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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Antitrust Process And Vertical Deference: Judicial Review Of State Regulatory Inaction, Jim Rossi Feb 2007

Antitrust Process And Vertical Deference: Judicial Review Of State Regulatory Inaction, Jim Rossi

ExpressO

Courts struggle with the tension between national competition laws, on the one hand, and state and local regulation, on the other – especially as traditional governmental functions are privatized and as economic regulation advances beyond its traditional role to address market monitoring. This Article defends a process-based account of the state action antitrust exception against alternative interpretations, such as the substantive efficiency preemption approach recently advanced by Richard Squire, and elaborates on what such a process-based account would entail for courts addressing the role of state economic regulation as a defense in antitrust cases. It recasts the debate as focused …


Using Ethanol As A Fuel To Reenergize Free Trade Area Of The Americas Negotiations, Marcel De Armas Feb 2007

Using Ethanol As A Fuel To Reenergize Free Trade Area Of The Americas Negotiations, Marcel De Armas

ExpressO

Currently the United States imposes a 2.5 percent ad valorem tax along with a 14.27 cents per liter tax on imported ethanol from countries with normal trade relations under the harmonized tariff schedule. However, the United States exempts many countries from this tariff or reduces the tariff under various free trade agreements or initiatives. The issues that resulted in Doha’s failure also caused FTAA negotiations to temporarily stall since both Brazil and the United States wanted certain FTAA issues negotiated at the WTO level. The United States could initiate this process with a discussion of reducing or eliminating its ethanol …


When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry Jan 2007

When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry

ExpressO

As research has advanced, technologies have become more closely knit, and the relationships between them—both complementary and competitive—have become increasingly important. Unfortunately, the patent system’s use of monopoly power to reward innovators creates inefficient results by overly encouraging the development of substitute technologies and discouraging the development of complementary technologies. This paper explains how an optional patent purchase system could help ameliorate such problems and discusses the implications of such a system.