anticompetitive dangers of concerted tying arrangements. After providing real-world examples of tying conspiracies, Professor Leslie explains how concerted tying arrangements present a far greater threat to competitive markets than traditional, unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. Because tying jurisprudence evolved without considering the existence or effects of concerted tie-ins, the current test for evaluating the legality of tying arrangements …
The Procompetitive Interest In Intellectual Property Law, Thomas F. Cotter
The Procompetitive Interest In Intellectual Property Law, Thomas F. Cotter
William & Mary Law Review
When government recognizes intellectual property (IP) rights, it is often viewed as sanctioning the existence of private "monopolies," in contrast to the general antimonopoly thrust of the antitrust laws. And yet, on occasion IP law itself condemns conduct on the part of IP owners-or excuses otherwise infringing activity on the part of IP defendants-expressly for the purpose of promoting competition. It does so even though antitrust law -if one were to apply it at all under analogous circumstances-would not find anticompetitive harm without conducting a more thorough analysis of whether the antitrust defendant possesses power over a well-defined market. Salient …
Preventing Predatory Abuses In Litigation Between Business Competitors: Focusing On A Litigant's Reasons For Initiating The Litigation To Ensure A Balance Between The Constitutional Right To Petition And The Sherman Act's Guarantee Of Fair Competition In Business, Scott D. Helsel
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Anti Trust - Personal Liability Of Corporate Officers Participating In Sherman Act Violations, Paul Auster
Anti Trust - Personal Liability Of Corporate Officers Participating In Sherman Act Violations, Paul Auster
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Constitutional Law, Attempts To Monopolize A Method Of Doing Business, Daniel U. Livermore Jr.
Constitutional Law, Attempts To Monopolize A Method Of Doing Business, Daniel U. Livermore Jr.
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.