Law Commons^™

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Do Institutions Really Matter? Assessing The Impact Of State Judicial Structures On Citizen Litigiousness, Jeff L. Yates, Paul Brace, Holley Tankersley

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

The Comparative Law And Economics Of Pure Economic Loss, Francesco Parisi, Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mauro Bussani

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Law and economics shows that a key factor in determining the optimal economic loss rule is found in the relationship between pure economic loss and social loss. Economic loss should be compensable in torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a socially relevant loss. In this paper we undertake a comparative evaluation of the economic loss rule to verify whether modern legal systems, although not formally adopting the economic criterion, define the exclusionary rule in light of efficiency considerations. The comparative analysis reveals that the substantive applications of the economic loss rule in European jurisdictions are consistent with …

Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, Gerrit De Geest, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Judges have a tendency to be more demanding than regulators. In the United States, a majority of the courts has adopted the rule that the unexcused violation of a statutory standard is negligence per se. However, the converse does not hold: compliance with regulation does not relieve the injurer of tort liability. In most European legal systems, the outcome is similar. We use a framework in which, on the one hand, the effects of tort law are undermined by insolvency and evidence problems and, on the other hand, regulation is expensive in terms of monitoring and information gathering. We show …

The Risks Of And Reactions To Underdeterrence In Torts, Thomas C. Galligan

ExpressO

The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts posits that as our nation considers tort reform at both the state and federal levels, it should not be blinded to the fact that, while tort law may, in some cases, overdeter, it also may underdeter, especially in mass tort cases. The piece contends that the traditional (one-on-one) model of tort law may both cause and exacerbate the underdeterrence problems and, consequently, alternative models (class action, augmented awards, and public tort suits) must be considered and analyzed. The piece proceeds to compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses of each of …

Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec

ExpressO

This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed …

Disappearing Defendants V. Judgment Proof Injurers: Upgrading The Theory Of Tort Law Failures, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Barbara Mangan

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Do injurers’ insolvency and victims’ reluctance to sue affect accident prevention in the same way? Are these circumstances less of a problem under the negligence rule than under strict liability? We argue, contrary to the literature, that the answer is, in most cases, negative and make three main points. First, the judgment proof problem and the disappearing defendant problem are shown to have different effects on injurers’ behavior and hence yield dissimilar levels of social welfare. Second, when these two problems occur simultaneously they may have offsetting effects. Third, the negligence rule is superior to strict liability only under some …

How Liability Distorts Incentives Of Manufacturers To Recall Products, Omri Ben-Shahar

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

The nature and likelihood of harms associated with products may be revealed over time. As more information is gathered, a manufacturer must decide whether to continue selling the product as is, or to recall it. The paper shows that existing products liability law gives the manufacturers bad incentive to recall products. It shows, counter-intuitively, that as the post-recall liability becomes more severe, manufacturers would be more likely to leave products in the market longer and more often than is socially desirable. It also demonstrates that the law hurts the incentives of manufacturers to acquire better information about the riskiness of …

Liability Insurance As Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law In Action, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

Leaving aside difficult to interpret doctrinal developments, such as the abrogation of traditional immunities, liability insurance has at least the following six impacts on tort law in action. First, for claims against all but the wealthiest individuals and organizations, liability insurance is a de facto element of tort liability. Second, liability insurance limits are a de facto cap on tort damages. Third, tort claims are shaped to match the available liability insurance, with the result that liability insurance policy exclusions become de facto limits on tort liability. Fourth, liability insurance makes lawsuits against ordinary individuals and small organizations into repeat …

Solving The Punitive Damage Mismatch, Ari Behar

ExpressO

There are several reasons underlying the system of punitive damages. Application of these reasons to cases yields differing results. The reasons fall into two categories: those that support awarding additional damages to the plaintiff and those that support extracting more damages from the defendant. When the reasons in favor of extraction exceed those in favor of award, the award should be split between the plaintiff and a fund. This fund should be used to supplement awards when the reasons favoring award exceed those favoring extraction.

Selling Mayberry: Communities And Individuals In Law And Economics, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

The small village of Cheshire, Ohio was recently acquired in its entirety by the firm whose giant power plant, located at the edge of town, caused it serious pollution problems. Although the plant was worth substantially more than the town, this was not a simple Coasean bargain. This paper combines an ethnographic methodology with theoretical insights from law and economics to present an empirical and theoretic challenge to the standard account of nuisance disputes. We explore the transaction in detail and explain what prevented collective action and holdout problems that are usually thought to hinder bargaining with groups. Specifically, we …

Hand, Posner, And The Myth Of The "Hand Formula", In Symposium, Negligence In The Law, Richard W. Wright

All Faculty Scholarship

There is a striking incongruence between the discussions of negligence in the legal literature, including the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, and the understandings of ordinary people and the actual practice of the courts. The legal literature generally assumes that an aggregate-risk-utility test is employed to determine whether conduct was reasonable or negligent. This test was invented by legal academics and inserted in the first Restatement during the first part of the twentieth century, although, as recent studies all conclude, it had almost no support in the cases prior to its adoption in the Restatement and for several decades …

Pain-And-Suffering Damages In Tort Law: Revisiting The Theoretical Framework And The Empirical Evidence, Ronen Avraham

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

Should there be pain-and-suffering damages in tort law? Most legal economists who wrote on the subject that there should not be pain-and-suffering damages in tort law. A minority of scholars thought the decision of whether tort law should provide pain-and-suffering damages is an empirical, or an experimental, question that cannot be armchair-theorized. Yet, all scholars who have done empirical or experimental work to explore the desirability of pain-and-suffering damages reached the conclusion that it is undesirable. In this paper I argue that the majority view cannot serve as a policy-making aid. I side with the minority of scholars who argue …

Justice And Reasonable Care In Negligence Law, Richard W. Wright

All Faculty Scholarship

The academic literature generally assumes that an aggregate-risk-utility test is employed to determine whether conduct was reasonable or negligent. This aggregate-risk-utility test is a transparent implementation of the basic impartiality and aggregation principles of utilitarianism and the most popular (Kaldor-Hicks) interpretation of economic efficiency. Thus, the test's assumed prevalence as the criterion of reasonableness in negligence law has been highlighted by legal economists as confirmation of the utilitarian efficiency foundations of tort law, while those, including Ronald Dworkin, who think that the law, including tort law, is or should be grounded on principles of justice have sought to demonstrate that, …

Teaching Real Torts: Using Barry Werth's Damages In The Law School Classroom, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Introduction, Anthony J. Scirica

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, And The Dark Side Of Tort Liability, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Reconsidering Insurance For Punitive Damages, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Corporate Judgement Proofing: A Response To Lynn Lopucki's 'The Death Of Liability', James J. White

Articles

In "The Death of Liability" Professor Lynn M. LoPucki argues that American businesses are rendering themselves judgment proof.- Using the metaphor of a poker game, Professor LoPucki claims American businesses are increasingly able to participate in the poker game without putting "chips in the pot." He argues that it has become easier for American companies to play the game without having chips in the pot because of the ease with which a modern debtor can grant secured credit, because of the growth of the peculiar form of sale known as asset securitization, because foreign havens for secreting assets are now …

Conflicts And Defense Lawyers: From Triangles To Tetrahedrons, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

On The Genealogy Of Moral Hazard, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Recovery For Economic Loss Following The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

The physical cleanup following one of the worst oil spills in history, that of the Exxon Valdez, is done. The legal cleanup, however, has barely begun. Over 100 law firms participating in over 200 suits in federal and state courts involving more than 30,000 claims are presently engaged in litigation. Fishermen, cannery workers, fishing lodges, tour boat operators, oil companies whose shipments were delayed, and even California motorists facing higher gasoline prices have filed claims against Exxon and its fellow defendants.

Most claimants face a formidable roadblock, the so-called Robins doctrine. Under Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint …

Law And Economics, Michael J. Trebilcock

Dalhousie Law Journal

Prior to 1960, most North American law schools paid attention only to anti-trust, public utility regulation, and perhaps tax policy from a law and economics perspective (sometimes referred to as the "old" law and economics). However, beginning in the early 1960's with pioneering articles by Guido Calabresi on tort law and Ronald Coase (the 1991 recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics) on property rights, followed by prolific writings and a comprehensive text by Richard Posner on a vast range of legal issues, the field of law and economics has burgeoned with many lawyers and economists around the world now …

Government Liability For Economic Losses: The Case Of Regulatory Failure, David S. Cohen

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Compensation claims against provincial and federal governments are largely a product of the second half of the 20th century. The initial surge of cases after the enactment of the federal Crown Liability Act in 1953--mirrored also in developments at the provincial level-- were typically "private" tort claims. Indeed a significant percentage of claims against the federal government continue to be nothing more than automobile accident, occupier liability claims and lawsuits arising out of similar relatively minor bureaucratic error. Recently, however, as a result of both the imagination of litigators and the growth of the regulatory state, claims against governments have …

Regulating Regulators: The Legal Environment Of The State, David S. Cohen

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

In this paper I focus on the ability of tort law to reduce primary costs, or losses associated with the number and seriousness of accidents. In one sense I will be analysing the state as if it were a private firm in which losses suffered by private individuals and firms are externalities. Several years ago Mark Spitzer wrote a paper on this topic in which he posited several models of state activity and analysed the incentive effects of liability rules in each case. In my view Spitzer's general conclusion - the rule which may be synthesized from all of the …

Bleeding Hearts And Peeling Floors: Compensation For Economic Loss At The House Of Lords, David S. Cohen

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The decision of the House of Lords in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Ltd. represents an unwarranted development in the law of tort and contract, unless its rationale and limitations are fully appreciated. This reform in such an important area is premature "in the absence of hard data on the probable impact of such an extension of liability.” Much of the published commentary on recovery of economic loss in tort, and on this decision in particular, has been written from the ex post perspective of accident compensation doctrine and theory. Most writers have been concerned with the development of positive …

The Enterprise Liability Theory Of Torts, Howard C. Klemme

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Theory Of Economic Policy And The Law Of Torts, Robert L. Birmingham

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Tort Liability Of Organizations For Intentionally Impairing Economic Relations

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.