Law Commons^™

Wasting The Corporate Waste Doctrine: Why Waste Claims Are Obsolete In Delaware Corporate Law And Why The Waste Doctrine Is The Wrong Solution To The Problem Of Executive Compensation, Kris S. Swift

Kris S. Swift

Abstract

Kristen S. Swift

This Note makes several points, drawn from Delaware litigation history, on the futility of pleading corporate waste in Delaware. At inception, the waste doctrine was a tool for shareholder protection and empowerment; however, as calculated business risk became encouraged and later formally protected by the business judgment rule, the waste doctrine evolved to protect officers and boards and now sets a nearly impossible benchmark for misconduct that would allow shareholders to recover on a waste claim. The waste doctrine is inextricably tied to how business risk-taking is perceived by Delaware courts and shifting attitudes toward risk …

10 Things That Tick Off The Chancellors, And The Ethical Issues They Raise, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

The Duty To Think Strategically, Nadelle Grossman

Louisiana Law Review

Under Delaware corporate law, directors and officers have a duty to oversee their firm's management of risk to limit losses. Corporate law does not, however, require directors or officers to oversee their firm's management of strategy to create gains. Yet, managing both risk and strategy is essential to a firm in creating value. In fact, as I argue in the Article, the current focus by courts and commentators only on risk management to prevent losses could actually undermine a firm's management of its strategy for gains. I therefore propose a model for how Delaware corporate law can drive firms to …

Recent Developments In Delaware Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh, Faiza Saeed, Mark Gentile

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

The Law Of Corporate Purpose, David Yosifon

David G. Yosifon

Delaware corporate law requires corporate directors to manage firms for the benefit of shareholders, and not for any other constituency. Delaware jurists have been clear about this in their case law, and they are not coy about it in extra-judicial settings, such as speeches directed at law students and practicing members of the corporate bar. Nevertheless, the reader of leading corporate law scholarship is continually exposed to the scholarly assertion that the law is ambiguous or ambivalent on this point, or even that case law affirmatively empowers directors to pursue non-shareholder interests. It is shocking, and troubling, for corporate law …

Delaware's Non-Waivable Duties, Lyman P. Q. Johnson

Lyman P. Q. Johnson

This Article disputes the view - seemingly settled among scholars, judges, and lawyers - that recently - enacted statutes in Delaware legally permit fiduciary duties to be waived in noncorporate business associations. The argument is a rarity in business law because it is a constitutional argument, not one initially based on policy considerations or statutory interpretation, and it seeks to harmonize judicial review of fiduciary duties in noncorporate businesses with that in Delaware corporations, where waivers are not permitted. Delaware’s Constitution vests the Delaware Court of Chancery with general equity jurisdiction and powers of a kind that cannot be curtailed …

Good Faith In Revlon-Land, Christopher M. Bruner

Christopher M. Bruner

The Delaware Supreme Court has set a very high hurdle for plaintiffs challenging directors' good faith in the sale of a company. In Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan, the court held that unconflicted directors could be found to have breached the good faith component of their duty of loyalty in the transactional context only if they "knowingly and completely failed to undertake," and "utterly failed to attempt" to discharge their duties. In this essay I argue that the Lyondell standard effectively imports into the transactional context the exacting standard previously applied in the oversight context — a move clearly aimed …

How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist

Ian D. Ghrist

This article applies ideas from the Law and Economics movement to the D.C. Circuit's 2011 decision in Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission. The article lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis that, if followed, should increase new rules' chances of surviving the heightened arbitrary and capricious review standard imposed by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.

The Dodd-Frank Act comprises the broadest financial reforms since the 1930s. The Act, however, makes surprisingly few important decisions and instead, almost exclusively defers to agency rulemaking or the creation of a new organization. The Act mandates the promulgation of …