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Full-Text Articles in Administrative Law
A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp
A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp
ExpressO
The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.
Whistleblower Protections Under The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer And A Critique, Valerie J. Watnick
Whistleblower Protections Under The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer And A Critique, Valerie J. Watnick
ExpressO
In the wake of scandals involving Enron Corporation, Arthur Andersen and other corporations, Congress enacted the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 (hereinafter the “Act” or “Sarbanes-Oxley”).This article critically examines the whistleblower protections afforded employees under Sarbanes-Oxley. Part I of the article considers the statutory language, the legislative history, and the regulations pursuant to the Act. Part II of the article examines recent decisions by the U.S. Department of Labor in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases (cases under the Act are initially adjudicated by the Department of Labor) and the overall framework for implementation …
Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp
Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp
ExpressO
This brief comment suggests where the anti-eminent domain movement might be heading next.
Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo
Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo
ExpressO
Legislation and Legitimation:
Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s
Abstract
Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …