Law Commons^™

Private Equity's Governance Advantage: A Requiem, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

Private equity’s original purpose was to optimize companies’ governance and operations. Reuniting ownership and control in corporate America, the leveraged buyout (or the mere threat thereof) undoubtedly helped reform management practices in a broad swath of U.S. companies. Due to mounting competitive pressures, however, private equity is finding relatively fewer underperforming companies to fix. This is particularly true of U.S. public companies, which are continuously dogged by activist hedge funds and other empowered shareholders looking for any sign of slack.

In response, private equity is shifting its center of gravity away from governance reform, towards a dizzying array of new …

A Complete View Of The Cathedral: Claims Of Tortious Interference And The Specific Performance Remedy In Mergers And Acquisitions Litigation, Luke Nikas, Paul B. Maslo

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

A bank promises to lend several billion dollars to fund a buyer’s purchase of a target company. The buyer enters into a merger agreement with the target. Thereafter, the economy plummets, and the bank decides that breaching its contract with the buyer will cost less than performing. The buyer seeks specific performance. The target also sues the bank, alleging tortious interference with the merger agreement. Billions of dollars are on the line. This is the reality lived by many investment banks that committed to fund leveraged buyouts during the recent economic downturn. Most of these matters were resolved in private …

Creatively Financed Legal Education In A Marketized Environment: How Faculty Leveraged Buyouts Can Maximize Law Schools’ Stakeholder Values, David Groshoff

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

“This [financial aid] money is not necessarily going to educate more students or to improve education. It’s a scholarship ultimately going into profits.”1

The 2007 Private Equity Bust: Re-Contextualizing Material Adverse Change Clauses In A Credit-Stricken Market, Justin L. Browder

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

Harmonizing The Policy Of The Bankruptcy Code And Article 9, Edwin E. Smith, Elizabeth Warren, James J. White

Other Publications

In a true sense bankruptcy law--at least as represented by the 1978 Code--is in conflict, not in harmony, with Article 9. To a considerable degree (perhaps more than they realize) debtors and unsecured creditors got things they wanted from Congress by the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. It is doubtful that that Act could have been passed in any Congress before or since. In many ways, the rights of the debtor and of the unsecured creditors have been cut back since the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.

Applying Fraudulent Conveyance Law To Leveraged Buyouts, Raymond J. Blackwood

Duke Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Carryforward Of Net Operating Losses And Other Tax Attributes After Bankruptcy Reorganizations., Martin M. Van Brauman

St. Mary's Law Journal

When stock is exchanged for debt in a bankruptcy reorganization, potentially abusive tax situations can result if the reorganization occurs strictly for the carryforward of tax attributes to the acquiring corporation. The basic question is to what extent the discharge of indebtedness provisions, the application of the various statutory and judicial requirements, and the consolidated return regulations prohibit or restrict the carryforward of the tax history of the debtor corporation. Bankruptcy reorganization for a corporation under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code can take the form of either a recapitalization or a reorganization. Because a “G” reorganization involves a discharge …

Resolving The Conflict Of Interest In Management Buyouts, Bill Shaw

Hofstra Law Review

No abstract provided.

Introduction—The Biggest Deal Ever, Deborah A. Demott

Duke Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory In A Time Of Restructuring, William W. Bratton Jr.

Duke Law Journal

No abstract provided.