Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Due Process In Antitrust Enforcement: Normative And Comparative Perspectives, Christopher S. Yoo, Yong Huang, Thomas Fetzer, Shan Jiang

All Faculty Scholarship

Due process in antitrust enforcement has significant implications for better professional and accurate enforcement decisions. Not only can due process spur economic growth, raise government credibility, and limit the abuse of powers according to law, it also promotes competitive reforms in monopolized sectors and curbs corruption. Jurisdictions learn from the best practices in the investigation process, decisionmaking process, and the announcement and judicial review of antitrust enforcement decisions. By comparing the enforcement policies of China, the European Union, and the United States, this article calls for better disclosure of evidence, participation of legal counsel, and protection of the procedural and …

Unfair-But-Not-Deceptive: Confronting The Ambiguity In Washington State’S Consumer Protection Act, Emily Beale

Seattle University Law Review

This Comment will argue that Washington state courts must promulgate a new, workable definition of “unfair-but-not-deceptive” under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act. Washington courts have acknowledged that a business act or practice can be unfair but not deceptive, but a simple recognition does not fulfill the liberal intentions of the Consumer Protection Act. By continuously declining to define unfair- but-not-deceptive, Washington courts have left consumers vulnerable and without recourse. This Comment will highlight the approaches developed by the federal government and other state governments on how to confront the ambiguity of unfair-but-not-deceptive and will propose a concrete definition for the term.

Procedural Fairness In Antitrust Enforcement: The U.S. Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo, Hendrik M. Wendland

All Faculty Scholarship

Due process and fairness in enforcement procedures represent a critical aspect of the rule of law. Allowing greater participation by the parties and making enforcement procedures more transparent serve several functions, including better decisionmaking, greater respect for government, stronger economic growth, promotion of investment, limits corruption and politically motivated actions, regulation of bureaucratic ambition, and greater control of agency staff whose vision do not align with agency leadership or who are using an enforcement matter to advance their careers. That is why such distinguished actors as the International Competition Network (ICN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the …

The Ftc's Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The FTC’s wide ranging complaint against Intel Corporation indicates that the FTC intends to rely on the “unfair methods of competition” language in §5 of the FTC Act to reach beyond the proscriptions on unilateral conduct contained in §2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has expressly authorized such expansion, and statutory text, legislative history and legal policy all support it. While §2 reaches only conduct that threatens to “monopolize” a market, the “unfair methods of competition” language can reach improper abuses of a dominant position that fall short of creating monopoly. Further, the FTC has expertise that courts …

The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The FTC has explicit antitrust authority to enforce the Clayton Act, although not the Sherman Act. More than a half century ago, however, the Supreme Court held that the FTC Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of competition” reaches everything the Sherman Act reaches and also a “penumbra” of practices that are not technical Sherman Act violations. That view, which had fallen into disuse in recent decades, is now being revived.

This essay defends a limited version of that “penumbra” view and suggests several applications. First, while both Sherman Act provisions are open ended in their coverage, they have limitations. Section …

Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc's Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) unprecedented enforcement action against Intel raises profound issues concerning the scope of the FTC’s powers to give a construction to Section 5 of the FTC Act that goes beyond the substantive reach of the Sherman Act. While I have urged the FTC to assert such independence from the Sherman Act, this is the wrong case to make a break. Indeed, if anything, Intel poses a risk of seriously setting back the development of an independent Section 5 power by provoking a hostile appellate court to rebuke the FTC’s effort and cabin the FTC’s powers in …

Abuse Of Trademarks: A Proposal For Ompulsory Licensing, Mara L. Babin

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article neither deals with the propriety of the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) proposed order nor evaluates the effectiveness of compulsory trademark licensing as a remedy for unfair trade practices.8 Rather, the pending cereal industry case is used as a point of departure for an examination of the problem of trademark abuse and the responses of the courts, the Congress, and the FTC to it. Acknowledging the legality of compulsory licensing of trademarks, the article suggests legislation which will incorporate licensing and standards for its application. Such legislation would make licensing an accessible remedy for trademark abuse while accommodating both …

Proposals For Change In The Structure Of Antitrust Enforcement: The Department Of Justice, The Ftc And The Courts, Roger C. Cramton

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Restraint Of Trade--Trading Stamps--The Federal Trade Commission And The Green Stamp: The Effect Upon Competition Of Restrictions On Distribution And Redemption Of Trading Stamps, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Sperry and Hutchinson Company (S & H), the largest trading stamp company in the United States, has maintained two policies throughout its seventy-two years of business. The one-for-ten policy requires retailers licensed by S & H to issue stamps to consumers at the rate of one stamp for every ten cents worth of merchandise purchased. The intent of this policy is to prevent retailers from engaging in "multiple stamping"-the practice of giving more than one stamp for every ten-cent purchase. This restricted rate of issuance is maintained through contractual agreements between the stamp company and its licensees. The second policy …

Cease And Desist: The History, Effect, And Scope Of Clayton Act Orders Of The Federal Trade Commission, Thomas E. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

A cease and desist order is not entered in a vacuum. What an order should say or require depends upon the effect which the order is to have. A substantial portion of the present study is therefore concerned with the array of effects which may result from the order's entry, and with the relationship between those effects and the order itself. Not all of the detailed discussion of enforcement procedures which follows may seem directly relevant to the content of the FTC's orders. There are important unresolved issues within the enforcement procedures themselves which warrant examination for their own sake …

The Ftc's Power To Seek Preliminary Injunctions In Anti-Merger Cases, James H. Cohen

Michigan Law Review

This Comment will examine the bases and the implications of the Supreme Court's holding. It will point out a number of problems raised by granting the FTC this remedial power, and will suggest that the situations in which preliminary injunctions may be obtained from a court of appeals should be strictly limited.

The Gasoline Price Wars: A Case Study Of The Shortcomings Of The Mandatory Processes

Indiana Law Journal

Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement

Voluntary Compliance: An Adjunct To The Mandatory Processes

Indiana Law Journal

Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement

Symposium On The Federal Trade Commission: A Program Of Enforcement (Forward), Ralph F. Fuchs

Indiana Law Journal

Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement

Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance, And The Federal Trade Commission, Daniel Jay Baum, Eugene R. Baker

Indiana Law Journal

Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement

Interstate Dissemination Of Advertising: Jurisdiction Which Must Be Earned

Indiana Law Journal

Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement