Law Commons^™

Professor Fish—Why Are You Still Picking On Liberalism?, Micah Schwartzman

FIU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Fish On First, Larry Alexander

FIU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reasonable Appropriation And Reader Response, Laura A. Heymann

Laura A. Heymann

Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., many courts have considered, when evaluating a claim of fair use in copyright, whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work is “transformative,” which the Campbell Court described as “add[ing] something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”

In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit shifted the focus of the analysis, both confirming that a work could be transformative even if it did not comment on the original work or its author and stating that the key to …

Reasonable Appropriation And Reader Response, Laura A. Heymann

Faculty Publications

Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., many courts have considered, when evaluating a claim of fair use in copyright, whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work is “transformative,” which the Campbell Court described as “add[ing] something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”

In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit shifted the focus of the analysis, both confirming that a work could be transformative even if it did not comment on the original work or its author and stating that the key to …

The Social Value Of Academic Freedom Defended, J. Peter Byrne

Indiana Law Journal

In his recent book, Versions of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to Revolution, Stanley Fish renewed his arguments for an “it’s just a job” account of academic freedom, begun in his 2008 book, Save the World on Your Own Time. He claims that academic freedom consists of nothing more than the conditions necessary to follow the established criteria for scholarship and teaching within each discipline. He complains chiefly against the invocation of academic freedom to protect or glorify political advocacy by academics. There is a lot in Fish’s account to admire and agree with. The appropriate sphere of academic freedom needs …

Justifying Academic Freedom, Brian L. Frye

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

While academic freedom can only be described in relation to academic norms, its justification can and should depend on its contribution to the common good. Academics contribute to the common good by producing scholarship. But scholarship is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Academic freedom is justified not only because enables academics to produce more and better scholarship, but also because it enables academics to challenge academic norms that diminish the quantity or quality of scholarship they produce.

2011 Cardozo Life (Issue 1), Benjamin N. Cardozo School Of Law

Cardozo Life Magazine

Table of Contents:

Around Campus, page 2

Questions for Prof. Max Minzner, page 16

Faculty Briefs, page 18

An Interview with Stanley Fish, page 22

Same-Sex Marriage in the US, page 28

Standing Up to the Vatican, page 32

A Summer of Public Service, page 36

Intellectual Property: Fast Forward, page 42

Alumni News & Notes, page 49

Cardozo Advancement, page 57

Endnote, page 60

A Rhetorician's View Of Religious Speech In Civic Argument, Jack L. Sammors

Seattle University Law Review

I first examine and reject liberal political methods of addressing the question of religious speech in civic argument, all of which depend upon norms external to the argument that are then excluded from it. Next, in proposing a method that relies only upon the constitutive norms of civic argument itself, I offer a description of civic argument as rhetoric, examine the risks of religious rhetoric in this civic argument, and examine the constitutive norms of civic argument. I address whether the constitutive norms of civic argument are sufficient restraints upon religious rhetoric such that reliance upon external norms is not …

Law And Phrenology, Pierre Schlag

Publications

As the intellectual credentials of American law become increasingly dubious, the question arises: how has this discipline been intellectually organized to sustain belief among its academic practitioners? This Commentary explores the nineteenth-century pseudo-science of phrenology as a way of gaining insight into the intellectual organization of American law. Although there are, obviously, significant differences, the parallels are at once striking and edifying. Both phrenology and law emerged as disciplinary knowledges through attempts to cast them in the form of sciences. In both cases, the "sciences" were aesthetically organized around a fundamental ontology of reifications and animisms -- "faculties" in the …

How To Do Things With The First Amendment, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Meaning Of Equality And The Interpretive Turn, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The turn to hermeneutics and interpretation in contemporary legal theory has contributed at least two central ideas to modern jurisprudential thought: first, that the "meaning" of a text is invariably indeterminate -- what might be called the indeterminacy claim -- and second, that the unavoidably malleable essence of texts -- their essential inessentiality -- entails that interpreting a text is a necessary part of the process of creating the text's meaning. These insights have generated both considerable angst, and considerable excitement among traditional constitutional scholars, primarily because at least on first blush these two claims seem to inescapably imply a …

Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach To Law, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About The Law-As-Literature Movement, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Among other achievements, the modern law-as-literature movement has prompted increasing numbers of legal scholars to embrace the claim that adjudication is interpretation, and more specifically, that constitutional adjudication is interpretation of the Constitution. That adjudication is interpretation -- that an adjudicative act is an interpretive act -- more than any other central commitment, unifies the otherwise diverse strands of the legal and constitutional theory of the late twentieth century.

In this article, I will argue in this article against both modern forms of interpretivism. The analogue of law to literature, on which much of modern interpretivism is based, although fruitful, …

Fish V. Zapp: The Case Of The Relatively Autonomous Self, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

A Response To Fish And White, Richard H. Weisberg

Faculty Articles

No abstract provided.