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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Administrative Law
The "Benefits" Of Non-Delegation: Using The Non-Delegation Doctrine To Bring More Rigor To Benefit-Cost Analysis, Victor B. Flatt
The "Benefits" Of Non-Delegation: Using The Non-Delegation Doctrine To Bring More Rigor To Benefit-Cost Analysis, Victor B. Flatt
ExpressO
This article examines the problems of benefit-cost (or cost-benefit) analysis in our regulatory system and posits that a more nuanced version of the “non-delegation” doctrine (made famous in Schechter Poultry) could improve many of the problems associated with the use of benefit-cost analysis. In particular this article notes that many of the problems with benefit-cost analysis are its use by agencies to make large policy decisions, which could be characterized as legislative. The article also notes that though the “non-delegation” doctrine may appear to be dead or dormant, that a form of it, in separation of powers doctrine, exists in …
Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism?, David M. Driesen
Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism?, David M. Driesen
ExpressO
This article explores the question of whether contemporary regulatory reformers’ attitudes toward government regulation have anything in common with those of the Lochner-era Court. It finds that both groups tend to favor value neutral law guided by cost-benefit analysis over legislative value choices. Their skepticism toward redistributive legislation reflects shared beliefs that regulation often proves counterproductive in terms of its own objectives, fails demanding tests for rationality, and violates the natural order. This parallelism raises fresh questions about claims of neutrality and heightened rationality that serve as important justifications modern regulatory reform.
Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral, David M. Driesen
Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral, David M. Driesen
University of Colorado Law Review
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) owes much of its appeal to its image as a neutral principle for deciding upon the appropriate stringency of environmental, health, and safety regulation. This Article examines whether CBA is neutral in effect-i.e. whether it sometimes makes regulations more stringent or regularly leads to weaker environmental, health, and safety protection. Using a representative data set from recent Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews, an examination of OMB prompt letters, and a literature review, this Article shows that CBA has almost always proven anti-environmental in practice. It also shows that the most common approaches to CBA are …