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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng
Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng
University of Cincinnati Law Review
In recent years, states have launched several antitrust investigations targeting digital platforms. A major difficulty in these investigations is demonstrating the extent of a digital platform’s market power. Market power is defined as the control of the output or the price without the loss of business to competitors. As will be explored in this Article, market power is a critical component in an antitrust analysis. On several occasions, courts have adopted the switching costs approach in their analysis of market power. According to this approach, market power may be inferred when the costs of switching from one supplier to another …
Antitrust Law’S Harm To Competition: A New Understanding Of Exclusivity, Ittai Paldor
Antitrust Law’S Harm To Competition: A New Understanding Of Exclusivity, Ittai Paldor
Buffalo Law Review
One of the long-accepted axioms of antitrust law is that the competitive danger posed by exclusivity agreements increases as the market share foreclosed by these arrangements increases. The larger the market share foreclosed by an exclusivity agreement, the less likely the arrangement is to be upheld by courts. And exclusivity arrangements foreclosing extremely large market shares are practically never upheld. The business community has responded by forsaking such arrangements (or concealing them). This Article challenges this very intuitive axiom. It shows that due to an unobserved feature of exclusivity, when extremely large market shares are foreclosed, the competitive danger posed …
Put A Cork In It: The Use Of H.R. 161 To End Direct Wine Shipping Throughout The States Once And For All, Victoria H. Jones
Put A Cork In It: The Use Of H.R. 161 To End Direct Wine Shipping Throughout The States Once And For All, Victoria H. Jones
Journal of Food Law & Policy
Due to Congress' recent agenda, oenophiles throughout the country are up in arms about the possible threat to their beloved wine. Wine lovers and other alcohol enthusiasts face the very real fear that access to their favorite products may soon be heavily restricted. This is in large part attributed to the fact that House Resolution 1161 would effectively change the ways in which states regulate alcohol shipment. The possible implications of this bill range from the forced shutdown of many wineries and distilleries due to lack of funding, to the smaller effects of regulation such as the inability of customers …
Privity Vs. Proximity: The Supreme Court’S Erroneous Reading Of The Illinois Brick Doctrine In Apple Inc. V. Pepper, Suzin A. Win
Privity Vs. Proximity: The Supreme Court’S Erroneous Reading Of The Illinois Brick Doctrine In Apple Inc. V. Pepper, Suzin A. Win
Golden Gate University Law Review
The rapid development of the digital marketplace led the United States Supreme Court to revisit the forty-two year old antitrust precedent set in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court decided that under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, direct purchasers have standing to sue for treble damages due to unfair business practices, while indirect purchasers do not. Over four decades later, in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Court reevaluated this doctrine. This time, the Court had to determine which party received the “direct purchaser” status in a situation where plaintiffs bought apps from …
United States Food Law Update: Shrouded By Election-Year Politics, State Initiatives And Private Lawsuits Fill In The Gaps Created By Congressional And Agency Ossification, A. Bryan Endres, Lisa R. Schlessinger, Rachel Armstrong
United States Food Law Update: Shrouded By Election-Year Politics, State Initiatives And Private Lawsuits Fill In The Gaps Created By Congressional And Agency Ossification, A. Bryan Endres, Lisa R. Schlessinger, Rachel Armstrong
Journal of Food Law & Policy
Observers of food law in the 2012 presidential election year witnessed a dramatic slowing of federal initiatives-perhaps arising from a desire by both Congress and the administration to avoid upsetting critical constituent groups during a year seemingly dominated by campaigns and endless talking points. For example, Congress failed to take action on a unique compromise between what some had considered mortal enemies-the Humane Society of the United States and United Egg Producers-that would implement a federal animal welfare standard for laying hens in return for abandoning ballot measures in various states. Similarly, the FDA waited until the early days of …
The Growing Monopoly In The Corn Seed Industry: Is It Time For The Government To Interfere?, Bethany K Sumpter
The Growing Monopoly In The Corn Seed Industry: Is It Time For The Government To Interfere?, Bethany K Sumpter
Texas A&M Law Review
How a company conducts business is often a consumer concern. Individuals have accused company after company of monopolistic behavior. These individuals have also criticized the Department of Justice for not stopping a monopoly from forming in a specific industry. An example is the corn seed industry, where stakeholders have accused companies of monopolistic behavior. Recent mergers and acquisitions in the corn seed industry have left fewer companies in control, and because of this consolidation, individuals are urging the government to act. This Comment argues that, while the corn seed industry is on the road to containing a monopoly, the industry …
Equalizing The Playing Field: The Time Has Come For Secondary Meaning In The Making In Small Restaurant Trade Dress Infringement Cases, John Pesek
Journal of Food Law & Policy
Imagine it is opening day for your first restaurant. It has taken months, if not years, to get to this point and you have spent a lot of money in developing the menu, artist style, and feel for the restaurant. A few months after the opening of your restaurant, a competing restaurant, right down the block from your restaurant, opens its doors; its menu and overall look are virtually indistinguishable from your restaurant. You are left wondering what remedies, if any, you have as a small restaurant owner. This was the case for Chef Rebecca Charles and her Pearl Oyster …
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Seattle University Law Review
Table of Contents
A Monopoly Of Thought—How Growing Anticompetitive Practices On The Internet Affect Creative Work, Laurel Brown
A Monopoly Of Thought—How Growing Anticompetitive Practices On The Internet Affect Creative Work, Laurel Brown
Seattle University Law Review
This Note will address how dominant Internet companies detrimentally impact creative work and how legal solutions might be employed to combat the damage inflicted by online monopolies. Part I will focus on how certain Internet companies became dominant, showing an evolution from egalitarian ideals to the consolidated control of the World Wide Web (the web) by companies like Google, Facebook, and Amazon. In Part II, this Note will focus on how two particular companies—Google and Facebook—affect creative endeavors in their control of access to audiences and by determining the economics of content production on the Internet. Part III details what …