Law Commons^™

Cross-Listed Firms And Shareholder-Initiated Lawsuits: The Market Penalties Of Securities Class Action Lawsuits Against Foreign Firms, Kathryn Mary Schumann

Doctoral Dissertations

This paper examines the market penalties levied by shareholders against firms that are alleged to have violated securities laws within the U.S. Using a sample of private securities class action cases brought against foreign firms that cross-list on the major U.S. exchanges, this paper presents evidence that the enforcement risk criticism may not be as severe as initially thought. I examine market penalties at alleged violation disclosure dates and securities class action filing dates and find that each event corresponds to an economically and statistically significant loss of value for the accused firm. On average I find that the violation …

The Chameleon Effect: Beyond The Bonding Hypothesis For Cross-Listed Securities, Cally Jordan

ExpressO

This paper is based on a presentation made at the New York Stock Exchange Conference on the Future of Global Equity Trading, March 12, 2004, Sarasota, FL.

Looking back, was it a momentary enthusiasm? The dramatic increase in cross-listed securities, particularly in the United States, was one of the remarkable phenomena of the 1990s capital markets. The bonding, or corporate governance, hypothesis was one of the more intriguing theories to surface to explain the phenomenon. Cross-listing, the hypothesis suggested, might be a bonding mechanism by which firms, incorporated in a jurisdiction with “weak protection” of minority shareholder rights or poor …