Administrative Law Commons^™

Copyright Arbitrage, Kristelia A. García

Publications

Regulatory arbitrage—defined as the manipulation of regulatory treatment for the purpose of reducing regulatory costs or increasing statutory earnings—is often seen in heavily regulated industries. An increase in the regulatory nature of copyright, coupled with rapid technological advances and evolving consumer preferences, have led to an unprecedented proliferation of regulatory arbitrage in the area of copyright law. This Article offers a new scholarly account of the phenomenon herein referred to as “copyright arbitrage.”

In some cases, copyright arbitrage may work to expose and/or correct for an extant gap or inefficiency in the regulatory regime. In other cases, copyright arbitrage may …

The Administrative State's Passive Virtues, Sharon B. Jacobs

Publications

Fifty years ago, Alexander Bickel famousy suggested that courts use tools like standing, ripeness, and the political question doctrine to avoid reaching the merits of difficult cases. Yet despite the increasingly central role of administrative agencies in government, there have been no efforts to date to apply Bickel's insights to the bureaucracy. This Article remedies that deficit. The Article provides a three-part taxonomy of administrative restraint and offers case studies from federal agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. It argues that agencies sometimes use restraint strategically for reasons …

Trans-Substantivity Beyond Procedure, Suzette M. Malveaux

Publications

No abstract provided.

Goldwasser, The Telecom Act, And Reflections On Antitrust Remedies, Philip J. Weiser

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No abstract provided.

Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, And The Enforcement Of The Telecom Act, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

Congress increasingly has enacted cooperative federalism programs to achieve complex regulatory policy objectives. Such programs combine the authority of federal regulators, state regulators, and federal courts in creative and often pathmarking ways, but the failure of these actors to appreciate fully their respective roles threatens to undermine cooperative federalism's effectiveness. In this Article, Professor Philip Weiser develops a coherent vision of how federal courts should enforce cooperative federalism regulatory programs. In particular, he relates the rise and purpose of cooperative federalism to the federal courts' increased reluctance to make federal common law under the Erie doctrine and their greater deference …

Towards A Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

In this Article, Professor Weiser calls for a new conception of federal-state relations to justify existing political practice under cooperative federalism regulatory programs. In particular, Professor Weiser highlights how Congress favors cooperative federalism programs--that combine federal and state authority in creative ways--and has rejected the dual federalism model of regulation--with separate spheres of state and federal authority that current judicial rhetoric often celebrates. Given the increasing dissonance between prevailing political practice and judicial rhetoric, courts will ultimately have to confront three fault lines for current cooperative federalism programs: the legal source of authority for state agencies to implement federal law, …

Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, And Telecommunications Reform, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

No abstract provided.

Coordinating Judicial Review In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Specialized Courts In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Separation Of Powers Under The Texas Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Section 14(E) Of The Williams Act And The Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

The passage of the Williams Act in 1968 added a set of provisions to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to govern tender offers. In this article, Professor Loewenstein examines the antifraud provision of the Williams Act, codified as section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the development of decisional law under it. After discussing the propriety of inferring a private cause of action from section 14(e), Professor Loewenstein argues that the judiciary's reliance on rule 10b-5 precedents to set the bounds of the 14(e) cause of action is unwarranted. He concludes: 1) that scienter should not …

Book Review, Howard C. Klemme

Publications

No abstract provided.

Presidential Power And Administrative Rulemaking, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn

Publications

Several administrative programs contain provisions allowing Congress to veto agency rules, and there is now a bill before Congress to extend this veto power to all agency rulemaking. In this Article, Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn analyze the histories of five federal programs subject to the legislative veto to determine the effect of the veto on the rulemaking process and on the relationships between the branches of government. Extrapolating from this practical experience, they suggest that a general legislative veto is unlikely to increase the overall efficiency of the administrative process, may impede the achievement of reasoned decisionmaking based on …

The North Slope Borough, Oil, And The Future Of Local Government In Alaska, David H. Getches

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Consent Decree In Antitrust Enforcement--Analysis And Criticism, J. Dennis Hynes

Publications

No abstract provided.