Law Commons^™

Law School News: Professor Of The Year 2021: Brittany Raposa 05/20/2021, Michael M. Bowden

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Law Library Blog (April 2021): Legal Beagle's Blog Archive, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Law Library Newsletters/Blog

No abstract provided.

Exceptions Of The Principle Of Imperative Reasoning Of Individual Administrative Decisions In France

UAEU Law Journal

The imperative reasoning of administrative decisions is considered one of the most important landmarks of the policy of administrative clarity. It means that the administration has to be committed to give legal and substantial reasons upon issuing such decisions. Such procedure allows the senior officers to know the reasons of the decision while reviewing the decision addressed to them and influencing their legal positions. Such action achieves understanding and cooperation between the administration and its customers. It enhances the confidence bridges between the two parties and facilitates the administration's task to realize public welfare. This principle was adopted by the …

Anti-Modalities, David E. Pozen, Adam M. Samaha

Michigan Law Review

Constitutional argument runs on the rails of “modalities.” These are the accepted categories of reasoning used to make claims about the content of supreme law. Some of the modalities, such as ethical and prudential arguments, seem strikingly open ended at first sight. Their contours come into clearer view, however, when we attend to the kinds of claims that are not made by constitutional interpreters—the analytical and rhetorical moves that are familiar in debates over public policy and political morality but are considered out of bounds in debates over constitutional meaning. In this Article, we seek to identify the “anti-modalities” of …

Janus-Faced Judging: How The Supreme Court Is Radically Weakening Stare Decisis, Michael Gentithes

William & Mary Law Review

Drastic changes in Supreme Court doctrine require citizens to reorder their affairs rapidly, undermining their trust in the judiciary. Stare decisis has traditionally limited the pace of such change on the Court. It is a bulwark against wholesale jurisprudential reversals. But, in recent years, the stare decisis doctrine has come under threat.

With little public or scholarly notice, the Supreme Court has radically weakened stare decisis in two ways. First, the Court has reversed its long-standing view that a precedent, regardless of the quality of its reasoning, should stand unless there is some special, practical justification to overrule it. Recent …

2019-2020 Annual Report: Roger Williams University School Of Law, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Robot Criminals, Ying Hu

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

When a robot harms humans, are there any grounds for holding it criminally liable for its misconduct? Yes, provided that the robot is capable of making, acting on, and communicating the reasons behind its moral decisions. If such a robot fails to observe the minimum moral standards that society requires of it, labeling it as a criminal can effectively fulfill criminal law’s function of censuring wrongful conduct and alleviating the emotional harm that may be inflicted on human victims.

Imposing criminal liability on robots does not absolve robot manufacturers, trainers, or owners of their individual criminal liability. The former is …

Transparency And Algorithmic Governance, Cary Coglianese, David Lehr

All Faculty Scholarship

Machine-learning algorithms are improving and automating important functions in medicine, transportation, and business. Government officials have also started to take notice of the accuracy and speed that such algorithms provide, increasingly relying on them to aid with consequential public-sector functions, including tax administration, regulatory oversight, and benefits administration. Despite machine-learning algorithms’ superior predictive power over conventional analytic tools, algorithmic forecasts are difficult to understand and explain. Machine learning’s “black-box” nature has thus raised concern: Can algorithmic governance be squared with legal principles of governmental transparency? We analyze this question and conclude that machine-learning algorithms’ relative inscrutability does not pose a …

On Dancy’S Account Of Practical Reasoning, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that makes the reasoning practical. I trace his argument, suggest improvements to its superficial deficiencies, and conclude that it fails because Dancy misunderstands the nature of reasoning.

Myth, Inference And Evidence In Sexual Assault Trials, Lisa Dufraimont

Articles & Book Chapters

In sexual assault cases, the ability to distinguish myths and stereotypes from legitimate lines of reasoning continues to be a challenge for Canadian courts. The author argues that this challenge could be overcome by clearly identifying problematic inferences in sexual assault cases as prohibited lines of reasoning, while allowing the defence to bring forward evidence that is logically relevant to the material issues so long as it does not raise these prohibited inferences.

This paper advances that judges should take a broad view of relevance as an evidentiary approach in the adjudication of sexual assault cases. This approach allows for …

Function, Form, And Strawberries: Subverting Langdell, Jeremiah A. Ho

Faculty Publications

Beyond this Part I Introduction, Part II will briefly summarize why the Langdell tradition is at heart a learning model that intrinsically marginalizes active learning and exalts only a limited experience of skills teaching and acquisition and will conclude that the Langdellian tradition creates a hierarchy that juxtaposes knowledge of legal doctrine over skills. Part III will demonstrate a method for law teachers to incorporate skills teaching actively in the classroom, and do so in a way that legitimizes legal reasoning skills and elevates the teaching and learning of skills. Hopefully, as the Conclusion points out, the new normative in …

Supreme Court, New York County, Uhlfelder V. Weinshall, David Schoenhaar

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Normativity: The Place Of Reasoning, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

It is more or less common ground that an important aspect of the explanation of normativity relates it to the way Reason (our rational powers), reasons (for beliefs, emotions, actions, etc.) and reasoning, with all its varieties and domains, are inter-connected. The relation of reasoning to reasons is the topic of this this paper. It does not start from a tabula rasa. It presupposes that normativity has to do with the ability to respond rationally to reasons, and with responding to reasons with the use of our rational powers. The question is where does reasoning fit in?

I will compare …

Lower Court Compliance With Supreme Court Remands, Elise Borochoff

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Thinking, Big And Small, Stephen B. Burbank

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Reading Kahneman's book and thinking about a tribute to Ed Cooper that has more substance than a bouquet have caused me to reflect on a phenomenon within the world of legal scholarship. I would call it a cognate phenomenon, but that would dishonor the empirical basis of Kahneman's work by suggesting a firmer basis for my reflections than the power of analogical reasoning. The phenomenon is the view that the goal of legal scholarship is or should be big ideas, particularly if they can claim the mantle of theory, rather than small ideas, particularly if they can be tarred with …

When Socrates Meets Confucius: Teaching Creative And Critical Thinking Across Cultures Through Multilevel Socratic Method, Erin Ryan

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Taking Ownership Of Legal Outcomes: An Argument Against Dissociation Paradigm And Analytical Gaming, Ali Khan

Ali Khan

This article argues that professional responsibilities arise within the connectionist web of laws, ethics, and personal conscience. Lawyers, judges, and law professors must not renounce personal responsibility in providing professional services. Willful reasoning derived from personal conscience alone, however, cannot be the driver of legitimate reasoning. Legal professionals must pursue cognitive coherence by connecting personal responsibility with the knowledge of laws and ethics. Lawyers must not accept the dissociation paradigm that forces them to game the system or surrender personal responsibility in serving clients. Judges must not accept the dissociation paradigm that forces them to game legal reasoning or serve …

Legal Reasoning And Scientific Reasoning, Phoebe C. Ellsworth

Articles

In my presentation for the 2010 Meador Lectures on Rationality, I chose to compare legal reasoning and scientific reasoning. Both law and science pride themselves on the rationality of their intellectual methods and believe that those methods are designed to analyze questions and reach the correct conclusions by means of reason, free from cognitive or emotional biases. Of course, both law and science often fall short of this ideal at all levels, from the decisions about individual legal cases or scientific studies to the acceptance of general theories. In many ways, the biases that mislead legal and scientific thinkers are …

Judges And Religious-Based Reasoning, David Blaikie, Diana Ginn

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

Is it ever acceptable for a judge in a secular liberal democracy to rely on, and explicitly refer to, religious-based reasoning in reaching a decision? While it is unlikely that many Canadian judges will be seized with the desire to include religious-based reasoning in their judgments, we raise this issue because it allows us to examine the appropriate role of religious-based discourse in a challenging context, where arguments about unconstitutionality are strongest. In a previous article, we concluded that there are no ethical impediments to citizens using such discourse in discussing public affairs. We argued that it is no less …

When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Constitutional theory lacks an account of when each of the familiar sources of authority-text, original meaning, precedent, and so on-should be given weight. The dominant tendency is to regard all sources as potentially applicable in every case. In contrast, this Article proposes that each source of authority is pertinent in some categories of cases but not in others, much as a physical tool is appropriate for some but not all kinds of household tasks. The Article then applies this approach to identify the categories of cases in which original meaning is, or is not, a valid factor in constitutional decisionmaking.

Double-Consciousness In Constitutional Adjudication, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Constitutional theorists are familiar with epistemic and consequentialist reasons why judges might allow their decision making to be shaped by strongly held public opinion. The epistemic approach treats public opinion as an expert indicator, while the consequentialistapproach counsels judges to compromise legally correct interpretations so as not to antagonize a hostile public. But there is also a third reason, which we can think ofas constitutive. In limited circumstances, the fact that the public strongly holds a given view can be one of the factors that together constitute the correct answer to a constitutional question. In those circumstances, what the public …

Logic For Law Students: How To Think Like A Lawyer, Stephen Clowney

Stephen Clowney

Judicial Power And Mobilizable History, Richard A. Primus

Articles

One contribution that law professors can make to constitutional discourse, I suggest, is the nurturing of new mobilizable histories. A "mobilizable history," as I will use the term, is a narrative, image, or other historical source that is sufficiently well-known to the community of constitutional decisionmakers so as to be able to support a credible argument in the discourse of constitutional law. It draws upon materials that are within the collective memory of constitutional interpreters; indeed, a necessary step in nurturing a new mobilizable history is to introduce new information into that collective memory or to raise the prominence of …

The Authoritative Moment: Exploring The Boundaries Of Interpretation In The Recognition Of Queer Families, Kris Franklin

Articles & Chapters

This article examines the boundaries of judicial interpretation as courts struggle to define the families formed by lesbians, gay men and transexuals. It compares the jurisprudence of numerous state courts examining queer families in different contexts. The article identifies three interwoven components of judicial reasoning: "lex" reasoning, grounded in the jurisdiction's binding and persuasive law; factual reasoning in which the courts must categorize queer families as analogous to those the law already recognizes or instead as something quite new and distinct; and finally methodological reasoning, in which courts self-consciously examine the boundaries of their own interpretive authority. Showing that in …

Against Dictionaries: Using Analogical Reasoning To Achieve A More Restrained Textualism, Jason Weinstein

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that new textualists should abandon dictionaries as a source for legal interpretation. Textualists believe in restricting judges to the intent discernible from the words of a statute and contend that legislative history is unacceptable as a source of this intention. Both of these sentiments lead textualists to dictionaries as the intuitively correct solution for ambiguities in a text. The author argues, however, that dictionaries by their very nature cannot help discern between reasonable definitions at the margins of meaning. The use of dictionaries in these situations allows for a sham formalism, unrestrictive in result and unrevealing of …

The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology In Legal Deliberation And Negotiation, Erin Ryan

Scholarly Publications

All lawyers negotiate, and all negotiators deliberate. This article addresses the pervasive but unrefined use of emotional insight by deliberating and negotiating lawyers, and suggests that legal education could improve lawyering by adopting a fuller model of legal thinking that takes account of this "epistemological emotionality." In forming the beliefs that underlie choices made during deliberation and negotiation, people rely on insights informed by past and present emotional experience. Such epistemological emotionality fuels a pre-linguistic, quasi-inductive reasoning process that enables us to draw on stored information about emotional phenomena to hypothesize about motives, behavior, and potential consequences. As deliberation moves …

Creativity And The Law, Alfred C. Aman Jr.

Alfred Aman Jr. (1991-2002)

No abstract provided.

Inside The Judicial Mind, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The quality of the judicial system depends upon the quality of decisions that judges make. Even the most talented and dedicated judges surely make occasional mistakes, but the public understandably expects judges to avoid systematic errors. This expectation, however, might be unrealistic. Psychologists who study human judgment and choice have learned that people frequently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in judgment. Even though judges are experienced, well-trained, and highly motivated decision makers, they might be vulnerable to cognitive illusions. We report the results of an empirical study designed to determine whether five common cognitive illusions (anchoring, …

Thinking Critically About Equality: Government Can Make Us Equal, Robert L. Hayman, Nancy Levit

Nancy Levit

As kids we called it having to use the old noodle: needing to think real hard about something that was real hard to think about. It was the kind of thinking that would cause your face to get all scrunched up, and if you didn't stop or if someone didn't stop you - it would eventually make your head hurt. The expression came from our families when we figured something out: that's using your old noodle, they'd tell us. The noodle we eventually understood to be our brains, which, we reckon, do look something like noodles, though we were quite …

Thinking Critically About Equality: Government Can Make Us Equal, Robert L. Hayman, Nancy Levit

Faculty Works

As kids we called it having to use the old noodle: needing to think real hard about something that was real hard to think about. It was the kind of thinking that would cause your face to get all scrunched up, and if you didn't stop or if someone didn't stop you - it would eventually make your head hurt. The expression came from our families when we figured something out: that's using your old noodle, they'd tell us. The noodle we eventually understood to be our brains, which, we reckon, do look something like noodles, though we were quite …