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Articles 31 - 60 of 184
Full-Text Articles in Law
Section 2 Enforcement And The Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (Gdp), Alan J. Meese
Section 2 Enforcement And The Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (Gdp), Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
The Great Recession has provoked calls for more vigorous regulation in all sectors, including antitrust enforcement. After President Obama took office, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice abandoned the Bush Administration’s standard of liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids unlawful monopolization, as insufficiently interventionist. Based on the premise that similarly lax antitrust enforcement caused and deepened the Great Depression, the Obama Administration outlined a more intrusive and consumer-focused approach to section 2 enforcement as part of a larger national strategy to combat the “extreme” economic crisis the nation was then facing.
This Essay draws …
Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese
Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
Most scholars would agree that a merger between General Motors and Ford should not be judged solely by Delaware corporate law, even if both firms are incorporated in Delaware. Leaving the standards governing such mergers to state law would assuredly produce a race to the bottom that would result in unduly permissive treatment of such transactions. Similarly, if the two firms agreed to divide markets, most would agree that some regulatory authority other than Michigan or Delaware should have the final word on the agreement. Thus, in order to forestall monopoly or its equivalent, the national government must itself exercise …
Reframing The (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare And Total Welfare, Alan J. Meese
Reframing The (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare And Total Welfare, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
This Article critiques the role that the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare” that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine. The Article contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the debate between those who would equate “consumer welfare” with “total welfare” and those who equate consumer welfare with “purchaser welfare.” In particular, the model excludes, by fiat, the fact that new efficiencies free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output and thus the welfare of purchasers in those markets. Moreover, the model also assumes that both …
Reframing Antitrust In Light Of Scientific Revolution: Accounting For Transaction Costs In Rule Of Reason Analysis, Alan J. Meese
Reframing Antitrust In Light Of Scientific Revolution: Accounting For Transaction Costs In Rule Of Reason Analysis, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
This Article contends that modern rule of reason analysis, informed by workable competition’s partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm, is suitable for evaluating only a subset of agreements that may reduce transaction costs. The Article distinguishes between “technological” and “non-technological” transaction costs. Technological transaction costs entail the bargaining and information costs first emphasized by Ronald Coase, while non-technological transaction costs result from more fundamental departures from perfect competition, departures creating a risk of opportunism that accompanies relationship-specific investments. Modern law does accurately assess restraints that may reduce technological transaction costs—costs that are analogous to the sort of production costs recognized by the …
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure optimal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some scholars reject both approaches, …
Property, Aspen, And Refusals To Deal, Alan J. Meese
Property, Aspen, And Refusals To Deal, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Premerger Review And Bankruptcy: The Meaning Of Section 363(B)(2), Robert B. Greenbaum, Alan J. Meese
Premerger Review And Bankruptcy: The Meaning Of Section 363(B)(2), Robert B. Greenbaum, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Price Theory And Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, Alan J. Meese
Price Theory And Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has exerted a strong influence over the law of vertical restraints in the past two decades, leading the Supreme Court to abandon much of its traditional hostility toward such agreements. Chicago's success has provoked a vigorous response from Populists, who support the traditional approach. Chicago, Populists claim, has improperly relied upon neoclassical price theory to inform the normative and descriptive assumptions that drive its analysis of trade restraints generally and of vertical restraints in particular. This reliance is misplaced, Populists assert, because the real world departs from that portrayed by price-theoretic models and, at …
Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese
Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese
Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
Challenging traditional antitrust jurisprudence, Professor Alan J. Meese argues that the present structure of Rule of Reason analysis, applied pursuant to Standard Oil v. United States, has become outdated. The Rule of Reason as currently applied by the courts rests upon neoclassical price theory, an economic paradigm that assumes that legitimate competition consists of unbridled technological rivalry, unconstrained by nonstandard contracts. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to apply a competing paradigm- Transaction Cost Economics-when determining whether a contract is unreasonable "per se" or instead deserving of Rule of Reason scrutiny. Professor Meese argues that Transaction Cost Economics more …
Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese
Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese
Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Intrabrand Restraints And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Intrabrand Restraints And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
In Praise Of All Or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject The Quick Look, Alan J. Meese
In Praise Of All Or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject The Quick Look, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Farewell To The Quick Look: Redefining The Scope And Content Of The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese
Farewell To The Quick Look: Redefining The Scope And Content Of The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Economic Theory, Trader Freedom And Consumer Welfare: State Oil Co. V. Khan And The Continuing Incoherence Of Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
Economic Theory, Trader Freedom And Consumer Welfare: State Oil Co. V. Khan And The Continuing Incoherence Of Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …
Competition Policy And The Great Depression: Lessons Learned And A New Way Forward, Alan J. Meese
Competition Policy And The Great Depression: Lessons Learned And A New Way Forward, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
The recent Great Recession has shaken the nation’s faith in free markets and inspired various forms of actual or proposed regulatory intervention displacing free competition. Proponents of such intervention often claim that such interference with free-market outcomes will help foster economic recovery and thus macroeconomic stability by, for instance, enhancing the “purchasing power” of workers or reducing consumer prices. Such arguments for increased economic centralization echo those made during the Great Depression, when proponents of regulatory intervention claimed that such interference with economic liberty and free competition, including suspension of the antitrust laws, was necessary to foster economic recovery. Indeed, …
Competition And Market Failure In The Antitrust Jurisprudence Of Justice Stevens, Alan J. Meese
Competition And Market Failure In The Antitrust Jurisprudence Of Justice Stevens, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance Is Misguided And Futile, Alan J. Meese
Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance Is Misguided And Futile, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), the Supreme Court reversed Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), which had banned minimum resale price maintenance (“minimum RPM”) as unlawful per se. For many, Leegin was a straightforward exercise of the Court’s long-recognized authority, implied by the Sherman Act’s rule of reason, to adjust antitrust doctrine in light of new economic learning. In particular, Leegin invoked the teachings of transaction cost economics (“TCE”), which holds that many non-standard agreements, including minimum RPM, are voluntary mechanisms …
Antitrust, Regulatory Harm, And Economic Liberty, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust, Regulatory Harm, And Economic Liberty, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
A Careful Examination Of The Live Nation-Ticketmaster Merger, Barak D. Richman, Alan J. Meese
A Careful Examination Of The Live Nation-Ticketmaster Merger, Barak D. Richman, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
As great admirers of The Boss and as fans of live entertainment, we share in the popular dismay over rising ticket prices for live performances. But we have been asked as antitrust scholars to examine the proposed merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster, and we do so with the objectivity and honesty called for by The Boss’s quotes above. The proposed merger has been the target of aggressive attacks from several industry commentators and popular figures, but the legal and policy question is whether the transaction is at odds with the nation’s antitrust laws.
One primary source of concern to …
Antitrust Federalism And State Restraints Of Interstate Commerce: An Essay For Herbert Hovenkamp, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Federalism And State Restraints Of Interstate Commerce: An Essay For Herbert Hovenkamp, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Labor Unions In The Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, Davison M. Douglas
Labor Unions In The Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, Davison M. Douglas
Davison M. Douglas
No abstract provided.