Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Competition At The Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards For Banks And Other Financial Institutions, Joseph P. Bauer, Earl W. Kintner

Journal Articles

Congressional and judicial attitudes towards the banking industry have reflected two, sometimes conflicting, goals-the maintenance of the solvency of financial institutions to protect the interests of depositors, other creditors and the economy at large; and the promotion of competition among these institutions and in the economy. The advancement of these goals has been reflected in the application of the antitrust laws to the industry.

For the most part, the Sherman and Clayton Acts apply with the same force and scope to financial institutions as to other industries. In some cases, however, the goal of institutional protection is favored, and the …

Developments In Section Two Of The Sherman Act, Joseph P. Bauer

Journal Articles

The issues raised in this Symposium are of great interest and timeliness. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court explored the role of Section 2 of the Sherman Act as an essential element in the antitrust regime. As was true with antitrust generally, courts expanded the reach of Section 2, frequently concluding that the complained-of conduct constituted unlawful monopolization or attempts to monopolize, and approving injunctions forbidding the continuation of exclusionary or predatory practices and orders leading to the breakup of the monopoly itself. However, after the Grinnell decision in 1966, and the Otter Tail case almost a decade …

Antitrust Exemptions For Private Requests For Governmental Action: A Critical Analysis Of The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, Earl W. Kintner, Joseph P. Bauer

Journal Articles

Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for persons to engage in a combination or conspiracy, in restraint of trade. A variety of undertakings by persons seeking legislative action, judicial relief, administrative agency activity, or action by the executive branch of government may result in governmental steps which restrain competitors or diminish competition. Indeed, the very act of seeking governmental intervention, even if unsuccessful, may have adverse competitive effects. Similarly, monopolization or attempts to monopolize, proscribed by Section 2 of the Sherman Act, might actually be advanced by governmental activities or by an individual merely seeking governmental assistance. …

A Simplified Approach To Tying Arrangements: A Legal And Economic Analysis, Joseph P. Bauer

Journal Articles

Few types of antitrust conduct have received as much treatment from the Supreme Court as tying arrangements. This practice, which is unlawful per se when certain prerequisites are met, may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one product [the tying product] but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier. Notwithstanding this extensive Supreme Court attention, there is as much heat as light in this area. The doctrine that has developed is often unpredictable and frequently …

Per Se Illegality Of Concerted Refusals To Deal: A Rule Ripe For Reexamination, Joseph P. Bauer

Journal Articles

Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes [e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade. Early Supreme Court cases interpreting this provision held that it required a determination by the trier of fact of the reasonableness of the challenged conduct in each case — an approach which came to be known as the rule of reason. In subsequent cases, however, the Court has held that certain conduct is unreasonable per se. That is, once a court has determined that such conduct has taken place, it is foreclosed from undertaking an inquiry into the reasonableness of that …