Administrative Law Commons^™

Enhancing Public Access To Agency Law, Bernard Bell, Cary Coglianese, Michael Herz, Margaret Kwoka, Orly Lobel

Articles

A just, democratic society governed by the rule of law requires that the law be available, not hidden. This principle extends to legal materials produced by administrative agencies, all of which should be made widely accessible to the public. Federal agencies in the United States do disclose online many legal documents—sometimes voluntarily, sometimes in compliance with statutory requirements. But the scope and consistency of these disclosures leaves considerable room for improvement. After conducting a year-long study for the Administrative Conference of the United States, we identified seventeen possible statutory amendments that would improve proactive online disclosure of agency legal materials. …

Representative Rulemaking, Jim Rossi, Kevin Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The dominant form of lawmaking in the United States today-—notice-and-comment rulemaking—-is not a representative process. Notice-and-comment simply invites public participation, leaving the overall balance of engagement with the proposed regulations to the choices of individuals, public interest groups, trade groups, and regulated businesses. The result is a predictable one: In most rulemakings, industry voices dominate, and in many rulemakings, there is no participation by citizens or public interest groups. This representation deficit must be taken seriously. The basic rationales for a notice-and-comment rulemaking process depend upon some level of representation for those affected. The goal of providing the agency with …

Assessing Visions Of Democracy In Regulatory Policymaking, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Christopher J. Walker

Articles

Motivated in part by Congress’s failure to legislate, presidents in recent years seem to have turned even more to the regulatory process to make major policy. It is perhaps no coincidence that the feld of administrative law has similarly seen a resurgence of scholarship extolling the virtues of democratic accountability in the modern administrative state. Some scholars have even argued that bureaucracy is as much as if not more democratically legitimate than Congress, either in the aggregative or deliberative sense, or both.

Antitrust Rulemaking: The Ftc’S Delegation Deficit, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) recent assertion of authority to engage in legislative rulemaking in antitrust matters can be addressed in terms of three frameworks: the major questions doctrine, the Chevron doctrine, and as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation. The article argues that as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation the FTC has no such authority. This can be seen by considering the structure and history of the Act and is confirmed by the 1975 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act. Given that the result follows from ordinary statutory interpretation, it is unnecessary for courts to consider the other two …

The Evolving Apa And The Originalist Challenge, Ronald M. Levin

Scholarship@WashULaw

This article, written for a symposium marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), discusses the manifold ways in which courts have creatively interpreted the APA’s provisions on rulemaking, adjudication, and judicial review. Many of these interpretations seem to be barely, if at all, consistent with the intentions of the Act’s drafters and with standard principles of statutory construction. They can, however, be defended as pragmatic judicial efforts to keep up with the evolving needs of the regulatory state, especially in light of Congress’s persistent failure to take charge of updating the Act on its own. At this …

The Undemocratic Roots Of Agency Rulemaking, Emily S. Bremer

Journal Articles

Americans often credit—or blame—Congress for the laws and policies that govern their lives. But Congress enacts broad statutes that give federal administrative agencies the primary responsibility for making and enforcing the regulations that control American society. These administrative agencies lack the political accountability of those in public office. To address this democratic deficit, an agency seeking to adopt a new regulation must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking and provide an opportunity for the public to comment on the proposal. Heralded as “one of the greatest inventions of modern government,” the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure is understood …

How The Administrative State Got To This Challenging Place, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Written for a dispersed agrarian population using hand tools in a local economy, our Constitution now controls an American government orders of magnitude larger that has had to respond to profound changes in transportation, communication, technology, economy, and scientific understanding. How did our government get to this place? The agencies Congress has created to meet these changes now face profound new challenges: transition from the paper to the digital age; the increasing centralization in an opaque, political presidency of decisions that Congress has assigned to diverse, relatively expert and transparent bodies; the thickening, as well, of the political layer within …

The Case Against Chevron Deference In Immigration Adjudication, Shoba Wadhia, Christopher Walker

Journal Articles

The Duke Law Journal’s fifty-first annual administrative law symposium examines the future of Chevron deference—the command that a reviewing court defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute the agency administers. In the lead article, Professors Kristin Hickman and Aaron Nielson argue that the Supreme Court should narrow Chevron’s domain to exclude interpretations made via administrative adjudication. Building on their framing, this Article presents an in-depth case study of immigration adjudication and argues that this case against Chevron has perhaps its greatest force when it comes to immigration. That is because much of Chevron’s theory for congressional delegation …

The Regulatory Accountability Act And The Future Of Apa Revision, Ronald M. Levin

Scholarship@WashULaw

This article seeks to take stock of the Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA), a set of proposals to amend the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). House and Senate versions of the proposed Act have been pending in Congress since 2011, although the impending advent of Democratic control of the House may halt further progress on the bills in their present form. Some provisions in the RAA are desirable or at least supportable, because they would codify elements of current practice or make minor repairs to the APA. But other aspects of the bill are controversial and troubling. Among them are sections that …

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agen­cies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doc­trine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-com­ment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is neces­sary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doc­trine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of pow­ers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial defer­ence—has helped …

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

All Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agencies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doctrine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-comment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is necessary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doctrine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of powers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial deference—has helped …

Domesticating Guidance, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay, written for an occasion celebrating the scholarship of Professor William Funk of Lewis & Clark Law School, builds in good part on his analyses of soft law documents — statements of general policy and interpretive rules — that today one generally finds discussed under the rubric “guidance.” These are agency texts of less formality than hard law regulations adopted under the procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553, that inform the public how an agency intends to administer its responsibilities, as a matter of policy or (what may seem just one instance of that) via the interpretation of its …

Eroding "Checks" On Presidential Authority – Norms, The Civil Service, And The Courts, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Susan Rose-Ackerman's "Executive Rulemaking and Democratic Legitimacy: 'Reform' in the United States and the United Kingdom's Route to Brexit" insightfully illuminates important differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government in relation to executive bodies' production of the large volume of secondary legislation common, indeed inevitable, for both. Agreeing heartily with her conclusion that the weakness of parliamentary engagement with secondary legislation, and limited judicial review of its production, counsels greater provision for public participation and transparency of action at the agency level, there is little for me to add. Aware, too, as she remarks, that others have dealt more …

The Limits Of Copyright Office Expertise, Aaron K. Perzanowski

Faculty Publications

The mismatch between the expanding administrative and regulatory obligations of the United States Copyright Office and its limited institutional expertise is an emerging problem for the copyright system. The Office’s chief responsibility—registration and recordation of copyright claims—has taken a back seat in recent years to a more ambitious set of substantive rulemakings and policy recommendations. As the triennial rulemaking under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act highlights, the Office is frequently called upon to answer technological questions far beyond its plausible claims of subject matter expertise. This Article traces the Office’s history, identifies its substantial but discrete areas of expertise, and …

Fail To Comment At Your Own Risk: Does Issue Exhaustion Have A Place In Judicial Review Of Rules, Jeffrey Lubbers

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Lubbers discusses whether issue exhaustion have a place in judicial review of rules.

Improving Regulatory Analysis At Independent Agencies, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

Each year, independent regulatory agencies—such as the Federal Communications Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission—issue highly consequential regulations. When they issue their regulations, however, they do not have to meet the same requirements for analysis that apply to other agencies. Consequently, courts, policymakers, and scholars have voiced serious reservations about a general lack of high-quality prospective analysis of new regulations at independent agencies. These agencies’ track records with retrospective analysis of their existing regulations raise similar concerns. In this article, I approach the quality of regulatory analysis at independent agencies as a policy problem, assessing the current …

What Congress's Repeal Efforts Can Teach Us About Regulatory Reform, Cary Coglianese, Gabriel Scheffler

All Faculty Scholarship

Major legislative actions during the early part of the 115th Congress have undermined the central argument for regulatory reform measures such as the REINS Act, a bill that would require congressional approval of all new major regulations. Proponents of the REINS Act argue that it would make the federal regulatory system more democratic by shifting responsibility for regulatory decisions away from unelected bureaucrats and toward the people’s representatives in Congress. But separate legislative actions in the opening of the 115th Congress only call this argument into question. Congress’s most significant initiatives during this period — its derailed attempts to repeal …

Looking More Closely At The Platypus Of Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett

Popular Media

Professor Kent Barnett argues that the oft-criticized formal rulemaking process has virtues in proper settings.

Barriers To Participatory Erulemaking Platform Adoption: Lessons Learned From Regulationroom, Mary J. Newhart, Joshua D. Brooks

Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative Publications

Rulemaking, the process through which United States (U.S.) federal government agencies develop major health, safety and economic regulations, was an early target of electronic government (e-government) efforts. Because it was an established decision-making process that had substantial formal requirements of transparency, public participation and responsiveness it seemed a perfect target for technology-supported participatory policymaking. It was believed that new technologies could transform rulemaking, increasing its democratic legitimacy and improving its policy outcomes by broadening the range of participating individuals and groups (Brandon and Carlitz, 2003; Coglianese, 2004; Noveck, 2004). Despite the promise of a more deliberative and democratic process, rulemaking …

Remedial Restraint In Administrative Law, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

When a court determines that an agency action violates the Administrative Procedure Act, the conventional remedy is to invalidate the action and remand to the agency. Only rarely do the courts entertain the possibility of holding agency errors harmless. The courts’ strict approach to error holds some appeal: Better a hard rule that encourages procedural fastidiousness than a remedial standard that might tempt agencies to cut corners. But the benefits of this rule-bound approach are more elusive, and the costs much larger, than is commonly assumed. Across a wide range of cases, the reflexive invalidation of agency action appears wildly …

Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

When Congress undertakes major financial reform, either it dictates the precise contours of the law itself or it delegates the bulk of the rulemaking to an administrative agency. This choice has critical consequences. Making the law self-executing in federal legislation is swift, not subject to administrative tinkering, and less vulnerable than rulemaking to judicial second-guessing. Agency action is, in contrast, deliberate, subject to ongoing bureaucratic fiddling and more vulnerable than statutes to judicial challenge.

This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the extent of congressional delegation in securities law from 1970 to the present day, examining nine pieces of …

The Human Side Of Public-Private Partnerships: From New Deal Regulation To Administrative Law Management, Alfred C. Aman, Joseph C. Dugan

Articles by Maurer Faculty

During the New Deal era, Congress created a then-unprecedented program of economic and regulatory reforms, establishing independent agencies, and empowering them to shape and enforce pragmatic industrial policies. Twenty-first century regulation looks strikingly different from the New Deal vision. While New Deal agencies continue to perform some regulatory functions, market approaches have replaced many traditional command-and-control formulations, with private entities stepping in to perform tasks historically reserved to government.

Though government-by-contract is becoming the new normal, neither the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") nor many of its state equivalents provide adequate guidance to ensure that individual rights are protected and democratic …

How The Supreme Court Derailed Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

Based on archival research, this Essay explores the untold story of how the Supreme Court in the 1970s largely ended “formal” trial-like rulemaking by federal agencies in two railway cases. In the first, nearly forgotten decision, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., the Court held sua sponte that an agency was not required to use formal rulemaking, despite its significant historical provenance. That unpersuasive decision all but decided the second, better-known decision, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, the following term. In response to both decisions, agencies abandoned formal rulemaking—one of only four broad categories of agency action—and policymakers …

Chevron's Interstitial Steps, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

The Chevron doctrine’s apparent simplicity has long captivated judges, lawyers, and scholars. According to the standard formulation, Chevron involves just two straightforward steps: (1) Is a statute clear? (2) If not, is the agency’s interpretation of the statute reasonable? Despite the influence of this two-step framework, Chevron has come under fire in recent years. Some critics bemoan what they perceive as the Supreme Court’s incoherent application of the Chevron framework over time. Others argue that Chevron’s second step, which calls for courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, amounts to an abdication of judicial responsibility. …

Administrative Dissents, Sharon B. Jacobs

Publications

Commissioners, like judges, dissent. They do so at length, with vigor, and with persistence. Yet while separate judicial decisions are the subject of a rich literature, their administrative counterparts have long languished in obscurity. A closer look is warranted, however, because studying administrative dissent can enhance our understanding of internal agency operations as well as the relationships between agencies and other actors. This Article presents the results of an original review of separate statements at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission dating back four decades. It uses these findings to move beyond two common generalizations about …

Cybersecurity Stovepiping, David Thaw

Articles

Most readers of this Article probably have encountered – and been frustrated by – password complexity requirements. Such requirements have become a mainstream part of contemporary culture: "the more complex your password is, the more secure you are, right?" So the cybersecurity experts tell us… and policymakers have accepted this "expertise" and even adopted such requirements into law and regulation.

This Article asks two questions. First, do complex passwords actually achieve the goals many experts claim? Does using the password "Tr0ub4dor&3" or the passphrase "correcthorsebatterystaple" actually protect your account? Second, if not, then why did such requirements become so widespread? …

Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, Jennifer Nou, Edward H. Stiglitz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Congressional enactments and executive orders instruct agencies to publish their anticipated rules in what is known as the Unified Agenda. The Agenda’s stated purpose is to ensure that political actors can monitor regulatory development. Agencies have come under fire in recent years, however, for conspicuous omissions and irregularities. Critics allege that agencies hide their regulations from the public strategically, that is, to thwart potential political opposition. Others contend that such behavior is benign, perhaps the inevitable result of changing internal priorities or unforeseen events.

To examine these competing hypotheses, this Article uses a new dataset spanning over thirty years of …

Public Laws And Private Lawmakers, Kimberly L. Wehle

All Faculty Scholarship

The Obama Administration's "Clean Power Plan" for addressing industrial carbon emissions is controversial as a matter of environmental policy. It also has important constitutional implications. The rule was initially crafted not by officers or employees of the Environmental Protection Agency, but by two private lawyers and a scientist with industry ties. Private parties operate extra-constitutionally, and no existing legal doctrine tethers constitutional scrutiny to the nature of the power delegated to them. The nondelegation doctrine applies to delegations by Congress-not to agencies' subdelegations of legislative power to private parties. The other doctrinal lens for reviewing rulemaking by entities other than …

Acus - And Administrative Law - Then And Now, Michael Herz

Articles

The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) both shapes and reflects the intellectual, policy, and practical concerns of the field of administrative law. Its recommendations are therefore a useful lens through which to view that field. Also, because of an unfortunate hiatus, ACUS has gotten underway not once but twice. Those two beginnings provide a kind of natural experiment, and they make a revealing contrast. This article traces the transformations of American administrative law, as well as the field’s perpetual concerns, by comparing the initial recommendations of ACUS 1.0 (1968 to 1970) with the initial recommendations of ACUS 2.0 …

The Problem With Words: Plain Language And Public Participation In Rulemaking, Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart, Cheryl Blake

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This Article, part of the special issue commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”), situates ACUS’s recommendations for improving public rulemaking participation in the context of the federal “plain language” movement. The connection between broader, better public participation and more comprehensible rulemaking materials seems obvious, and ACUS recommendations have recognized this connection for almost half a century. Remarkably, though, the series of presidential and statutory plain-language directives on this topic have not even mentioned the relationship of comprehensibility to participation until very recently. In 2012, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) issued …