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Full-Text Articles in Administrative Law
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, Christopher J. Walker
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
The Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, yet Congress grants expansive lawmaking authority to federal agencies. As positive political theorists have long explored, Congress intends for federal agencies to faithfully exercise their delegated authority, but ensuring fidelity to congressional wishes is difficult due to asymmetries in information, expertise, and preferences that complicate congressional control and oversight. Indeed, this principal-agent problem has a democratic and constitutional dimension, as the legitimacy of administrative governance may well depend on whether the unelected bureaucracy is a faithful agent of Congress. Despite the predominance of lawmaking by regulation and the decades-long application of principal-agent …
Market Corrective Rulemaking: Drawing On Eu Insights To Rationalize U.S. Regulation, Reeve T. Bull
Market Corrective Rulemaking: Drawing On Eu Insights To Rationalize U.S. Regulation, Reeve T. Bull
Reeve T Bull
When justifying the government’s role in intervening in the free market, economists and legal scholars alike point to the problem of “market failures”: laissez-faire capitalism may not produce optimal outcomes in certain cases, and government interventions can promote overall market efficiency. The existence of such market failures is not terribly controversial; the question of whether government regulators can correctly identify these flaws and devise appropriate solutions, by contrast, is significantly more contentious. Unfortunately, under the existing regulatory framework, government officials are not especially well-positioned to make these difficult determinations. Congress does not, as a general matter, consider the economic costs …
Regulating The Family: The Impact Of Pro-Family Policy Making Assessments On Women And Non-Traditional Families, Robin S. Maril
Regulating The Family: The Impact Of Pro-Family Policy Making Assessments On Women And Non-Traditional Families, Robin S. Maril
Robin S. Maril
Beginning in the 1980s, pro-family advocates lobbied the Reagan administration to take a stronger, more direct role in enforcing traditional family norms through agency rulemaking. In 1986 the White House Working Group on the Family published a report entitled, The Family: Preserving America’s Future, detailing what its authors perceived to be the biggest threats to the “American household of persons related by blood, marriage or adoption – the traditional . . . family.” These threats included a lax sexual culture carried over from the 1960s, resulting in rising divorce rates, children born “out of wedlock,” and increased acceptance of “alternative …
A Constitutional And Empirical Analysis Of Iowa's Administrative Rules Review Committee Procedure, Jerry L. Anderson
A Constitutional And Empirical Analysis Of Iowa's Administrative Rules Review Committee Procedure, Jerry L. Anderson
Jerry L. Anderson
Iowa gives a joint legislative committee, called the Administrative Rules Review Committee, significant power over agency rulemaking. The ARRC can delay a rule, either for a 70-day period, or until the end of the next legislative session. It can also object to a rule, which switches the burden of proof to the agency in any future judicial challenge and makes the agency liable for the litigation costs of successful challengers. In this article, the authors study fifteen years of ARRC activity to determine how the committee has used its authority, in order to assess the degree to which this mechanism …
Acting Like An Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, Ryan G. Vacca
Acting Like An Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, Ryan G. Vacca
Ryan G. Vacca
When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, it thought it was creating a court of appeals. Little did it know that it was also creating a quasi-administrative agency that would engage in substantive rulemaking and set policy in a manner substantially similar to administrative agencies. In this Article, I examine the Federal Circuit's practices when it orders a case to be heard en banc and illustrate how these practices cause the Federal Circuit to look very much like an administrative agency engaging in substantive rulemaking. The number and breadth of questions the Federal Circuit agrees to hear en banc …