Law Commons^™

From The Frontlines Of The Modern Movement To End Forced Arbitration And Restore Jury Rights, F. Paul Bland, Myriam Gilles, Tanuja Gupta

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Docket Control, Mandatory Jurisdiction, And The Supreme Court's Failure In Rucho V. Common Cause, Carolyn Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper, part of a Symposium on Andrew Coan's book, Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making, traces congressional changes to Supreme Court jurisdiction over more than a century, noting that those changes were regularly made in response to concerns about the Court's caseload. To the extent that Coan, and the Court, turn to doctrinal methods of controlling caseloads, such as deferential standards of review, they are overlooking the important congressional role in setting the Court's jurisdiction. The paper concludes by criticizing the recent decision of Rucho v. Common Cause in which the Court held that extreme …

#Squadgoals: A Response To Seth Waxman, Amelia Smith Rinehart

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

No abstract provided.

Drd Response To Seth P. Waxman's Article, Donald R. Dunner

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

No abstract provided.

Charting Supreme Court Patent Law, Near And Far, Joseph Scott Miller

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

No abstract provided.

A Court Divided, Shubha Ghosh

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

No abstract provided.

May You Live In Interesting Times: Patent Law In The Supreme Court, Seth P. Waxman

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

No abstract provided.

How Much Has The Supreme Court Changed Patent Law, Paul Gugliuzza

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

The U.S. Supreme Court has decided a remarkable number of patent cases in the past decade, particularly as compared to the first twenty years of the Federal Circuit’s existence. No longer is the Federal Circuit “the de facto Supreme Court of patents,” as Mark Janis wrote in 2001. Rather, it seems the Supreme Court is the Supreme Court of patents. In the article at the center of this symposium, Judge Timothy Dyk of the Federal Circuit writes that the Supreme Court’s decisions “have had a major impact on patent law,” citing, among other evidence, the Court’s seventy percent reversal rate …

Foster V. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity For Batson And The Peremptory Challenge, Nancy Marder

All Faculty Scholarship

In 2016, the United States Supreme Court decided that the prosecutors in Foster v. Chatman exercised race-based peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. The Court reached the right result, but missed an important opportunity. The Court should have acknowledged that after thirty years of the Batson experiment, it is clear that Batson is unable to stop discriminatory peremptory challenges. Batson is easy to evade, so discriminatory peremptory challenges persist and the harms from them are significant. The Court could try to strengthen Batson in an effort to make it more effective, but in the end the only way …

Is The Supreme Court Concerned With Patent Law, The Federal Circuit, Or Both: A Response To Judge Timothy B. Dyk, Timothy R. Holbrook

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

This essay is a response to Hon. Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP. 67 (2016). In it, I address the reasons for the Supreme Court's engagement with patent law. In other words, is the Court interested in patent law itself, or is there something about the Federal Circuit as an institution that has garnered the Court's gaze. I conclude it is a combination of the two. The Court is concerned with certain aspects of patent doctrine, but it is also concerned with the Federal Circuit, …

How Can The Supreme Court Not “Understand” Patent Law?, Gregory Reilly

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

The Supreme Court does understand patent law. This invited Essay responds to Federal Circuit Judge Dyk’s remarks at the Chicago-Kent Supreme Court IP Review, in particular, his observation that the patent “bar and the academy have expressed skepticism that the Supreme Court understands patent law well enough to make the governing rules” (a view Judge Dyk did not endorse). The idea that the Supreme Court does not understand the law of patents is implausible. Even more generous interpretations of this criticism – that the Supreme Court insufficiently understands innovation policy, insufficiently understands the patent system that Congress desired in creating …

Response To Judge Timothy B. Dyk, Donald R. Dunner

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

No abstract provided.

Thoughts On The Relationship Between The Supreme Court And The Federal Circuit, Timothy B. Dyk

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

No abstract provided.

Abuse Of Supreme Court Precedent: The "Historic Kinship", David W. Barnes

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court applied a doctrine formulated for patent law to an issue arising in copyright law. The Court supplied a rationale for doing so by identifying a “historic kinship” between patent and copyright law based on fundamental goals of intellectual property law. The Court considered how the rationale applied in the particular factual context involved. The Court cautioned that the propriety of extending a doctrine developed in one intellectual property regime to another depends on the particular legal issue involved. Despite the importance of ensuring that new rules are …

Panel Discussion: Remembering Justice Scalia In Ip Cases, Graeme Dinwoodie

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

No abstract provided.

Restoring The Balancing Test: A Better Approach To Fair Use In Copyright, Charlie Penrod

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

Fair use analyses are overly vague and abstract. While the Copyright Act established four factors for courts to consider when determining if an alleged infringer’s use of copyrighted work is “fair”, these factors are not susceptible to easy interpretation. More importantly, once these factors have been interpreted, a trier of fact is instructed to balance these factors against each other. No effective method currently exists in guiding courts as to how to balance inherently disparate factors against each other, either in terms of intensity of the factors or how one factor might balance against another totally different factor. This article …

Federal Circuit Exclusive Appellate Patent Jurisdiction: A Response To Chief Judge Wood, Harold C. Wegner

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

No abstract provided.

Copyright And Freedom Of Expression: Saving Free Speech From Advancing Legislation, Amanda Beshears Cook

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the possibility of a First Amendment defense to copyright infringement claims, but it has never actually found such a defense to apply to a case before it. And nearly every year, Congress enacts or attempts to enact more legislation that restricts speech under the banner of the copyright clause. The problem is that the natural right of free speech is being depleted by the legislatively granted right of intellectual property, putting both individual liberty and the public good at risk. Congress and the courts both must begin to acknowledge that in the common law …

A "Progressive Contraction Of Jurisdiction": The Making Of The Modern Supreme Court, Carolyn Shapiro

125th Anniversary Materials

The Supreme Court in 1888 was in crisis. Its overall structure and responsibilities, created a century earlier by the Judiciary Act of 1789, were no longer adequate or appropriate. The Court had no control over its own docket - at the beginning of the 1888 term, there were 1,563 cases pending - and the justices’ responsibilities, which included circuit riding, were impossible to meet. Shaped as it was by a law almost as old as the country itself, the Supreme Court in 1888 - and the federal judicial system as a whole - would be barely recognizable to many today. …

Claiming Neutrality And Confessing Subjectivity In Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, Carolyn Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

Supreme Court confirmation hearings provide a rare opportunity for the American people to hear what (would-be) justices think about the nature of judging and the role of the Supreme Court. In recent years, nominees have been quick to talk about judging in terms of neutrality and objectivity, most famously with Chief Justice Roberts’ invocation of the “neutral umpire,” and they have emphasized their reliance on legal texts and sources as if those sources can provide answers in difficult cases. Many of the cases heard by the Supreme Court, however, do not have objectively correct answers that can be deduced from …

Fisher's Fishing Expedition, Vinay Harpalani

All Faculty Scholarship

This Essay delves into the Supreme Court oral arguments in Fisher v. Texas, which occurred on October 10, 2012. It examines the exchanges between the advocates and Justices, focusing on the meaning of 'critical mass' and the quest for total race neutrality in UT admissions. It argues that both of these are futile endeavors and unnecessary to decide Fisher. The entire Fisher case is a fishing expedition - albeit one that might reel in race-conscious admissions.

The Supreme Court's Theory Of The Fund, William Birdthistle

All Faculty Scholarship

Just as the firm has long served as the foundational molecule of the U.S. capitalist economy, theories of the firm have for more than a century dominated legal and economic discourse. Ever since Ronald Coase published The Nature of the Firm in 1937 and asked why firms should exist in an efficient market, classicists and neoclassicists have competed to develop theories — predominantly managerialist and contractual — that best explain the structure and behavior of business organizations.

The investment fund, by contrast, has languished at the margins of corporate theory, relegated as simply a minor, if somewhat curious, example of …

The Long And Winding Road From Monroe To Connick, Sheldon Nahmod

All Faculty Scholarship

In this article, I address the historical and doctrinal development of § 1983 local government liability, beginning with Monroe v. Pape in 1961 and culminating in the Supreme Court’s controversial 2011 failure to train decision in Connick v. Thompson. Connick has made it exceptionally difficult for § 1983 plaintiffs to prevail against local governments in failure to train cases. In the course of my analysis, I also consider the oral argument and opinions in Connick as well as various aspects of § 1983 doctrine. I ultimately situate Connick in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence which doubles back to Justice Frankfurter’s view …

Oral Dissenting On The Supreme Court, Christopher W. Schmidt, Carolyn Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Article we offer the first comprehensive evaluation of oral dissenting on the Supreme Court. We examine the practice in both historical and contemporary perspective, take stock of the emerging academic literature on the subject, and suggest a new framework for analysis of oral dissenting. Specifically, we put forth several claims. Contrary to the common assumption of scholarship and media coverage, oral dissents are nothing new. Oral dissenting has a long tradition, and its history provides valuable lessons for understanding the potential and limits of oral dissents today. Furthermore, not all oral dissents are alike. Dissenting Justices may have …

The Law Clerk Proxy Wars: Secrecy, Accountability, And Ideology In The Supreme Court, Carolyn Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

This piece provides an in-depth review and analysis of two recent books about Supreme Court law clerks, Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerk, by Todd C. Peppers, and Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court, by Artemus Ward and David L. Weiden. In addition, the essay addresses a question so obvious that it is rarely asked – why is there so much curiosity about Supreme Court law clerks in the first place? In the essay, I analyze a widespread concern – and one discussed in …

The Context Of Ideology: Law, Politics, And Empirical Legal Scholarship, Carolyn Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

In their confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Sotomayor both articulated a vision of the neutral judge who decides cases without resort to personal perspectives or opinions, in short, without ideology. At the other extreme, the dominant model of judicial decisionmaking in political science has long been the attitudinal model, which posits that the Justices’ votes can be explained primarily as expressions of their personal policy preferences, with little or no role for law, legal reasoning, or legal doctrine.

Many traditional legal scholars have criticized such scholarship for its insistence on the primacy of ideology in judicial decisionmaking, even …

Brown And The Colorblind Constitution, Christopher W. Schmidt

All Faculty Scholarship

This Essay offers the first in-depth examination of the role of colorblind constitutionalism in the history of Brown v. Board of Education. In light of the recent Supreme Court ruling in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (2007), such an examination is needed today more than ever. In this case, Chief Justice John Roberts drew on the history of Brown to support his conclusion that racial classifications in school assignment policies are unconstitutional. Particularly controversial was the Chief Justice's use of the words of the NAACP lawyers who argued Brown as evidence for his colorblind …

Dred Scott And The Crisis Of 1860, Louise Weinberg

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Recent suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Dred Scott decision and the controversy over the extension of slavery into the territories were at the very center of the crisis of 1860. This paper fills in the social, political, economic, and legal backgrounds of that crisis in order to clarify the centrality of Dred Scott in the election of Abraham Lincoln and to the ensuing destruction of the Union.

Scott V. Sandford: The Court's Most Dreadful Case And How It Changed History, Paul Finkelman

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Dred Scott, without doubt, is the most controversial case in the history of the United States Supreme Court. Unlike the controversies that surround other decisions of the Court, the controversy surrounding Dred Scott does not turn on if the outcome or Chief Justice Taney's analysis was wrong, but rather on why the outcome and Chief Justice Taney's analysis were wrong. This article focuses on the political goals Taney attempted to accomplish through his decision in Dred Scott. Though there existed reasons for Taney's belief that his decision in Dred Scott would once and for all end the political …

Thirteen Ways Of Looking At Dred Scott, Jack M. Balkin, Sanford Levinson

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Dred Scott v. Sandford is a classic case that is relevant to almost every important question of contemporary constitutional theory.

Dred Scott connected race to social status, to citizenship, and to being a part of the American people. One hundred fifty years later these connections still haunt us; and the twin questions of who is truly American and who America belongs to still roil our national debates.

Dred Scott is a case about threats to national security and whether the Constitution is a suicide pact. It concerns whether the Constitution follows the flag and whether constitutional rights obtain in federally …