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Full-Text Articles in Administrative Law
Reincarnating The 'Major Questions' Exception To Chevron Deference As A Doctrine Of Non-Interference (Or Why Massachusetts V. Epa Got It Wrong), Abigail Moncrieff
Reincarnating The 'Major Questions' Exception To Chevron Deference As A Doctrine Of Non-Interference (Or Why Massachusetts V. Epa Got It Wrong), Abigail Moncrieff
Faculty Scholarship
In a pair of cases declaring a major questions exception to Chevron deference, the Supreme Court held that executive agencies may not implement major policy changes without explicit authorization from Congress. But in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court unceremoniously killed its major questions rule, requiring the EPA to implement one such major policy change. Because the scholarly literature to date has failed to discern a worthy justification for the major questions rule, the academy might be tempted to celebrate the rule's death. This Article, how-ever, argues that the rule ought to be mourned and, indeed, reincarnated. It offers a non-interference …
Congressional Administration, Jack M. Beermann
Congressional Administration, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
In recent years, at least since President Reagan's precedent-setting Executive Order 12291, the phenomenon of direct presidential supervision of agencies has received significant attention in legal scholarship. Congress's involvement has been much less thoroughly examined, and, although most people are familiar with congressional hearings and oversight, the dominant image as a legal matter is that once Congress legislates, it loses control over how its laws are administered unless it chooses to legislate again. In the political science/public policy literature, the understanding of Congress's role in monitoring agencies has evolved from despair that Congress is not sufficiently engaged to a recognition …