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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Taking Antitrust Away From The Courts, Ganesh Sitaraman Sep 2018

Taking Antitrust Away From The Courts, Ganesh Sitaraman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A small number of firms hold significant market power in a wide variety of sectors of the economy, leading commentators across the political spectrum to call for a reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement. But the antitrust agencies have been surprisingly timid in response to this challenge, and when they have tried to assert themselves, they have often found that hostile courts block their ability to foster competitive markets. In other areas of law, Congress delegates power to agencies, agencies make regulations setting standards, and courts provide deferential review after the fact. Antitrust doesn’t work this way. Courts – made up of …


Hit And Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, And Refusal To Deal In The Supreme Court Decision In Trinko, Nicholas Economides Jan 2007

Hit And Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, And Refusal To Deal In The Supreme Court Decision In Trinko, Nicholas Economides

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Under the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent local exchange carriers, including Verizon, were obligated to lease parts of their local telecommunications network to any firm, at "cost plus a reasonable profit" prices, that could combine them at will, add retailing services, and sell local telecommunication service as a rival to the incumbent. AT&T, an entrant into the local telecommunications market, leased parts of Verizon's network. Curtis Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&T, sued Verizon, alleging various anti-competitive actions of Verizon against AT&T, including that Verizon raised the costs of AT&T, its downstream retail rival. The …


Old Man And The Sky: The Brazilian Antitrust Implications For Rupert Murdoch's Expansion Of The Sky Global Satellite Network, Geoffrey Drake Jan 2004

Old Man And The Sky: The Brazilian Antitrust Implications For Rupert Murdoch's Expansion Of The Sky Global Satellite Network, Geoffrey Drake

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

To expand its global satellite network to the United States, Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation purchased DirecTV in 2003. Brazil's antitrust regulatory body, CADE, has expressed concern about a potential monopoly in the Brazilian satellite market controlled by Murdoch because News' Sky Latin America competes directly with DirecTV. If News opts to combine the two Brazilian satellite services, it will consolidate control of ninety-five percent of Brazil's satellite market, leaving satellite and cable competitors at a disadvantage. The Author argues that CADE should conditionally approve the acquisition because of the combination's ability to benefit Brazilian consumers, the government, and News Corporation …


Book Reviews, Arthur D. Austin, John N. Hazard Oct 1973

Book Reviews, Arthur D. Austin, John N. Hazard

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Case Against Oligopoly: A New Perspective--

Campaigns of corporate aggrandizement have always attracted a wide assortment of camp followers, with politicians and academics among the most persistent. To the politician, corporate size is a convenient and headline-provoking punching bag (and, during election time, a plentiful source of funding), while many a professor has established a reputation--and made money--by criticizing, extolling, or analyzing its various components. In a series of public hearings, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, with Dr. John Blair as chief economist, produced a subdued blend of both callings. Drawing heavily but not exclusively from the …


Monopoly Profits, Economic Impossibility, And Unfairness As Anti-Trust Tests, Philip Marcus Mar 1961

Monopoly Profits, Economic Impossibility, And Unfairness As Anti-Trust Tests, Philip Marcus

Vanderbilt Law Review

One must agree with the district court's observation that the mere fact that one opens a business in an area with the idea that he will succeed and an existing-perhaps poorly run-business will have to withdraw and leave him alone in the field is hardly a situation which the Sherman Act is intended to reach. The Sherman Act does not protect one from competition, least of all a monopolist, which the Gazette admittedly was. And this is true even though the competition is likely to result in a monopoly. But there are limits upon the methods which one can use …


Worldmarks And The Antitrust Law, Rudolf Callmann Mar 1958

Worldmarks And The Antitrust Law, Rudolf Callmann

Vanderbilt Law Review

Like all things, trademark rights can also be exploited for sinister purposes. A trademark can, for example, be used in violation of the antitrust laws and no elaborate references need be made to the legislative history of the Lanham Act to demonstrate that the Act was "not intended to undermine the anti-trust laws."' Certain specific provisions of the Act clearly disclose the legislative intent to dissuade a trademark owner from using his mark in violation of the antitrust laws.


A Note On Concentration Studies And Antitrust Policy, Jesse W. Markham Mar 1958

A Note On Concentration Studies And Antitrust Policy, Jesse W. Markham

Vanderbilt Law Review

The current interest in industrial concentration studies almost rivals that which gave rise to the Temporary National Economic Committee's voluminous output on the subject two decades ago. Indeed,by almost any standard, 1957 was a banner year. The Federal Trade Commission opened the season with its 656-page report in January. The National Industrial Conference Board devoted a session to the topic at its forty-first annual meeting in May. In July the Bureau of the Census published its study performed at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. In June the Chamber of Commerce of the United States issued …


For H.R. Ii And S. Ii To Strengthen The Robinson-Patman Act And Amend The Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Discrimination, Wright Patman M.C. Mar 1958

For H.R. Ii And S. Ii To Strengthen The Robinson-Patman Act And Amend The Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Discrimination, Wright Patman M.C.

Vanderbilt Law Review

H. R. 11 and S. 11 are modest and simple legislative proposals.'They provide for no change in our antitrust laws prohibiting price discrimination except to limit somewhat the use of the "good faith" defense. The extent of this limitation goes no further than to assist the Act by providing that the "good faith" defense shall not operate as an absolute and complete bar to a proceeding by the Government against the practices of destructive price discrimination: In other words, those discriminations which would have the effect of substantially lessening competition and tending to create a monopoly may not be defended …


Du Pont General Motors Case, James A. Hart Mar 1958

Du Pont General Motors Case, James A. Hart

Vanderbilt Law Review

On June 3, 1957, the United States Supreme Court, in a four to two decision, held that the du Pont Company's ownership of twenty-three per cent of the voting stock of General Motors had tended to create a monopoly in a line of commerce and thus violated section 71 of the Clayton Act. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion and Justice Burton, joined by Justice Frankfurter filed a vigorous dissent. Three of the Justices, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Hence, a possibility remains that the present Court, with all nine …