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Articles 1 - 30 of 510
Full-Text Articles in Law
Game Changers: Rewriting The Playbook A Sports And Entertainment Law Symposium, Brandon Posivak
Game Changers: Rewriting The Playbook A Sports And Entertainment Law Symposium, Brandon Posivak
Akron Law Review
Brandon Posivak gave the following remarks as part of the Akron Law Review 2023 Symposium at The University of Akron School of Law in April 2023.
Mr. Posivak graduated in May 2023 from Pepperdine Caruso School of Law in Malibu, CA with Certificates in Entertainment, Media, and Sports; Dispute Resolution; and Entrepreneurship and the Law with a specialization in Entertainment, Technology, and Intellectual Property. Prior to law school he was a Division I baseball player at Lafayette College in Easton, PA and has published two books, Step on the Cracks: Reinventing Happiness, Positivity, and Optimism and Waiting for Yesterday.
Prosecuting Excessive Pricing Of Pharmaceuticals Under Competition Law: Evolutionary Development, Frederick M. Abbott
Prosecuting Excessive Pricing Of Pharmaceuticals Under Competition Law: Evolutionary Development, Frederick M. Abbott
Scholarly Publications
Prosecution of pharmaceutical companies for excessive pricing of products under competition law is now a reality. As recently as a decade ago, such prosecutions were virtually nonexistent. That situation has changed dramatically as competition authorities in Europe and South Africa have pursued a significant number of such prosecutions and have levied substantial fines against the investigated parties. While the United States has traditionally led in policing the pharmaceutical market against anticompetitive misconduct, in this specific arena it has fallen behind, principally because federal courts so far have refused to acknowledge excessive pricing as a cause of action under Section 2 …
Race-Ing Antitrust, Bennett Capers, Gregory Day
Race-Ing Antitrust, Bennett Capers, Gregory Day
Michigan Law Review
Antitrust law has a race problem. To spot an antitrust violation, courts inquire into whether an act has degraded consumer welfare. Since anticompetitive practices are often assumed to enhance consumer welfare, antitrust offenses are rarely found. Key to this framework is that antitrust treats all consumers monolithically; that consumers are differently situated, especially along lines of race, simply is ignored.
We argue that antitrust law must disaggregate the term “consumer” to include those who disproportionately suffer from anticompetitive practices via a community welfare standard. As a starting point, we demonstrate that anticompetitive conduct has specifically been used as a tool …
Ftc V. Qualcomm And The Need To Reboot Antitrust Goals, Beatriz Del Chiaro Da Rosa
Ftc V. Qualcomm And The Need To Reboot Antitrust Goals, Beatriz Del Chiaro Da Rosa
University of Miami Business Law Review
The antitrust community is facing a demanding question: Is antitrust enforcement ultimately about protecting consumers, competition, or both? This question has sparked debates about the ultimate goals of antitrust law. On one side of the debate, supporters of the consumer welfare standard; and on the other side, supporters of the Neo-Brandeisian standard of enforcement. At this crucial time in the debate of overarching antitrust goals, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated, one of the most important antitrust cases in the twenty-first century, poses many issues for the consumer welfare standard and antitrust enforcement in the …
The Impact Of Amex And Its Progeny On Technology Platforms, Kacyn H. Fujii
The Impact Of Amex And Its Progeny On Technology Platforms, Kacyn H. Fujii
Michigan Law Review
Big Tech today faces unprecedented levels of antitrust scrutiny. Yet antitrust enforcement against Big Tech still faces a major obstacle: the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Ohio v. American Express. Popularly called Amex, the case imposed a higher initial burden on antitrust plaintiffs in cases involving two-sided markets. Two-sided markets connect two distinct, noncompeting groups of customers on a shared platform. These platforms have indirect network effects, meaning that one group of customers benefits when more of the second group of customers joins the platform. Two-sided markets are ubiquitous in the technology sector, encompassing social media, search engines, …
Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng
Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng
University of Cincinnati Law Review
In recent years, states have launched several antitrust investigations targeting digital platforms. A major difficulty in these investigations is demonstrating the extent of a digital platform’s market power. Market power is defined as the control of the output or the price without the loss of business to competitors. As will be explored in this Article, market power is a critical component in an antitrust analysis. On several occasions, courts have adopted the switching costs approach in their analysis of market power. According to this approach, market power may be inferred when the costs of switching from one supplier to another …
Federalism, Free Competition, And Sherman Act Preemption Of State Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Federalism, Free Competition, And Sherman Act Preemption Of State Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The Sherman Act establishes free competition as the rule governing interstate trade. Banning private restraints cannot ensure that competitive markets allocate the nation's resources. State laws can pose identical threats to free markets, posing an obstacle to achieving Congress's goal to protect free competition.
The Sherman Act would thus override anticompetitive state laws under ordinary preemption standards. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected such preemption in Parker v. Brown, creating the "state action doctrine." Parker and its progeny hold that state-imposed restraints are immune from Sherman Act preemption, even if they impose significant harm on out-of-state consumers. Parker's progeny …
The Necessity In Antitrust Law, Gregory Day
The Necessity In Antitrust Law, Gregory Day
Washington and Lee Law Review
Antitrust rarely, if ever, gives primacy to a dispute’s subject matter. For instance, exclusionary conduct that raises the price of a lifesaving drug receives the same analysis as a restraint of baseball cards. Since antitrust’s purpose is to promote consumer welfare, the equal treatment of important and mundane goods might appear perplexing. After all, competition to produce affordable foods, medicines, and other necessities would seem to foster consumer welfare more than inane products do.
In fact, defendants generally win antitrust lawsuits even when monopolizing necessities because the primary method of antitrust review is notably deferential to defendants. To explain this …
Monopolizing Sports Data, Marc Edelman, John T. Holden
Monopolizing Sports Data, Marc Edelman, John T. Holden
William & Mary Law Review
With legal sports betting viewed as a panacea for state budget woes across the United States, the underlying data that fuels the sports betting industry has emerged as an especially valuable asset. In the hopes of capitalizing on state laws that have now legalized sports betting, United States professional sports leagues have attempted to gain exclusive ownership rights over valuable sports betting data by asking legislators to mandate that bookmakers exclusively use data sold through the league. In addition, some sports leagues have imposed policies mandating that teams bundle together their collected data for purposes of selling it exclusively through …
Reviving Antitrust Enforcement In The Airline Industry, Jonathan Edelman
Reviving Antitrust Enforcement In The Airline Industry, Jonathan Edelman
Michigan Law Review
The Department of Transportation (DOT) has broad but oft overlooked power to address antitrust issues among airlines through section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act. However, the DOT’s unwillingness to enforce antitrust more aggressively may be translating into higher fares and fees for airline travelers.
More aggressive antitrust enforcement is urgently needed. Recent research has revealed a widespread practice of common ownership in the airline industry, whereby investment firms own large portions of rival airline companies. Although this practice leads to higher prices and reduced competition, antitrust regulators, from the DOT to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade …
Alston And The Dejudicialization Of Antitrust, Richard D. Friedman
Alston And The Dejudicialization Of Antitrust, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
A curious feature of NCAA v. Alston is the shoe that didn’t drop, at least not immediately. “Put simply,” Justice Gorsuch wrote for a unanimous Court, “this suit involves admitted horizontal price fixing in a market where the defendants exercise monopoly control.” Given that this pronouncement occurred on page fourteen of the Court’s opinion, one might have expected that the opinion would end on, say, page fifteen, for if there has been one fixed point in American antitrust law it has been that horizontal price-fixing, especially but not only by those with monopoly power, is per se illegal. Instead, the …
Will The Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair The Damage Resulting From Ncaa's Sports League Exemption, Alan J. Meese
Will The Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair The Damage Resulting From Ncaa's Sports League Exemption, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
Horizontal restraints are unlawful per se unless a court can identify some redeeming virtue that such restraints may create. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (“NCAA”), the Supreme Court rejected this standard, refusing to condemn horizontal restraints on price and output imposed by the NCAA without specifying any possible redeeming virtues. The Court emphasized that other restraints not before the Court were necessary to create and maintain athletic competition like that supervised by the NCAA. This exemption for sports leagues ensures that all restraints imposed by such entities merit Rule …
Farmer Cooperatives "Take Cover": The Capper-Volstead Exemption Is Under Siege, Donald M. Barnes, Jay L. Levine
Farmer Cooperatives "Take Cover": The Capper-Volstead Exemption Is Under Siege, Donald M. Barnes, Jay L. Levine
Arkansas Law Review
"When tillage begins, other arts follow. The farmers, therefore, are the founders of human civilization." There can be little dispute that food production is of vital interest to any nation’s security and economy. For this reason, the United States Congress, like many other legislatures around the world, has accorded special treatment to the agricultural industry, and particularly to farmers. One example of this special treatment is the Capper-Volstead Act, which provides farmers with immunity from antitrust liability for joint conduct undertaken by and through an “association” of producers.
The Case For Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation, Jeffrey D. Manns
The Case For Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation, Jeffrey D. Manns
Indiana Law Journal
One of the few things former President Donald Trump and leading Democrats appear to agree on is the need to subject Big Technology (“Big Tech”) firms to antitrust scrutiny. But unsurprisingly they disagree about how to address the problem. Senator Elizabeth Warren and many other leading Democrats have called for breaking up large technology firms, such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, in a revival of the trust-busting progressive era of the early twentieth century. In contrast, the Trump administration triggered more traditional antitrust monopoly review of potential anticompetitive activities of a number of leading technology firms, which is more likely …
Interstate Burdens And Antitrust Federalism: A Reexamination Of Parker Immunity, John Sack
Interstate Burdens And Antitrust Federalism: A Reexamination Of Parker Immunity, John Sack
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar
The Supreme Court has largely immunized state action from Federal antitrust enforcement. However, this carte blanche immunity, while founded on federalism grounds, runs counter to a number of constitutional principles, and too easily allows states to impose costs on other states while reaping all the benefits of anti-competitive policies. While the Supreme Court has only scantily discussed revisiting this immunity, academics and the Federal Trade Commission have largely criticized the doctrine. The Sherman Act, described as taking on a constitutional standing, should seek to form a more perfect economic union, and our understanding of State Action Immunity should strive towards …
Antitrust's High-Tech Exceptionalism, Rebecca H. Allensworth
Antitrust's High-Tech Exceptionalism, Rebecca H. Allensworth
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
American competition policy has four big problems: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. These companies each reign over a sector of the digital marketplace, controlling both the consumer experience and the possibility of competitive entry. This Essay argues that the conventional account of how antitrust law allowed this consolidation of market power - that it failed to evolve to address the market realities of the technology sector-is incomplete. Not only did courts fail to adapt antitrust law from its smoke-stack roots, but they gave big tech special dispensation under traditional antitrust doctrine. Swayed by prevailing utopic views about digital markets in …
Requiem For A Lightweight: How Ncaa Continues To Distort Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
Requiem For A Lightweight: How Ncaa Continues To Distort Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court speaks rarely about the meaning of the Sherman Act. When the Court does speak, its pronouncements have particular resonance and staying power among jurists, scholars, and enforcers. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma was such a case. There the Court assessed agreements reducing the output and increasing the prices of televised college football games. After announcing that restraints imposed by sports leagues are exempt from per se condemnation, the Court went on to invalidate the challenged agreements under the rule of reason because they produced significant economic harm without offsetting benefits. In so …
Teamwork Or Collusion? Changing Antitrust Law To Permit Corporate Action On Climate Change, Dailey C. Koga
Teamwork Or Collusion? Changing Antitrust Law To Permit Corporate Action On Climate Change, Dailey C. Koga
Washington Law Review
In an era of apprehension about climate change and the future of our planet, private companies are increasingly recognizing their role in increasing sustainability and lowering carbon emissions. To address this growing concern, some industry leaders are taking unilateral action to implement sustainable practices, but other companies have made agreements to fight emissions together. However, the Sherman Antitrust Act forbids agreements in restraint of trade. Further, antitrust law traditionally has refused to recognize ethical or moral justifications as legitimate reasons to permit anticompetitive agreements. As society’s concern for the planet grows and elected leaders move slower than needed to address …
Mere Common Ownership And The Antitrust Laws, Thomas A. Lambert
Mere Common Ownership And The Antitrust Laws, Thomas A. Lambert
Faculty Publications
"Common ownership," also called "horizontal shareholding," refers to a stock investor's ownership of minority stakes in multiple competing firms. Recent empirical studies have purported to show that institutional investors' common ownership reduces competition among commonly owned competitors. "Mere common ownership" is horizontal shareholding that is not accompanied by any sort of illicit agreement, such as a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, or the holding of a control-conferring stake. This Article considers the legality of mere common ownership under the U.S. antitrust laws. Prominent antitrust scholars and the leading treatise have concluded that mere common ownership that has the incidental effect of lessening market …
Antitrust Regulation And The Federal-State Balance: Restoring The Original Design, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Regulation And The Federal-State Balance: Restoring The Original Design, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The U.S. Constitution divides authority over commerce between states and the national government. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act (“the Act”) reflects this allocation of power, reaching only those harmful agreements that are “in restraint of... commerce among the several States.” This Article contends that the Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state and national power over trade restraints in 1948, abruptly abandoning decades of precedent recognizing exclusive state authority over most intrastate restraints. This revised construction of the Act contravened the statute’s apparent meaning, unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and undermined the …
Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle is accepted in some form by the entire Supreme Court and the majority of other writers. However, it means different things to different people. For example, some members of the Supreme Court can simultaneously acknowledge the antitrust consumer welfare principle even as they approve practices that result in immediate, obvious, and substantial consumer harm. At the same time, however, a properly defined consumer welfare principle is essential if antitrust is to achieve its statutory purpose, which is to pursue practices that injure competition. The wish to make antitrust a more general social justice statute is understandable: …
Sherman's Missing "Supplement": Prosecutorial Capacity, Agency Incentives, And The False Dawn Of Antitrust Federalism, Daniel E. Rauch
Sherman's Missing "Supplement": Prosecutorial Capacity, Agency Incentives, And The False Dawn Of Antitrust Federalism, Daniel E. Rauch
Cleveland State Law Review
When the Sherman Act passed in 1890, it was widely expected that it would operate primarily as a "supplement" to vigorous state-level antitrust enforcement of state antitrust statutes. This did not happen. Instead, confounding the predictions of Congress, the academy, and the trusts themselves, state antitrust enforcement overwhelmingly failed to take root in the years between 1890 and the First World War. To date, many scholars have noted this legal-historical anomaly. None, however, have rigorously or correctly explained what caused it. This Article does.
Using historical and empirical research, this Article establishes that the best explanation for the early failure …
No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao
No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao
William & Mary Law Review
The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competition is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy. These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate …
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the
firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the
first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation
originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the
Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision.
Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous
dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman
Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired
a monopoly. …
Do Founders Control Startup Firms That Go Public?, Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Do Founders Control Startup Firms That Go Public?, Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
American competition policy has four big problems: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. These companies each reign over a sector of the digital marketplace, controlling both the consumer experience and the possibility of competitive entry. This Essay argues that the conventional account of how antitrust law allowed this consolidation of market power - that it failed to evolve to address the market realities of the technology sector- is incomplete. Not only did courts fail to adapt antitrust law from its smoke-stack roots, but they gave big tech special dispensation under traditional antitrust doctrine. Swayed by prevailing utopic views about digital markets …
Antitrust & Corruption: Overruling Noerr, Tim Wu
Antitrust & Corruption: Overruling Noerr, Tim Wu
Faculty Scholarship
We live in a time when concerns about influence over the American political process by powerful private interests have reached an apogee, both on the left and the right. Among the laws originally intended to fight excessive private influence over republican institutions were the antitrust laws, whose sponsors were concerned not just with monopoly, but also its influence over legislatures and politicians. While no one would claim that the antitrust laws were meant to be comprehensive anti-corruption laws, there can be little question that they were passed with concerns about the political influence of powerful firms and industry cartels.
Since …
Direct Evidence Of A Sherman Act Agreement, William H. Page
Direct Evidence Of A Sherman Act Agreement, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
In cases that allege price fixing or other per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts usually begin their opinions by saying there is no direct evidence of agreement—evidence like a “recorded phone call” that is “explicit and requires no inferences to establish” that the necessary direct communications occurred. Only at that point do the courts turn to the sufficiency of the inferences of agreement from circumstantial evidence. Courts highlight the absence of direct evidence of agreement in this way because of its special role on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, when courts do not …
Conspiracy Allegations In The Stock Loan Market: Why Plaintiffs Should Be Seeking A Remedy In Congress And Not In Court, Danielle P. Katz
Conspiracy Allegations In The Stock Loan Market: Why Plaintiffs Should Be Seeking A Remedy In Congress And Not In Court, Danielle P. Katz
Et Cetera
This Article first provides a comprehensive analysis of conspiracy allegations in over-the-counter markets, focusing on the stock loan market as an exemplar.
Multiple conspiracy claims, implicating antitrust law, have been brought regarding over the counter markets since the financial crisis of 2008. The biggest banks in the country have been the center of novel complaints, new regulations, and innovative legislation in the recent years. But, despite regulation and legislation, Sherman Act litigation alleging conspiracy has endured as plaintiffs claim that big banks are conspiring to fix markets when, in fact, they are exercising economies of scale to provide unique, tailored …
American Oligarchy: How The Enfeebling Of Antitrust Law Corrodes The Republic, Zachariah Foge
American Oligarchy: How The Enfeebling Of Antitrust Law Corrodes The Republic, Zachariah Foge
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
In this note, I will argue that the current antitrust framework is misguided and based on erroneous legal and economic theories originating from the Chicago School. I will argue that the neoclassical approach is not only wrong when examining the legislative intent of Congress but is also in contravention with the policy goals and foundational principles of antitrust law. Furthermore, I will argue that the Chicago School’s narrow, outcome-based view of antitrust is ill-equipped to deal with the demands of the twenty-first century and especially with the online marketplace. The tech giants are unprecedented in their scale, and the online …
The Future Of Dairy Cooperatives In The Modern Marketplace: Redeveloping The Capper-Volstead Act, Sarah K. Phillips
The Future Of Dairy Cooperatives In The Modern Marketplace: Redeveloping The Capper-Volstead Act, Sarah K. Phillips
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
Agriculture plays a fundamental role in the U.S. economy as a multibillion-dollar industry that feeds people all over the world. However, over the past decade, the dairy industry in particular has changed from a reliable sector of the greater agricultural industry into an unsettled, politically-charged, and fractured group. Dairy farmers’ consistently receiving low milk prices has facilitated this divide. Tired of being ignored and underpaid, dairy farmers are demanding change in the current dairy market structure.
Federal Milk Marketing Orders and a variety of statutes regulate the dairy industry, but the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act remains the most notable piece of …