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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

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Consumer Protection Law

Series

2009

Antitrust

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande Jun 2009

The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The May 13, 2009 decision by the European Commission ('EC') holding that Intel violated Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome and should be fined a record amount and prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, set off a predictable four part chorus of denunciations:

  1. Intel did nothing wrong and was just competing hard;
  2. Intel's discounts were good for consumers;;
  3. The entire matter is just another example of Europeans protecting their own against a more efficient U.S. company; and;
  4. Even if Intel did engage in anticompetitive activity, the fine was much too large. These assertions will be addressed in turn.;


Revitalizing Section 5 Of The Ftc Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis, Robert H. Lande Feb 2009

Revitalizing Section 5 Of The Ftc Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper makes two points. First, Section 5 of the FTC Act, properly construed, is indeed significantly broader and more encompassing than the Sherman Act or Clayton Act. Section 5 violations include incipient violations of the other antitrust laws, and also violations of their policy or spirit.

Second, the best - and probably the only - way to interpret Section 5 in an expansive manner is to do so in a way that also is relatively definite, predictable, principled and clearly bounded. This best can be done if Section 5 is articulated using the consumer choice framework. Without the discipline …


Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright Jan 2009

Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright

Articles

Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of …