Administrative Law Commons^™

Congressional Power, Public Rights, And Non-Article Iii Adjudication, John M. Golden, Thomas H. Lee

Notre Dame Law Review

When can Congress vest in administrative agencies or other non–Article III federal courts the power to adjudicate any of the nine types of “Cases” or “Controversies” listed in Article III of the United States Constitution? The core doctrine holds that Congress may employ non–Article III adjudicators in territorial courts, in military courts, and for decision of matters of public right. Scholars have criticized this so-called “public rights” doctrine as incoherent but have struggled to offer a more cogent answer.

This Article provides a new, overarching explanation of when and why Congress may use non–Article III federal officials to adjudicate matters …

Can A "Mere Employee" Stop You From Vaping? The Appointments Clause Applied To Rulemakers, Melinda Holmes

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note analyzes whether actors discharging the rulemaking function of an agency are officers and discusses whether persons not appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause can constitutionally exercise such power. Part I examines the development of the doctrine over time leading to Lucia. Part II presents possible frameworks for challenges following Lucia. Part III traces delegation of authority from Congress to the agency and from senior agency officials to the individual who actually exercises the delegated authority. In doing so, it explores how the framework should apply in the rulemaking context, focusing on the example presented by litigation …

Why Robert Mueller's Appointment As Special Counsel Was Unlawful, Steven G. Calabresi, Gary Lawson

Notre Dame Law Review

Since 1999, when the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act expired, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has had in place regulations providing for the appointment of “special counsels” who possess “the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.” Appointments under these regulations, such as the May 17, 2017 appointment of Robert S. Mueller to investigate the Trump campaign, are patently unlawful, for three distinct reasons.

First, all federal offices must be “established by Law,” and there is no statute authorizing such an office in the DOJ. We …

Antidiscrimination Laws And The Administrative State: A Skeptic's Look At Administrative Constitutionalism, David E. Bernstein

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article discusses why administrative agencies charged with enforcing antidiscrimination legislation while implicitly undertaking administrative constitutionalism tend to be inconsiderate of constitutional limitations on government authority in general, and especially of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.

To establish the existence and contours of the problem, Part I of this Article provides context by recounting several detailed examples of how federal, state, and local civil rights agencies have favored broad antidiscrimination enforcement over countervailing constitutional doctrines that impose limits on regulatory authority. These examples include the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights’ …

Blank Checks: An Analysis Of Emergency Actions Warranting Unilateral Executive Action, Megan E. Ball

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note discusses the separation of powers issues raised in the D.C. Circuit by then-Judge, now Justice Kavanaugh in Mexichem Fluor’s suit. Specifically, this Note analyzes the federal government’s approach to climate change, overreach of the EPA to act beyond its statutorily granted authority, and the EPA’s reliance upon President Obama’s executive directives as the justification for its overreach. Part I of this Note provides a broad introduction of the CAA and the importance of the policy motivations for the later addition of Title VI to the Act. Part II discusses in more depth the decision in Mexichem Fluor v. …

Due Process, Free Expression, And The Administrative State, Martin H. Redish, Kristin Mccall

Notre Dame Law Review

The first Part of this Article will explore the theoretical foundations of procedural due process, focusing particularly on the essential due process requirement of a neutral adjudicator. We will follow that discussion with an analysis of the extent to which administrative adjudication of constitutional challenges to its regulatory authority or decisions satisfies the demands of procedural due process. After concluding that administrative regulators categorically fail to satisfy the requirements of due process, at least in the context of constitutional challenges to their regulatory authority, we will explain why the availability of post–administrative judicial review cannot cure the constitutional defect in …

Mischief Managed? The Unconstitutionality Of Sec Aljs Under The Appointments Clause, Jackson C. Blais

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues that SEC ALJs are inferior officers of the United States and, as a result, are unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause. Part I examines the current state of ALJs and the jurisprudence of the Appointments Clause. Part II provides an analysis of the circuit split between the Tenth and D.C. Circuits over the question of SEC ALJs and the Appointments Clause. Part III argues that the Tenth Circuit in Bandimere v. SEC correctly decided the question presented. This Part further urges the Supreme Court to reverse the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Lucia and, in so doing, adhere to …

Introduction: Administrative Lawmaking In The Twenty-First Century, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Notre Dame Law Review

It is always hard to map a river while sailing midstream, but the current state of administrative law is particularly resistant to neat tracing. Until the past few years, administrative law and scholarship was marked by pragmatic compromise: judicial deference on questions of law (but not too much and not all the time) and freedom for agencies on questions of politics and policy (but not to an unseemly degree). There was disagreement around the edges—and some voices in the wilderness calling for radical change—but they operated within a shared framework of admittedly unstated, and perhaps conflicting, assumptions about the administrative …

How Agencies Choose Whether To Enforce The Law: A Preliminary Investigation, Aaron L. Nielson

Notre Dame Law Review

One of the most controversial aspects of administrative law in recent years concerns agency decisions not to enforce the law. Such nonenforcement is often beneficial or, in any event, inevitable. A particular violation may be so distant from what Congress or the agency had in mind when the general prohibition was put on the books that enforcement makes little sense. Likewise, because agencies have finite resources, they cannot enforce the law in all situations. At the same time, however, nonenforcement can also raise difficult questions about basic notions of fairness and administrative regularity, as well as separation of powers concerns. …

Symbolism And Separation Of Powers In Agency Design, Kristin E. Hickman

Notre Dame Law Review

My goal with this Essay is a modest one: to raise a few reservations regarding judicial refashioning of agency design via this severance remedy for separation of powers violations. To that end, the Essay will proceed fairly straightforwardly. I will describe three cases or sets of cases in which the Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit has employed the severance remedy: Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a series of D.C. Circuit cases brought by the Intercollegiate Broadcasting System against the Copyright Royalty Board, and PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Then I will highlight three …

Accountability For Nonenforcement, Urska Velikonja

Notre Dame Law Review

Changes in enforcement can move in more than one direction: enforcement can increase significantly as the Securities and Exchange Commission saw in the aftermath of the accounting scandals or the Madoff Ponzi scheme, and decrease precipitously, as evidenced at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau under Acting Director Mick Mulvaney. There is no reason in constitutional or administrative law to treat changes in enforcement policy differently depending on whether enforcement increases or decreases. Policy choices raise similar questions about reviewability and accountability, regardless of whether they increase or decrease enforcement. They also raise symmetrical questions about fair notice and due process …

The Never-Ending Assault On The Administrative State, Jack M. Beermann

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article is an exploration of the twists and turns of the never-ending assault on the administrative state. Without attempting to resolve all of the separation of powers controversies that have existed since the beginning of the Republic, this Article examines and analyzes the fundamental constitutional challenges to the administrative state as well as the more peripheral constitutional difficulties involving the administrative state and the nonconstitutional legal challenges that have arisen over the decades. In my view, the legal and political arguments made in favor of major structural changes to the administrative state do not provide sufficient normative bases for …

The Ambiguous Ambiguity Inquiry: Seeking To Clarify Judicial Determinations Of Clarity Versus Ambiguity In Statutory Interpretation, Meredith A. Holland

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note will apply Judge Kavanaugh’s proposed mechanism to the interpretation of the Title IX prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. Part I discusses recent cases decided by the Roberts Court that demonstrate the difficulties with the current jurisprudential approach to the clarity versus ambiguity determination. Part II explores Judge Kavanaugh’s recent proposal for reducing threshold findings of ambiguity. Part III considers various interpretive methods and applies Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal in the context of Title IX. Finally, this Note concludes that Judge Kavanaugh’s approach, while most dramatically transforming the purposivist approach, also has consequences for the textualist inquiry.

Executive Orders As Lawful Limits On Agency Policymaking Discretion, Adam J. White

Notre Dame Law Review

After briefly retracing previous Presidents’ general uses of executive orders and debates over presidential power more generally, culminating with the late twentieth century executive orders on White House regulatory oversight, I review the case of Sherley v. Sebelius, in which the D.C. Circuit held that when an agency receives an executive order lawfully cabining or directing the its regulatory discretion, it is excused from its otherwise general duty to respond to rulemaking comments challenging its policy choice. Then, examining this general duty of agencies to respond to rulemaking comments, I consider whether the D.C. Circuit’s approach comports with the …

The Attorney General And Early Appointments Clause Practice, Aditya Bamzai

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide an overview of the Appointments Clause and the officer-employee line as it currently stands in caselaw and in executive branch practice. I also summarize the Appointments Clause practices of the First Congress. In Part II, I address the opinions of the Attorneys General, and their attempt to rationalize and to explain the statutes enacted by the First Congress and the appointments practices of the nation. In Part III, I derive some implications and conclusions, generally for the Appointments Clause and specifically for the Administrative Law Judge controversy that is currently …

On Viewing The Courts As Junior Partners Of Congress In Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating The Scholarship Of Daniel J. Meltzer, Richard H. Fallon Jr

Notre Dame Law Review

In this Essay, written in tribute to Dan Meltzer, I shall attempt to explicate his views regarding statutory interpretation in general, thematic terms. In doing so, I shall register my agreement with virtually all of Dan’s conclusions and frequently echo his practically minded arguments in support of them. But I shall also advance arguments—with which I cannot be entirely sure he would have agreed—that seek to show that his position reflected theoretical insights about how language works, not only in law, but also more generally in life. By seeking simultaneously to defend Dan’s views and to build on them, this …

The Curious Case Of Seminole Rock: Revisiting Judicial Deference To Agency Interpretations Of Their Ambiguous Regulations, Peter M. Torstensen Jr.

Notre Dame Law Review

Seminole Rock deference warrants reconsideration as it is based on questionable constitutional and pragmatic foundations. This Note argues that courts should provide a meaningful check on agency interpretations by engaging in de novo review of agency resolutions of regulatory ambiguities. Part I explores the development of the Seminole Rock doctrine, from its questionable doctrinal foundations and rapid expansion to the developing concerns regarding its continued validity. In addition, Part I explains the variety of forms that agency interpretations can take, including legal briefs, amicus briefs, and internal memoranda, and discusses their impact in expanding the scope of Seminole Rock deference. …

Exclusion And Equality: How Exclusion From The Political Process Renders Religious Liberty Unequal, Philip Hamburger

Notre Dame Law Review

Exclusion from the political process is a central question in American law. Thus far, however, it has not been recognized how religious Americans are excluded from the political process and what this means for religious equality. Put simply, both administrative lawmaking and § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code substantially exclude religious Americans from the political process that produces laws. As a result, apparently equal laws are apt, in reality, to be unequal for religious Americans. Political exclusion threatens religious equality. The primary practical conclusion concerns administrative law. It will be seen that this sort of “law” is made through …

Parting The Chevron Sea: An Argument For Chevron's Greater Applicability To Cabinet Than Independent Agencies, Andrew T. Bond

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues that cabinet agencies are better suited to receive Chevron deference than independent agencies because voters should desire such policy decisions to be made by those closest to electoral accountability, rather than unelected Article III judges with life-tenure. In other words, the judiciary should accept the countermajoritarian difficulty as fundamentally true and review cabinet agency decisions in light of Chevron deference. Part I examines the revolutionary decision of Chevron and its aftermath. Central to Part I is an inquiry into whether Chevron should be applied on a case-by-case or across-the-board basis, and whether Chevron has usurped the judiciary’s …