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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Algorithmic Opacity, Private Accountability, And Corporate Social Disclosure In The Age Of Artificial Intelligence, Sylvia Lu
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
Today, firms develop machine-learning algorithms to control human decisions in nearly every industry, creating a structural tension between commercial opacity and democratic transparency. In many of their commercial applications, advanced algorithms are technically complicated and privately owned, which allows them to hide from legal regimes and prevents public scrutiny. However, they may demonstrate their negative effects—erosion of democratic norms, damages to financial gains, and extending harms to stakeholders—without warning. Nevertheless, because the inner workings and applications of algorithms are generally incomprehensible and protected as trade secrets, they can be completely shielded from public surveillance. One of the solutions to this …
Zombie Energy Laws, Joshua C. Macey
Zombie Energy Laws, Joshua C. Macey
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article traces the development of three legal rules—cost recovery for vertically integrated utilities, the requirement that regulators assess the financial viability of energy projects before issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and the filed rate doctrine—that emerged out of the view that electric power companies should be shielded from market forces. It argues that important elements of these legal rules have become “zombie energy laws.” Zombie energy laws are statutes, regulations, and judicial precedents that continue to apply after their underlying economic and legal bases dissipate. Zombie energy laws were originally designed to protect consumers by, among …
Franchise Participants As Proper Patent Opponents: Walker Process Claims, Robert W. Emerson
Franchise Participants As Proper Patent Opponents: Walker Process Claims, Robert W. Emerson
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
Franchise parties may be sued for patent infringement, or they may seek to sue others for an antitrust injury as the result of a fraudulently obtained patent. Indeed, franchisors and franchisees may simultaneously fall under both categories-sued for infringement but aggrieved because the very basis of that suit is illegitimate in their eyes. These franchise parties may turn for relief to a patent-validity challenge authorized in the seminal case Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machine & Chemical Corp. Franchise participants-franchisees and franchisors alike-may be the ideal Walker Process claimants. When these types of cases occur, the damages within the …
Misaligned Lawmaking, Timothy Meyer
Misaligned Lawmaking, Timothy Meyer
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article makes three contributions. First, it introduces the Misalignment Thesis in the context of U.S. trade policy. The Misalignment Thesis is a descriptive claim about how the structure of a legislative bargain influences the long-term stability and effectiveness of that bargain. Second, the Article introduces the normative corollary to the Misalignment Thesis: if political stability hinges on respecting the legislative bargain, interdependent policies should be subject to renegotiation on the same timeline and implementation on the same terms. In light of this prescription, I offer three concrete proposals for aligning trade liberalization and trade adjustment assistance in order to …
Do Founders Control Startup Firms That Go Public?, Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Do Founders Control Startup Firms That Go Public?, Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
American competition policy has four big problems: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. These companies each reign over a sector of the digital marketplace, controlling both the consumer experience and the possibility of competitive entry. This Essay argues that the conventional account of how antitrust law allowed this consolidation of market power - that it failed to evolve to address the market realities of the technology sector- is incomplete. Not only did courts fail to adapt antitrust law from its smoke-stack roots, but they gave big tech special dispensation under traditional antitrust doctrine. Swayed by prevailing utopic views about digital markets …