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Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Administrative Law

Peeking Behind The Iron Curtain: How Law "Works" Behind Prison Walls, Donald F. Tibbs Sep 2006

Peeking Behind The Iron Curtain: How Law "Works" Behind Prison Walls, Donald F. Tibbs

ExpressO

The prison disciplinary process plays a major role in maintaining institutional order. It starts from the premise that the safety of the institution trumps the punishment of the inmate. Given the massive incarceration rates in virtually every part of the United States, most prisons are overcrowded and, therefore, forced to place a premium on order and safety. The only way to maintain order and safety is to have prison rules that deter inmate behavior; and the only way to enforce those rules is fairly and humanely.

Peeking Behind the Iron Curtain is a study of the law-in-action. Using a variety …


Scientific Expertise In Policymaking: The Case For Open Review And Patent Reform, Beth Simone Noveck Aug 2006

Scientific Expertise In Policymaking: The Case For Open Review And Patent Reform, Beth Simone Noveck

ExpressO

The Energy Research Advisory Board, the group of external scientific advisors that provided impartial expert advice to the Secretary of Energy since 1978, was disbanded this May. The Administration, like its predecessors, regularly replaces experts on agency advisory panels with ideologues and political allies. We are at the nadir of a historical progression since World War II away from trust in and use of scientific expertise in policymaking. This shift however, has not been countered with greater public participation. Instead, administrative law and theory have developed a model of the managerial administrative authority. The "expertocratic" agency relies on internal expertise …


Auditing Executive Discretion, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar Mar 2006

Auditing Executive Discretion, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

Executive branch officials routinely make thousands of decisions affecting public security and welfare. While it is rare that such discretionary decisions are entirely immune from some kind of judicial review, courts’ role is often so circumscribed or deferential that in some domains the probability of uncovering problems through such review almost certainly falls close to zero. The resulting amount of executive discretion carries considerable risks along with rewards. Some discretionary decisions undoubtedly benefit from the speed and flexibility that results from limiting judicial review. Yet judicial review’s evisceration as a tool to restrain certain forms of discretion also makes it …


Why Judicial Review Fails: Organizations, Politics, And The Problem Of Auditing Executive Discretion, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar Oct 2005

Why Judicial Review Fails: Organizations, Politics, And The Problem Of Auditing Executive Discretion, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

Every day executive branch officials make thousands of decisions affecting our security and welfare. Homeland security officials screen tens of thousands of people at the border. They decide whose name gets on government “no fly lists.” Agencies freeze suspected terrorist assets, choose what companies to inspect for environmental violations, and decide whom to prosecute. This article describes how judicial review predictably and systematically fails to prevent abuse and promote organizational learning when government officials make many such choices using their discretion to target individuals or groups. It then proposes the use of quasi-judicial audits of executive discretion as a remedy. …


The Opacity Of Transparency, Mark Fenster Mar 2005

The Opacity Of Transparency, Mark Fenster

ExpressO

The normative concept of transparency, along with the open government laws that purport to create a transparent public system of governance promise the world—a democratic and accountable state above all, and a peaceful, prosperous, and efficient one as well. But transparency, in its role as the theoretical justification for a set of legal commands, frustrates all parties affected by its ambiguities and abstractions. The public’s engagement with transparency in practice yields denials of reasonable requests for essential government information, as well as government meetings that occur behind closed doors. Meanwhile, state officials bemoan the significantly impaired decision-making processes that result …


Review Of Agency Interpretations: The Difference Discovers Itself, Marla E. Mansfield Mar 2005

Review Of Agency Interpretations: The Difference Discovers Itself, Marla E. Mansfield

ExpressO

The Supreme Court regularly reviews agency interpretations of statutes. For many years, the official dogma of the Court was one of deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes – the so-called “Chevron doctrine.” After Mead and Christensen, the Court was open to other levels of respect for agency interpretations. Recently, cases have so emphasized the particular statutory construction methods of the individual justices that the agency interpretation of a statute is now on the level of legislative history or other aids to interpretation, such as canons, which may or may not be used at a justice’s option. The array …


Procedural Justice, Lawrence B. Solum Feb 2004

Procedural Justice, Lawrence B. Solum

ExpressO

The real work of procedure is to guide conduct. It is sometimes said that the regulation of primary conduct is the work of the general and abstract norms of substantive law—clauses of the constitution, statutes, regulations, and common law rules of tort, property, and contract. But substance cannot effectively guide primary conduct without the aid of procedure. This is true because of three problems: (1) the problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. The solution to these problems is particularization by a system of …


Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson Feb 2004

Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson

ExpressO

This paper investigates rational choice explanations for patterns of Supreme Court decision-making with respect to the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agency decisions. In particular, I assess empirically the thesis that the Supreme Court expands deference when the Supreme Court is ideologically closer to the executive than to the circuit courts, and contracts deference when the opposite is true. I find little to no evidence supporting this "rational choice" theory of judicial deference. Given this surprising null finding, I offer alternative explanations for the data and suggest directions for future research.